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ABSTRACT  
   
In nineteenth-century France, in rural areas, women washed laundry in the 
nearest streams or in the sea and hung the linens where they could, on lavender 
bushes, rocks and grass fields, where it had a quaint, if not artistic quality. In 
villages, laundresses washed linens in fountains, or other water sources, which 
were often found at or near the center of town. In either case, laundresses operated 
in public spaces without problem. I argue that, in Paris, changing ideas about the 
functioning of city space, the management of public hygiene and decisions about 
the use of public space, made laundresses and laundry operations matter out of 
place in the city. This study will demonstrate the changes laundering and 
laundresses underwent during the nineteenth century in Paris, making them out of 
place. City administrators and public health officials changed the occupation and 
places where laundry could be done as they sought to render laundry and 
laundresses invisible within Paris. In the early nineteenth century the Préfet de la 
Seine forbade women from using the river banks. In the mid-nineteenth century 
complaints about the disgraceful aspect of women laundering on the river 
prompted the Préfet to try to eliminate bateaux-lavoirs. In the late nineteenth 
century the discovery of microbes focused attention on laundry and laundresses 
and their potential to transmit diseases prompting another wave of hygiene 
regulations and questions about closing bateaux-lavoirs and lavoirs. The Préfet 
and Conseil d'Hygiène's struggle to make them invisible by moving them into 
approved facilities continued until the end of the nineteenth century. Studying 
laundresses and laundry sheds light on how the shifts in politics, changes in 
  ii 
acceptable uses of public space and public hygiene affected working women. It 
illustrates the manner in which public hygiene- the Conseil de Salubrité and later 
the Conseil d'Hygiène, functioned and to what degree they could demand changes 
to the city in the name of hygiene. Through identifying subtle policy shifts, 
historians may learn how laundry demonstrates policies on the use of urban space, 
public hygiene or issues about work. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 Washing laundry has been a visible activity. In rural areas, women washed 
laundry in the nearest streams or in the sea and hung the linens where they could, 
on lavender bushes, rocks and grass fields, where it had a quaint, if not artistic 
quality. In villages, laundresses washed linens in fountains, or other water 
sources, which were often found at or near the center of town. In either case, 
laundresses operated in public spaces without problem.1 The laundresses’ 
presence in many novels, paintings and postcards attested to their visibility.2   
 Studying laundresses and laundry sheds light on how the shifts in politics, 
changes in acceptable uses of public space and public hygiene affected working 
women, specifically those doing laundry in public, on bateaux-lavoirs and in 
public facilities, lavoirs.  Furthermore, it illustrates the manner in which public 
hygiene, the Conseil de Salubrité and later the Conseil d’Hygiène, functioned and 
to what degree the officials could demand changes to the city in the name of 
hygiene. It shows how politicians, the Conseil de Salubrité, and the Conseil 
d’Hygiène, with their prejudices about poor women in public space, sought to 
render laundresses persona non grata in Paris. In addition, an examination of 
laundresses and laundry in Paris is significant, as it reveals how new ideas about 
                                                 
1 Françoise Wasserman, Blanchisseuse, laveuse, repasseuse: La Femme, le linge 
et l’eau (Fresnes: Écomusée de Fresnes, 1986), 1-5.  
 
2 Émile Zola, L’Assommoir, Trans. Margaret Mauldon, 1877, reprint (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998). Paintings of Edgard Degas: Blanchisseuse 
souffrant des dents 1872, Les Blanchisseuses 1874, Les Repasseuses 1884. 
Painting of Honoré Daumier : La blanchisseuse, 1860-1861.  
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public space changed the acceptable uses of the river Seine – a natural resource 
within the city – and greatly reduced access for people that depended on it. 
Closing free access to a natural resource like water cut off the poorest who could 
not afford to pay for it when city administrators privileged corporate use. Once 
the Préfet de la Seine – prefect appointed by the head of state who was in charge 
of the administration of the Seine department – eliminated free places to wash, the 
city did not provide alternatives and had to contend with women in illegal places. 
Studying laundry from written historical sources necessitated the study of public 
policy. It is only from identifying subtle policy shifts that historians may learn 
how laundry illustrates policies on the use of urban space, public hygiene or 
issues about work.  
I argue that changing ideas about the functioning of city space, the 
management of public hygiene and decisions about the use public space, made 
laundresses and laundry operations matter out of place in the city. 3 This study 
will demonstrate the changes laundering and laundresses underwent during the 
nineteenth century in Paris, making them out of place. City administrators and 
public health officials changed the occupation and places where laundry could be 
done as they sought to render laundry – a traditionally visible activity carried out 
in public space – and laundresses invisible within Paris through various means. In 
                                                 
 
3 The term city administrators refers to the Préfet de la Seine, Préfet de Police, 
public hygienists and engineers who oversaw and regulated Paris. Mary Douglas 
articulated the concept of “matter out of place” in anthropological terms in Purity 
and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo (London: 
Routledge, 1966, 2001). 
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the early nineteenth century the Préfet de la Seine forbade women from using the 
river banks. In the mid-nineteenth century complaints about the disgraceful aspect 
of women doing laundry outside in the river prompted the Préfet to study the 
question of eliminating bateaux-lavoirs – laundry boats that resembled a barge 
that was connected to the river bank by a stairway or system of pontoons and 
lashed to the banks on the river Seine.4 The solution to the problem laundresses 
and their occupation in public space raised consisted in moving the operation 
indoors and into private space. The city administrators sought to construct a 
different meaning – and thus use – for the space directly connected with the river 
Seine. Making laundry operations forbidden in public space affected laundresses 
themselves in different ways, primarily by limiting their choices and driving them 
into uncomfortable and unsafe places for laundering. In the late nineteenth 
century the discovery of microbes focused attention on laundresses and their 
potential to transmit diseases. The Préfet and Conseil d’Hygiène’s struggle to 
make them invisible by moving them into approved facilities continued until the 
end of the nineteenth century.  
The acceptance of laundry in public spaces changed in the nineteenth 
century in urban locations as poor women in the city faced challenges in 
laundering that women in rural areas did not have to contend with. Paris is an 
ideal city to study changes in the use of public space that affected the laundresses 
so much. As Donald Olsen points out, Paris was “a deliberate artistic creation 
                                                 
4 All translations in this dissertation are my own. The technical aspects of the 
laundering process are discussed at the beginning of chapter one.  
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intended not merely to give pleasure but to contain ideas, inculcate values, and 
serve as tangible expressions of systems of thought and morality.”5 France is also 
a centralized state; Paris serves as an example and a leader for the rest of the 
nation. Paris was also different from other cities in France during the nineteenth 
century. Its system of administration made it, according to David Jordan, “a state 
within a state” with its own Prefecture and administration separate from the 
bureaucratic structure of other cities and departments.6 Therefore, Paris lends 
itself as a city that may be studied on its own terms separate from other 
governmental structures and as a leader of innovations for the nation. This 
dissertation will examine the different and complicated processes of laundry and 
the unique obstacles that arose while doing laundry in an urban environment, 
specifically Paris. 
Beginning in the Napoleonic era through the Third Republic, 1800-1914, 
laundry and laundresses represented a problem in Paris. Executed in various 
locales with a focus on the river Seine, the laundry process raised several issues 
about the use of public space, associated with urbanization. Each time period 
produced different strategies to resolve the problems raised by laundry in public 
space. First, city administrators in the Napoleonic era connected laundry hanging 
on the banks of the river and buildings and women using the river with poverty. 
An ordonnance from the Préfet de la Seine in 1805 made laundering on the river 
                                                 
5 Donald Olsen, The city as a work of art (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1986), 4.  
 
6 David Jordan, Transforming Paris: The Life and Labors of Baron Haussmann, 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995) 25.  
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banks illegal in view of the increasing river traffic.7 From the early nineteenth 
century, making traffic on the river more fluid reflected the new political goals of 
the city to make commerce more efficient in the industrial age. City 
Administrators supported private businesses using the Seine and wished to limit 
the women’s free use of the river. Then, during the Second Empire, Baron 
Georges Eugène Haussmann, as Préfet de la Seine, sought to create the river as a 
thoroughfare for commercial traffic, not a static place with businesses parked on 
the banks; he enlisted the help of mayors of the arrondissements, engineers, and 
the Conseil de Salubrité. Later, in the 1880s, the Conseil d’Hygiène wanted to 
relocate the women for reasons of public health. Moving the laundresses indoors 
and eventually eliminating small lavoirs, would only leave industrial 
blanchisseries that could integrate all the prescriptions Conseil de Salubrité 
proposed to protect public health against cholera outbreaks8. Further, as Victoria 
Thompson has shown, ideas about gender made women out of place in public 
spaces.9 Influenced by gendered notions which disapproved of women occupying 
public space, social commentators and the artistic discourse about the 
laundresses’ visibility placed them discursively little above a prostitute. 
                                                 
7 APP, DA 336 Navigation, Ordonnance du 19 floréal An XIII (9 mai 1805). 
 
8 The lavoirs were small sheltered laundry facilities on the ground, which were 
open to the public and did not have machines. The blanchisseries were the 
facilities the more affluent clients used; they were the largest facilities, housed 
every process under one roof, and included some machinery like spinning 
machines to help dry the clothes; these facilities primarily employed women – the 
blanchisseuses. The buanderies were laundry facilities using steam (from the 
word buée – condensation).  
 
9 Victoria Thompson, The Virtuous Marketplace: Women and Men, Money and 
Politics in Paris, 1830-1870 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press), 5.  
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Consequently, city officials from the Napoleonic era to the end of the nineteenth 
century no longer found it acceptable for laundry to be done publicly in Paris and 
sought diverse methods to solve the problem.  
 This study will incorporate different methodologies, including 
anthropology and social history, to examine laundresses and the laundry business 
in nineteenth-century Paris. The anthropologist Mary Douglas argued that in a 
society the label of polluter was synonymous with something that no longer fit 
into the accepted social schema and was “matter out of place”.10 Douglas 
underlined that ideas about pollution and social taboo are influenced by a given 
cultural and social context and thus are constantly changing. New considerations 
in nineteenth-century Paris rendered laundry and laundresses literally “matter out 
of place…as ordering involves rejecting inappropriate elements”.11 Cultures 
signify elements that are out of place as polluters of space. Douglas used 
examples of things occupying spaces different to which they belonged, which 
illustrated the phenomenon, i.e., “bedroom things in the living room and out-
doors things indoors”.12 When city administrators attempted to make laundry and 
laundresses invisible, beginning in the early nineteenth century, because they 
were matter out of place, they used the idea that the laundresses and laundering 
were polluting Paris. From the Napoleonic era through the Third Republic, 1800-
1914 city administrators were attempting to create new meanings for public 
                                                 




12 Ibid., 37.  
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spaces around the Seine; however, the laundresses continued to use that space. 
Laundresses also opened what the Conseil d’Hygiène termed as clandestine 
laundry boutiques that were nearly impossible for the Conseil to regulate. These 
situations exemplify Michel de Certeau’s premise, in The Practice of Everyday 
Life, that there were practices outside the ability of city administrators to regulate; 
thus, they could not control all uses and meanings of space in a city.13 The quest 
to forbid the use of public space to hang laundry continues to the present day.14 Of 
course, when the Préfet de la Seine closed a bateau-lavoir there was little the 
women could do, although what the Conseil d’Hygiène termed clandestine 
laundry boutiques began opening in the 1870s when controls on lavoirs made 
them difficult to open within Paris which illustrates de Certeau’s point that people 
will use space in ways that suit their needs.  
Further, this study is influenced by social history, which focuses on 
ordinary people and their experiences. Laundry was a visible symbol of women’s 
presence in the city. I will use the tools of social history, taking into account 
economics and social class to uncover the forces driving the administrators who 
                                                 
13 Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life. trans Steven Rendall 
(Berkeley: University of  California Press, 1984), 95. 
 
14 L'étendage de linge interdit à Reillanne. Retrieved on 03.23.2011. 
http://www.ladepeche.fr/article/2010/12/03/962272-Bouches-du-Rhone-L-
etendage-de-linge-interdit-a-Reillanne.html 
It has been forbidden to hang laundry out since the nineteenth century, now 
people wish to hang laundry out for economic or ecological reasons and it is 
illegal according to the appeals court. « Depuis le 1e décembre 2010, il est interdit 
d'étendre son linge dans le village de Reillanne. Le tribunal administratif de 
Marseille a décidé de rejeter le recours déposé par un habitant contre un arrêté 
municipal interdisant l'étendage du linge dans l'espace public. »  
  8 
changed the occupation over the nineteenth century and the responses to those 
changes. Women’s history is influenced by the history of everyday life, which in 
many cases is the only method to uncover women’s participation in history. For 
example Rachel Fuchs, in Poor and Pregnant in Paris: Strategies for Survival in 
the Nineteenth Century, brought to light poor women’s influence on the political 
policies and practices of the Third Republic.15 Sonya Rose, in Limited 
Livelihoods: Gender and Class in Nineteenth-Century England, uncovered the 
ways ideas about gender roles had kept women in the lowest skilled and lowest 
paid work.16  
Additionally, the incorporation of cultural history methodology, the study 
of how meaning is constructed, is crucial in examining language and actions to 
identify power structures and attitudes regarding the laundresses and laundry. 
Laundresses and laundry were at the center of debates about the meaning and use 
of Parisian space and changing notions of hygiene. They were aslo the subject of  
novels, paintings and social commentaries associating them with a less acceptable 
moral code than that of bourgeois women. Robert Nye in Crime, Madness, and 
Politics in Modern France: The Medical Concept of National Decline studied the 
discourse of social commentators which focused on national decline and their 
explanation of the supposed decline in medical terms.17 Judith Walkowitz in City 
                                                 
15 Rachel Fuchs, Poor and Pregnant in Paris: Strategies for Survival in the 
Nineteenth Century (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1992), 1-10.  
 
16 Sonya Rose, Limited Livelihoods: Gender and Class in Nineteenth-Century 
England (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 4, 22.  
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of Dreadful Delight: Narratives of Sexual Danger in Late-Victorian London, 
uncovered the ways in which different social actors, including women, 
constructed narratives about the streets of London and sexuality.18 She uncovered 
the power of language in constructing ideas about women occupying public space. 
Nye’s examiniation of the medicalized language about degeneration is useful in 
analyzing how the Conseil d’Hygiène and Annales d’Hygiène medicalized issues 
surrounding laundry. They first targeted the waste water from laundry the 
establishments as a potential source of disease and later focused on the laundering 
process and laundresses as transmitters of dangerous microbes. Walkowitz’s study 
is useful in analyzing similar commentaries on laundresses in public space, which 
accused the women of being engaged in casual prostitution because they waited in 
certain public areas for day work.  
 The sources for this study of laundry and laundresses in nineteenth-
century Paris are primarily archival; they shed light on the inner workings of 
governing offices and uncover the political goals and conflicts that, in part, 
decided the fate of laundry and laundresses. My sources come primarily from the 
Archives de la Ville de Paris, the Archives de la Préfecture de Police, and the 
Archives Nationales. The Archives de Paris contain the records of correspondence 
and requests in relation to any laundering facilities on the ground; these records 
illustrate the goals, and sometimes the wishes, of the city administrators. The 
                                                                                                                                     
17 Robert Nye, Crime, Madness and Politics in Modern France: The Medical 
Concept of National Decline (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 4-11.  
 
18 Judith Walkowitz, City of Dreadful Delight: Narratives of Sexual Danger in 
Late-Victorian London (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 1-14.  
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Archives de Police hold the records and correspondence for all of the bateaux-
lavoirs in the department of the Seine, demonstrating the difference between the 
public policies and the direction that the Conseil de Salubrité and other 
technocrats wanted to take. The Archives Nationales keep the records for 
governmental investigations into the implementation of labor laws in the 
department of the Seine; these records indicate that the women appreciated the 
laws, but the owners of industrial laundries rarely followed these laws. 
 The historical context of laundry in the nineteenth century evolved. Two 
things changed to make laundresses more important in people’s daily lives. One, 
during the nineteenth century people had more clothing. The industrial revolution 
enabled the acquisition of linen.19 People across classes owned more clothing as a 
result of industrial manufacturing and less costly textiles, such as cotton. 20 Two, 
standards of bodily hygiene became stricter for everyone, and it became necessary 
to clean clothes more than two or three times a year as was the tradition in rural 
areas.21  The plethora of linen and its commonplace usage became closely linked 
to ideas about hygiene; washing soon became a problem of social order, which 
Préfets and urbanists attempted to solve.22 
                                                 
19 Quynh Delaunay, La machine à laver en France: Un objet technique qui parle 
des femmes (Paris : L’Hartmattan, 2003), 13.  
 
20 Michael Miller, The Bon Marché: Bourgeois Culture and the Department Store 
1869-1920 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 4.  
 
21 Pierre-Jakez Hélias, The Horse of Pride: Life in a Breton Village, trans. June 
Guicharnaud (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 52.   
22 Delaunay, La machine à laver en France, 14. 
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 The greater need for clothing in society meant a greater need for and 
presence of laundresses who occupied an increasingly important social function 
during the nineteenth century in order to meet the population’s needs. Alain 
Corbin investigated the accumulation of linen by women and its effects on French 
society. In Time, Desire and Horror: Towards a History of the Senses, Corbin 
briefly examined the changing relationship with textiles and indicated that, due to 
increased and cheaper textile production, the working class was able to afford 
ready-to-wear store-bought clothing.23 Thus, cleaning laundry became an 
increasingly large part of life from the mid-nineteenth century. Similarly, in his 
influential study of clothing, Dessus et les dessous de la bourgeoisie : Une 
histoire de vêtements au XIXème siècle, Philippe Perrot underlined the symbolic 
importance of clothing in Paris. Perrot argues that because industrialization had 
made different types of clothing widely available, the bourgeoisie had to 
constantly differentiate themselves with more complicated or expensive styles. 
Beginning in the 1830s and especially during the Second Empire, a wider range of 
people could afford to buy ready-to-wear clothing. 24 Further, in his influential 
work on manners, The Civilizing Process: The History of Manners, Norbet Elias 
identified that socially-set standards of cleanliness have evolved throughout the 
centuries, and that by the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the upper classes 
                                                 
 
23 Alain Corbin, Time, Desire and Horror: Towards a History of the Senses. trans. 
Jean Birrell (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), 55.  
 
24 Philippe Perrot, Fashioning the Bourgeoisie: A History of Clothing in the 
Nineteenth Century. trans. Richard Bienvenu (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1994), 25.  
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were socially obligated to present themselves with a tidy appearance.25 Being 
considered clean also depended on wearing clothing free from stains and smells. 
According to Quynh Delaunay’s study of the washing machine in France, “the 
maintenance of clothing and linen was directly linked to the perceptions of 
notions of cleanliness. It evolved with them and testified of the permanent tension 
from the weight of norms of cleanliness onto social categories…The renewal of 
linen became a social obligation…Clothes carried the values of which cleanliness 
was more a preoccupation of conventions than a precise assessment of the 
absence of dirt…[The importance was] to belong to the norm makers’ world.” 26 
 These changes in standards of cleanliness also applied to how clothing and 
the body smelled. Alain Corbin identified the shifting social standards relating to 
smell. Corbin’s study is a valuable source in analyzing and identifying the 
increasingly important function of laundry and laundresses during the nineteenth 
century. The bourgeois sought to deodorize their body in a quest to differentiate 
themselves from the poor who they accused of being foul smelling.27 These 
changes dictated that clothing not only appear clean but also not smell. 
Paradoxically, the laundresses’ place became drastically limited in the city.  
In addition, the historical context around ideas about gender led city 
administrators to question the appropriateness of women in public space and 
                                                 
25Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process: The History of Manners (New York: 
Urizen books 1978), 81.  
 
26 Delaunay, La machine à laver en France, 15-16. 
 
27 Alain Corbin, The Foul and the Fragrant: Odor and the French Social 
Imagination, trans. Miriam Kochan (Leamington Spa, NY: Berg, 1986), 145.  
  13 
administrators’ actions to push laundresses indoors and away from public sight, 
which created another link to the idea that laundresses and laundry were out of 
place in Paris. I will attempt to uncover what Joan Scott labeled as the “operations 
of gender…that are present and defining forces in the organization of most 
societies.”28  During the nineteenth century, gendered notions about women and 
their role in society evolved. While the male-breadwinner model was less 
pertinent for France than England, the idea that women should be subordinate to a 
patriarchal structure at work and at home was a current for French social 
commentators.29 Scott highlighted that the studies of women and work like La 
Statistique de l’Industrie à Paris emphasized that conditions of work outside the 
home could erode or engender good morals, which was the cornerstone of 
representations of proper gender relations.30 Ideas about working conditions put 
laundresses outside of the acceptable moral and gender order. Scott revealed the 
prejudices in the Statistique that mediums with which workers toiled created in 
them certain appetites or wants, working with gold and silver created an appetite 
for luxury goods in the jewelry workers “as water stimulated in those who worked 
with it – washerwomen and tanners, for example – an unfortunate and excessive 
thirst for alcoholic drink.”31 Social commentators identified that the working 
                                                 
28 Joan Wallach Scott, Gender and the Politics of History (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1988, 1999), 27. 
 
29 Rachel Fuchs, Gender and Poverty in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 110.  
 
30 Scott, Gender and the Politics of History, 132. 
 
31 Ibid., 130.  
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conditions for laundresses engendered bad morals; many laundresses were hired 
for the day and thus went to the usual places for day laborers to be hired, namely 
the Place de Grève. The overtones of the commentary connected the waiting 
outside for work with prostitutes waiting in the streets for work. While waiting for 
work, laundresses would be subject to indecent proposals and were possibly 
tempted to work as casual prostitutes.32 These working conditions made them 
outside the acceptable gendered codes of conduct. The structure of the business of 
laundering also placed laundresses in a precarious position in relation to the 
acceptable gender order. Their morality was compromised because they were not 
subject to a defined patriarchal model at work.33 The laundresses who worked as 
day laborers or those who ran their own businesses washing others’ laundry were 
at the top of their own female-lead hierarchy. They could make their own rules of 
conduct without reference to a male patron (boss). There were no steadfast rules 
of apprenticeship; there was no master to answer to. It was a trade open to anyone 
with rudimentary skills. Working without male supervision and being out in 
public with no master represented a tenuous situation in the eyes of social 
commentators who worried about women’s morality. Laundresses were not 
subject to patriarchal family settings and were thus free to have “subversive 
independence.”34 It was only later – at the end of the nineteenth century when the 
                                                                                                                                     
 
32 Ibid., 131.  
 
33 Ibid., 132.  
 
34 Ibid., 149.  
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Parisian administration succeeded in sweeping the bateaux-lavoirs from the Seine 
and when the lavoirs were used mostly by ménagères – that laundresses could 
possibly fit back into the gendered order.35  In the industrial blanchisseries, they 
were hired wage-workers who answered to a male boss and were thus subjected to 
a patriarchal work environment that would, ideally, keep their morality intact; 
practically, this gender-appropriate setting often generated sexual harassment and 
sexual abuse by male patrons.36 
The Préfet de la Seine and other commentators underlined the drawbacks 
of having laundresses and laundry in public space. The laundresses sought to 
protect their own interests in the midst of change. When possible, they made their 
voices heard when proposals occurred to move or change the laundry facilities 
they used. Moreover, laundresses continued to use river placements to wash after 
the Préfet de la Seine outlawed it in 1805.                                                      
Survey of Gender and Public Space 
The discourse on gender made women out of place in the city. This shift in 
ideas about gender roles affected laundresses. In The Women of Paris and Their 
French Revolution, Dominique Godineau showed that after the Revolution 
women who visibly occupied public spaces were identified with disorder and 
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danger.37 For example, laundresses and laundry in public space brought other 
connotations with their presence, ideas about poverty and disease, which also 
threatened the social order. In Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of the 
French Revolution, Joan Landes showed how political commentators and officials 
connected the excesses of the revolution with the participation of women and the 
excesses of the Old Regime with the power of aristocratic women.38 Landes’ 
study showed how the revolutionaries created new notions about who had the 
right to occupy public space that excluded women, which is helpful in examining 
how and why successive nineteenth-century governments sought to limit 
laundresses use of public space.  Victoria Thompson studied the effects of women 
in the free market economy emerging in the 1830s in France.39 Thompson focused 
on the pushcart vendors around Paris and the women speculators around the stock 
exchange to illustrate the construction of a virtuous marketplace and the 
destruction of the vendors who were a staple of Parisian working-class life in the 
mid nineteenth century. The women push cart vendors and stock speculators made 
up an important part of the commerce in Paris, as evidenced by the legislation 
enacted to eliminate women vendors from public space and to stop women from 
speculating in the stock market. These actions to remove women from the public 
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space of the city and the civil society of the financial trading center of France 
mirrored the goals of city administrators in removing laundresses and laundry 
from public space and into acceptable spaces dedicated only to laundry, outside of 
the city. The advent of the industrial blanchisseries coupled with the closing of 
the bateaux-lavoirs drove laundresses out of public spaces and met the ideals of 
the social commentators and the Conseil de Salubrité. 
Survey of City Planning and Uses of Urban Space   
 The historical context of ideas about urban spaces changed during the 
nineteenth century, making laundresses out of place. Napoléon began the first 
urban renovation project when he cut through part of central Paris in an attempt to 
create a grand boulevard along Les Tuilleries through Paris to La Place de la 
Bastille. He was not the first with the impetus to reorganize the streets of Paris, 
but he was the first to want to promote the grandeur of France through the 
ornamentation and amelioration of the city.40  He thought of Paris through 
monuments to his various military victories. Laundresses in public interfered with 
the image of grandeur the monuments were supposed to project. It was only the 
coup driving him out of France that stopped his urban renovation projects. 
Concern with the circulation of the river Seine began with Stéphane Flachat in the 
1820s, who was later part of the St. Simonians, which, as Nicholas Papayanis 
argued, were very influential in the conceptualization of city planning. Flachat 
noted that, besides laundry boats, others occupations impeded the flow of the 
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river, such as water sellers, millers and dyers, just to name a few.41 According to 
Papayanis, Flachat’s attention to the river represented one of the main 
preoccupations of early city planning, the circulation of water, air and commerce. 
His successors followed his ideas in representing the strength of France through 
Paris. However, it was during the July Monarchy that the Préfet de la Seine 
Claude-Philibert Barthelot de Rambuteau drew up more extensive urban 
renovation plans. The waves of migration from the periphery of Paris and 
northern departments had created a crisis of organization in Paris.42 The streets 
were overcrowded and merchandise could not pass through the city easily. The 
more affluent residents of central Paris were leaving to inhabit the less populated 
western parts of the city. Rambuteau wanted to change the usages of the streets 
and rivers which had consequences for laundresses in Paris.  He wanted the streets 
to be dedicated to traffic, not dumping grounds for waste, places to conduct 
business or social meetings.43 Laundries around Paris had used the streets for 
washing and draining water. The river Seine was another space whose use 
Rambuteau wanted to re-conceptualize, which would directly impact laundresses. 
Haussmann carried on Rambuteau’s ideas about making the river a focal point for 
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Paris, as it once had been during its medieval period.44 He wanted to change the 
character of the river from one that nurtured various métiers and commercial 
activities that were essentially static to an artery specifically used for navigation.45 
 During the Second Empire, the growth in river traffic accelerated in 
response to the new demands of industrialization and urbanization. Consequently, 
increased navigation made the laundresses’ presence in the river problematic in 
the eyes of city administrators, not merely for evoking scenes of poverty in the 
center of Paris, but because laundry hanging out to dry became a physical obstacle 
for boats on the Seine as well, which contributed another element to the idea that 
they did not fit in the public spaces of Paris. In order to do the washing, 
laundresses needed to find a place in the river which had a swift current and at 
least half a meter deep. This meant the women usually had to wade out into the 
river away from the bank and get in the way of the navigating vessels. According 
to the administrators, the solution was to force the women off of the banks of the 
Seine and into bateaux-lavoirs. In 1862, to continue the changes to the river space 
and support the idea that the river should be the main artery of circulation for 
Paris, the Préfet de la Seine proposed a public transport service to carry 
passengers. The increase in traffic made the bateaux-lavoirs obstacles to 
circulation and to the re-conceptualization of the river space. Transportation of 
people around the city preoccupied city planners who proposed major changes for 
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laundresses to access laundry facilities on the Seine. Haussmann continued to 
focus on circulation around the city. In terms of city planning, the bateaux-lavoirs 
presented an immediate obstacle to navigating the river Seine, and Haussmann 
began a campaign to phase them out of existence in the city.46 By the 1880s, 
many owners of bateaux-lavoirs requested to move locations. The responses from 
the prefects reflected the new attention to city traffic and organization that 
Haussmann had begun. The new attention placed on city management 
characterizes the period of Haussmannization 
 The authors of studies on the reconstruction of Paris and the re-
conceptualization and uses of urban public space agree that the ideas reflected in 
Haussmann’s work were in preparation long before he came to power. As 
Papayanis in Planning Paris Before Haussmann and Karen Bowie in La 
Modernité avant Haussmann demonstrated, city planning began well before 
Haussmann in 1853.47 It was only during the Second Empire that the resources 
and political will united to accomplish the major work that Paris needed to 
undergo to make it the capital of a modern nation. David Pinkney indicated that 
the rebuilding of Paris was a response to problems engendered by migration to the 
city.48 The flood of people to Paris in the 1840s had shown that Paris had 
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antiquated systems of transport and not enough resources like water and space for 
people and commerce to be able to comfortably coexist. These authors all 
highlighted that the main preoccupations of city planning was the circulation of 
water, air and commerce.  
 Napoleon III also meant for the rebuilding of Paris to show the prosperity 
and power of Paris as the capital of France, to demonstrate that France was a 
power to be contended with on the geopolitical stage. That meant that urban space 
needed, at all times, to reflect progress and wealth, which meant hiding any signs 
of poverty, such as women doing laundry on the river. Napoleon III wanted Paris 
to be a model for all cities of the world.49 Donald Olsen argues that “Imperial 
Paris was a conscious expression of national glory and thus city building was too 
important a task to be left to private citizens.”50 It would take a government with 
the foresight and ability to build the boulevards and monuments required to 
project that glory. To project glory, poverty needed to be hidden. In Visions of the 
Modern City, William Sharpe argues that the changes to Paris represented a 
gentrification of the city where the poor no longer fit and that Haussmann wanted 
to conceal the poor that the impressionists sought out.51 These studies of urban 
development and ideas about urban space reflect the changes that the laundresses 
endured through the nineteenth century. As urban spaces changed, the laundresses 
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became reminders of poverty and dirt in a city that wanted to eschew those 
realities of life. As the city was supposed to represent power and prestige 
laundresses were out of place.  
Survey of Public Hygiene and Laundry 
In 1800, the Napoleonic administration created the Conseil de Salubrité to 
deal with health crises and give the Préfet de Police methods for handling 
quarantines and sequestration. The development of the governmental structures 
was intended to stop epidemics and contain outbreaks of disease to protect the 
city. The creation of the Conseil de Salubrité marked the beginning of public 
hygiene as a governmental entity and advised the Préfet de Police on new 
regulations for laundering. The Conseil de Salubrité was responsible for the 
surveillance of businesses that could have a negative effect on the health of 
Parisian residents. Their mandate was primarily to inspect all classified 
businesses, and in times of need, to study and suggest solutions to epidemics after 
the law on the classification of businesses in 1810. Composed of physicians, 
architects and engineers, the Conseil de Salubrité played an advisory role to the 
Préfet de la Seine and Préfet de Police in any public health matter. Then, in 1848, 
after the second cholera epidemic the Conseil de Salubrité became the Conseil 
d’Hygiène with the members of the Conseil being appointed from the Préfet de 
Police, which integrated the Conseil even more into the city administration.  
The context of the public hygiene movement that developed outside the 
government is also important in understanding the changes that took place to the 
industry of laundry and to the attitudes towards laundry and laundresses. Public 
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hygiene affected city planning which is evidenced through regulations on laundry. 
In 1829, the pioneering public hygienist Louis-René Villermé started Les Annales 
d’Hygiène Publique et de Médecine Légale – then, France’s only professional 
journal dedicated to questions of public health – which united studies from across 
the country and attempted to standardize public hygiene policy in France. His first 
major study focused on water and drainage, which, as already discussed, was a 
major problem in Paris and directly affected the treatment of lavoirs in Paris. He 
argued that it was the city’s cesspool system which created foul odors and made 
those predisposed to disease sick. He linked habits and morality to being 
predisposing factors for contracting illnesses.52 As the century progressed, public 
hygiene reflected the major political and medical preoccupations of the time. In 
1832, as the cholera epidemic raged, the prominent figures in public hygiene 
studied the disease and sought ways to stop the epidemic and answer leading 
questions as to why the poor seemed disproportionally affected by the disease. 
Those writing about medical questions also projected their ideas and 
preconceptions. In the 1850s, industrial growth sparked debates about the effects 
of industry on the health of the population and the changes it brought to the social 
order of cities. Villermé was also interested in the creation and health of a large 
working class and wrote influential studies on the subject like Tableau de l'état 
physique et moral des ouvriers employés dans les manufactures de coton, de laine 
et de soie. He studied the health problems the people within the class had 
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developed as a result of working in the industry, as well as changes the industry 
brought to the morality of workers which he connected to their overall health. 
Before the acceptance of Pasteur’s germ theory in the decades after his discovery 
in 1867, influential public hygienists like Villermé and Alexandre Parent-
Duchatêlet posited that the physical environment shaped the morality and thus the 
health of the population.53 Therefore, controlling the uses of public space was 
essential to maintaining public health. The hygienist’s range was far reaching; 
they practiced what Anne LaBerge termed “…[a] hygienism, a kind of medical 
imperialism incorporating both the medicalization and moralization of 
society…”54 Thus, they envisioned a double task of regulating the physical and 
moral environment. The hygienists on the Conseil de Salubrité also created new 
rules for the laundry establishments – the lavoirs publics – that the poor women of 
Paris used if they were not near a river. Examining the bateaux-lavoirs also sheds 
light on the relationship between the city and the river, and the connections with 
laundry and public hygiene. The changing needs of city administrators created a 
niche for the public hygiene movement to collaborate with the government. The 
Conseil de Salubrité contributed to the idea that laundresses and laundry did not 
                                                 
53 « Prospectus et Introduction » Annales d’hygiène publique et médecine légale, 
série première, tome 1. Juillet 1828 : 1-30.  
 
54 Anne LaBerge, Mission and Method: The Early Nineteenth-Century French 
Public Health Movement (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Her 
work is the most comprehensive study of the public health movement in France 
from 1815-1848, concentrating on the ideas and methods driving the first official 
group of public hygienists.  
 
  25 
fit in the city and moreover that the process was dangerous to the health of the 
city.  
Throughout the nineteenth century, the reasons laundry and laundresses 
were dangerous for public health changed with the different notions of cleanliness 
and dirt. From 1820-1860 the concern about the lavoirs focused on the accepted 
theory of disease transmission through miasma. Once the medical community 
accepted Pasteur’s germ theory in the 1870s, the Conseil d’Hygiène was 
concerned with the lavoirs and bateaux-lavoirs as potential transmitters of 
disease-causing microbes. The acceptance of the germ theory was not something 
that happened at the same time across the medical profession. While Pasteur had 
proven that heat killed microorganisms that made beer and wine putrefy in 1862, 
it was only after other microbe-studying scientists and physicians proved that 
small organisms not only visible with a microscope actually caused diseases in 
animals and humans. Robert Koch’s experiments with anthrax supported 
Pasteur’s original hypothesis. Once Koch discovered the tuberculosis bacillus in 
1876, more physicians and public health professionals eschewed other 
explanations of contracting diseases.55 Once public officials began to scrutinize 
and regulate laundering, they made this indispensible work more difficult to do. 
 The needs of laundering were not easy to meet: women needed an ample 
supply of clean water, easy drainage, and enough space and air to dry the linens. 
These exigencies did not match the conditions within Paris. Water was difficult to 
                                                 
55 Nancy Tomes and John Warner, “Introduction to Special Issue on Rethinking 
the Reception of the Germ Theory of Disease: Comparative Perspectives,” 
Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 52 (1997): 5.   
  26 
obtain if not taken directly from the Seine. Until the 1860s, wealthy people paid 
water porters, who obtained water from the Seine, to supply their house with 
water.56  Drainage posed many problems since there was not a complete sewer 
system until the Third Republic; stagnant water froze in the winter and became 
fetid in the warmer months producing odors perceived to be dangerous. These 
problems occupied the Conseil de Salubrité. Added to the problems associated 
with water, space and air flow were also lacking in the cramped spaces 
laundresses used to dry the laundry, which in turn created a humid environment in 
their rooms and caused damages to the building and, according to the Conseil de 
Salubrité, the health of the tenants. Ideas of contamination changed; however, the 
danger from laundry remained and grew more problematic. Germ theory led to 
the conclusion that clothing and the waste water from laundry could start an 
epidemic. For the city administrators and public hygiene officials, the first choice 
was to export the activity to the outskirts of Paris. However, this solution was not 
acceptable for the poor residents of the city who depended on facilities within 
walking distance. Public health strategies to ensure the health of the residents 
made laundry a threat.  
 As historians have illustrated, the concerns of public hygienists were 
driven by political considerations as well as medical concerns.57 The laundresses 
of Paris represented a group of poor women who threatened the city’s health by 
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their occupation and behavior. However, no one who has studied the hygiene 
movement has investigated the impact of the hygienists’ ideas on the Conseil de 
Salubrité on laundresses and laundry facilities. The public hygiene movement 
focused specifically on the poor and the dangers and contagions they engendered 
by their lifestyles, which were different than the bourgeoisie. The shifting ideas of 
what constituted dangers to the health of the population reflected political ideas of 
the era. François Delaporte and other cultural historians, such as Catherine 
Kudlick and Andrew Aisenberg, view the responses as a general cultural response 
to modernization; yet, their studies did not include anything on the role of 
laundresses and laundry in the ideas of the public hygienists. The cholera 
epidemic of 1830 heralded a new ideology about disease and the government’s 
role in society to help combat it. The cholera epidemic produced a discourse about 
the danger of the working-class, whose members transmitted immorality, crime 
and disease, with the perception they were the source of the national degeneration 
of France and England. This dissertation shows the impact of the public hygiene 
movement on an occupation of poor women in Paris. New concerns for hygiene in 
the city made laundering a target for regulation and scrutiny from the beginning 
of the nineteenth century when it was classed as dangerous or a nuisance to the 
health of city residents.  
  28 
Aisenberg focused on bourgeois responses to the cholera epidemic in the 
1830s.58 According to Aisenberg, in France ‘disorder’ was the term the 
investigators used to articulate the need to find the cause of contagion and quash 
the worker riots that had plagued the city since the cholera outbreak. He indicated 
that physicians thought disease was a result of vices. Alcohol made cholera a 
poverty issue, which social reformers explained in moral terms. However, 
Aisenberg did not include an examination of laundry and ideas of disease 
transmission through contaminated clothes.  As this dissertation explains, the new 
responsibility to regulate all activities in the city also led to scrutiny of 
laundresses’ morality, living conditions, where and even how they performed 
their occupation.  
Similarly, Kudlick examined the public hygiene movement in cultural 
terms. She demonstrated that, in the midst of panic, the bourgeoisie consolidated 
their dominant position in the social hierarchy through its role as information 
holders and givers. Public hygienists and political officials manipulated 
information about threat levels and sources according to the political climate. 
Kudlick wrote that, “…through information management, officials established an 
image of themselves as in control of the crisis.”59 Public hygienists linked the 
outbreak of cholera with social unrest. After the revolutions of 1830 and 1848 
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there were severe epidemics of cholera. In defense of the nation, health 
professionals searched for a cause for the outbreak and a way to control it. 
Although Kudlick did not examine laundry, public hygienists of Paris also framed 
the debate on the location of laundry spaces with the reigning ideas of the era that 
the health of Paris depended on the regulation of the laundresses because their 
occupation carried the risk of transmitting diseases.   
The advance of social investigators into certain sections of the city never 
visited before mirrored the changes in garbage collection that came about because 
of the epidemic. Garbage men, rather than the neighborhood residents, started to 
collect the trash.60 The working-class was wary of this intervention and was upset, 
since they viewed the rationalization of garbage collection as an infringement on 
their ability to earn a living. The health professionals threatened laundresses in the 
same way. As public health became a focus in Paris, public health officials 
ventured into the laundresses’ workspace and created regulations, which 
threatened their livelihood by endorsing the closure of small laundry ateliers 
(workshops). Public hygienists focused on managing the roads to keep public 
access open and the drainage of used water. After acceptance of the microbe 
theory, the bateaux-lavoirs also came under scrutiny as they occupied public 
spaces. However, the places that caused the most problems in the eyes of 
hygienists were small ateliers in the courts of apartment buildings. While the 
women were not in public view, they were a threat to public health, potentially 
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transmitting diseases. According to the Conseil d’Hygiène the optimal place for 
laundresses was in blanchisseries which could be regulated.  
 Similar attitudes towards the relationship between public hygiene and the 
working class existed in both England and France. Frank Mort’s work, Dangerous 
Sexualities: Medico-Moral Politics in England since 1830, examined the 
discourse surrounding the spread of disease and the role of physicians in society 
after the cholera outbreak. In England, as in France, the medical profession did 
not often view the working class as moral and upstanding constituents of the 
community; however, physicians did not target them until the outbreak of 
cholera.61 According to physicians, the disease originated from vicious habits.62 
Mort argued that, “the logic which entwined poverty and immorality with 
contagion was made through a specific language – the discourse of early social 
medicine – and was circulated at key institutional sites within the central and local 
state. The intentions were clear: greater surveillance and regulation of the poor.” 
Mort explained how this discourse affected the urban poor in their daily lives, 
“…[by] isolat[ing] the human sources of infection, subjecting them to a regime of 
compulsory inspection and detention, combined with the propaganda to educate 
the poor into a regime of cleanliness and morality.”63 Similarly, in Paris, 
politicians and public hygienists made the connection between laundresses using 
                                                 
61 Frank Mort, Dangerous Sexualities: Medico-Moral Politics in England Since 
1830 (NY: Routledge, 1997), 12.                                      
 
62 Ibid., 23. 
 
63 Ibid., 30.  
  31 
the river and the spread of diseases and immorality; they advanced a multitude of 
reasons to target the laundresses to remove them from the river and public space.  
From 1820 with the first appearance of a mechanized blanchisserie on land with 
proper drainage, the public hygienists sought to force laundresses into these 
establishments and out of the small ateliers and bateaux-lavoirs through 
advocating restrictive legislation.  
The cholera epidemic ushered in the professionalization of doctors in 
French and English societies, although physicians were never integrated into the 
government in England as they were in France.64  The government sought help 
from doctors during this time of crisis, thus legitimizing their position of 
authority. According to Frank Mort, “the Medical profession acted as powerful 
ideologues for the professional gentry and sections of the industrial bourgeoisie, 
laying claim to a middle-class monopoly over the issues of health and hygiene.”65  
Social reformers linked the advancement in medicine and the control of the 
working class with the improvement of the nation. As a British physician of the 
1830s asserted “…the health of individuals (promoted by the medical practitioner) 
and the vitality of the general population (the domain of public health 
administration) were interlinked.”66 Similar attitudes were present among the 
French hygienists as revealed by LaBerge, Delaport, Aisenberg, and Kudlick in 
their studies. The Conseil de Salubrité and Annales d’Hygiène proposed and 
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influenced legislation regulating lavoirs and attempted to close small workshops 
that employed many laundresses inside of Paris. This study illustrates that the 
scrutiny of laundry changed as politics influenced the Conseil. While the public 
hygienists were powerful, it was only in conjunction with political will that 
laundresses and laundry became out of place inside of Paris.  
Politicians and social commentators also used public health and medical 
issues to answer questions about France’s political position in regards to its 
European neighbors. In Crime, Madness, and Politics in Modern France: The 
Medical Concept of National Decline, Nye argues that a medical 
conceptualization provides a lens through which to understand the notion that 
France was in decline and ways to stop it.67 The Pasteurian revolution contributed 
to the professionalization and power of physicians. By the 1870s, the public 
hygienists were using germ theory to again target the laundresses of Paris as 
conveyors of disease with the possibility to contaminate Paris. Matching the 
political goals of the time, the medical concept of decline, meaning that the health 
and strength of the population were in decline resulting in France’s weakness on 
the wider European political stage provided another argument to render laundry 
and laundresses invisible in the city.  
Some historians have used a Foucauldian rubric to analyze the actions of 
public hygienists.68 Their contention, that the professionalization of hygienists – 
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through their connection to the government – made them more powerful as 
information holders who were able to shape ideas about, and political actions 
towards the urban poor, is valid. However, this dissertation will illustrate that, 
although they were in the government in France, the hygienists on the Conseil 
d’Hygiène were not always heeded; the decision-making power in regard to 
lavoirs and bateaux-lavoirs ultimately rested with the Préfet de la Seine. In short, 
politicians used the public hygienists’ ideas and advice when it was expedient for 
them. In light of the historiography of hygiene and its focus on its discourse and 
methods, an investigation of how its policies shaped the lives of poor and 
working-class women will broaden the understanding of how it functioned and 
changed people’s everyday lives.  
As a group of poor working women, the laundresses shared many 
characteristics in terms of regulations with the sweated labor of nineteenth-
century Paris. Judith Coffin studied women’s work in the needle trades, which 
occurred inside the home where labor regulations were absent.69 She found that 
the sweated labor was as dangerous to women’s health as working in a factory, 
but did not receive the same attention as women working outside of the home. 
The women fit into the economic and gender structure of Paris so well that they 
garnered little attention.  Instead, because the women were working in their 
homes in a gender-acceptable trade, social commentators romanticized the 
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women, who many times suffered from malnutrition as they could not afford to 
feed themselves. However, laundresses also worked in a ‘sweated’ industry that 
was uncomfortably public for social commentators. As discussed earlier in terms 
of gender norms, while at work, laundresses were not subject to any patriarchal 
structure which, for social reformers, made them a group of women who were of 
questionable morality because they were outside proper gender roles. Their 
occupation was a problem because it had the ability to contaminate Paris. It was 
preferable to have them inside a regulated industry like the industrial 
blanchisseries rather than working for themselves in the lavoirs or on bateaux-
lavoirs polluting Paris. 
Historians interested in uncovering women’s lived experiences have 
investigated certain aspects of laundresses’ lives and work. Michelle Perrot was 
the first historian to focus a small article on the blanchisseuses. 70 She briefly 
examined the occupation, showing its ancient origins and illustrating why the 
laundress was crucial to the village. According to Perrot, the laundresses who 
worked in a lavoir comprised a support network that allowed a mother to bring 
her child to work. If a single mother had trouble supporting herself, or a colleague 
could not work, the lavoir would take a collection for her. The lavoir was also the 
center of intense information exchange. While their hands were busy, the women 
were free to talk. The position of transmitting knowledge was a powerful element, 
which contributed to the unease with which society generally regarded them. In 
the village or neighborhood, gossip could make or break a reputation. The women 
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also exchanged healthcare tips and remedies, which according to Perrot led to 
their accusation of being abortionists. Her work recreates the society of the lavoir 
constructed by female solidarity, while demonstrating that the village or 
neighborhood associated laundresses with power because they held and 
distributed information, which was disturbing to those who were concerned about 
maintaining social order since ideas about proper gender roles maintained that 
women were supposed to be in a dependent position in society within the 
patriarchal model of family and social ties. Perrot illustrates the uneasy 
relationship some had with laundresses, even in rural communities where space 
was less a premium. Additionally, Françoise Wasserman conducted a study of 
blanchisseuses in nineteenth-century France, which included information 
regarding their sociability, the processes of washing, and some perceptions of the 
women in contemporary accounts. Her study is a collection of anecdotal primary 
accounts of the blanchisseuses meant to serve as an ethnographical accounting of 
a lost occupation and contained little historical analysis.71 This present 
examination of laundresses and laundering focuses on the political and medical 
shift that made the occupation and women out of place in Paris and seeks to place 
that shift in the historical context of larger changes occurring in the nineteenth 
century.   
 Gender, public policy and public hygiene all contributed to making 
laundry and laundresses threats to the growth and prosperity of Paris through the 
discourse of contamination or as a navigation obstacle. Laundry and laundresses 
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did not fit with the new vision of Paris. City administrators and public health 
officials wanted the poor – who were the main group using the facilities inside of 
the city – to follow the example of the more affluent and send their laundry out of 
the city to large establishments called blanchisseries that were able to follow all 
the laws and public health prescriptions set out during the nineteenth century, and 
that were out of sight and not causing any circulation obstacles in the city.  
Laundering was often connected with the working class, since the 
bourgeoisie did not have to do their own laundry. Unlike the poor who hung 
laundry around their home, wealthier people could afford to have it dried at the 
laundry facility, or the laundresses’ own apartments, because they had enough 
clothes to replace those that were out being laundered. For example, in Emile 
Zola’s novel L’Assommoir, he described a scene in which Gervaise’s husband 
compares their room to paradise because chemises and other women’s 
underclothes were hanging about.72 Women would wash many different items in 
the laundry establishments, which Zola enumerated: “men’s shirts, petticoats, 
sheets, drawers, tablecloths, chemises, handkerchiefs, socks, dish cloths, baby’s 
diapers, men’s pants, skirts, and lace collars.”73 The bourgeoisie did not have to 
directly associate with dirt in cleaning their own house or the dirt of others.74 
Laundering outside the home visibly connected the classes populaires to the dirt 
they were washing away. Whether it was their own family’s laundry that 
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working-class women did as part of household chores or as a professional 
laundresses, they were the ones who touched the dirty laundry. Depending on 
their marital status, the type of work of their husband, and the number of children 
they had, professional laundresses hovered between destitution and simply being 
poor. It was the working-class women who did laundry outside of their home in 
visible places, and who needed the resources of the bateaux-lavoirs or lavoirs 
such as hot water and space.  
Because inexpensive urban housing did not have convenient water sources 
for laundry, it was necessary for poor women to go outside of their home to 
accomplish the many steps laundering involved.75 Some neighborhoods had a 
well in the courtyard, though others only had one fountain to meet the residents’ 
water needs; up to fifty people used the same neighborhood fountain for drinking, 
cooking and washing before the city constructed a reliable water supply system in 
the 1860s.76 Certain neighborhoods had a concentration of small laundry ateliers 
dedicated to laundering which were located in the basements of apartment 
buildings; however, many women in the city depended on the bateaux-lavoirs. 
Laundry facilities were not evenly spread throughout the neighborhoods of Paris, 
they were on the periphery of the city leaving only the bateaux-lavoirs to serve 
the poor and working-class women in central Paris.  Beginning in the early 
nineteenth century, large blanchisseries relocated to the outskirts of Paris to ease 
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their access to water and drainage. By the end of the 1850s, laundresses working 
for others and women doing their family’s laundry had an increasingly difficult 
time accessing places to do laundry in the city. Lavoirs could only obtain 
permission to build on the periphery, yet not all poor and working-class housing 
was in the outskirts. There were sizeable less-affluent neighborhoods in the fifth 
and tenth arrondissements as well.77 
 The women who used the laundry facilities that were open to the public 
were the urban poor. There were several types of women using the public 
facilities. Some used these establishments for their own family and could not 
afford to have someone else do their laundry. In contrast, there were women who 
took others’ laundry to the public facilities to make a profit; there were two 
distinct groups of women who could earn money for washing clothes: the 
ménagères – often called pièçardes when they earned a few pièces washing 
others’ clothes – and the blanchisseuses or lessiveuses who washed laundry as a 
profession. However, the women had to make ends meet through a number of 
different odd jobs because laundry paid so little. Laundry was a vital source of 
income for women who had children and no particular skill. They could take in 
laundry while caring for their children at home.78 The lavoirs publics and 
bateaux-lavoirs catered to all three categories of women.  On the other hand, there 
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were the women who worked in industrial blanchisseries, which were closed to 
the public. These women were employees of the blanchisserie.  
 In the laundry-work continuum, one end had skilled workers, les 
blanchisseuses de fins who washed the fine items of the bourgeoisie, such as lace 
additions to sleeves, collars and the under clothes that also had lace.79 However, 
that does not exclude laundresses who took in all types of laundry, who were also 
skilled at washing lace and collars. At the other end of the spectrum were the 
women who washed their own laundry or that of other working-class families at 
the river or at the lavoir. A laundress as a business owner represents a grey area. 
There were different levels of ownership. The archives did not reveal that women 
owned a lavoir, or that the named applicant to open a laundry facility was a 
woman. Lavoirs owners were referred to as blanchisseurs, indicating that men 
owned or managed legally-operated lavoirs; women washed the laundry but did 
not own the business.80 However, the occupation of laundress, the one physically 
washing the laundry, was always a woman. She could use a lavoir to wash her 
and her customers’ laundry. Hence, she was her own boss, but did not own the 
space where she laundered. Since Paris did not have an efficient water delivery 
system, lavoirs would employ water carriers, who were boys and young men. The 
managers of the lavoirs publics were also men. Owners of a laundry 
establishment or its managers never washed a piece of laundry. The manager’ or 
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owners’ presence was primarily to oversee operations. The archives reveal only 
one bateau-lavoir – out of ten – which was owned by a woman within Paris 
during the early decades of the nineteenth century and none later in the century.81 
However, she was a widow and inherited the business from her husband. There is 
no record of a woman owning a bateau-lavoir after purchasing it herself. This is 
not to negate the fact that a woman ran and owned a business, but it underscores 
that women were not in charge of laundry businesses per se, even if the physical 
act of laundering was a feminized occupation.  
Representations of Laundresses 
From the 1800 to the turn of the century the working class of Paris 
regularly observed the mi-carême, a break from the rigors of lent. The lavoirs of 
the neighborhood held the most popular celebrations and would produce the 
queen of mi-carême who the laundresses elected from their ranks.82 The 
laundresses would hold a parade in their neighborhood, often joining with other 
near-by lavoirs to have more people and thus more contributions for a grander 
celebration. The parade and party of the laundresses during the mi-carême 
garnered attention from a host of social critics who criticized the laundresses 
behavior during this celebration. Each lavoir represented itself in a parade with 
banners and flags mimicking the royal family. In a newspaper article the author 
complained that the laundresses left their work and the needs of their clientele 
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behind to celebrate irresponsibly; the women dared to wear the clothes of their 
social superiors. The author described the scene “seeing them parade so richly 
dressed and to think that it is us who pay the bill of the party without knowing it. 
Yes my friends, it is our linen that dances; it is our finest shirts that decorate the 
breast of the laundresses; it is your embroidered underskirts, your lace collars that 
highlight of veil the graces of the robust vénus du battoir.”83 Other social 
commentators asserted that the compliments they received tempted them to 
eschew the social hierarchy.84 
The most well-known laundress of the nineteenth century was the creation 
of the naturalist novelist Emile Zola. In L’Assommoir published in 1877, he 
sought to create a prototypical working-class family; Gervaise, the woman of the 
family working as a laundress represented a typical occupation of poor women in 
Paris. Zola developed a character that would exemplify his idea of social and 
moral determinism. Despite Gervaise’s hard work in building a laundry business, 
her fatal moral flaws owing to her physical environment and family background 
could only make her outside the acceptable gender order; her unwise spending 
and her alcoholism were – in Zola’s view – circumstances that precluded her 
success. She lost her business and died of starvation. Zola’s ideas about natural 
law and heredity played an unmistakable role. Gervaise was, because of her 
lineage, predestined to be a failure in her business and her family. One can see 
Zola’s argument about heredity at play as her daughter Nana grew up to be a 
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courtesan. His story line also mirrored what social commentators of the day 
thought about the medium in which laundresses worked: because they were not 
subject to a patriarchal working structure, they had loose morals. His novel was a 
huge commercial success, confirming its resonance with received ideas about 
working-class women at the time; he agreed to have it serialized in Le Bien 
publique and later in La République des Lettres.85 Its serialization made it more 
accessible to readers coming from a wide variety of classes. It illustrated that 
those who believed in social determinism still thought of the working class as 
being poor because they were immoral. Zola did not explicitly blame the political 
or economic policies of the time for shaping the opportunities available for a 
woman like Gervaise. However, the methods he utilized – the most important 
being observation – served to initiate the reader into the life of a laundress, 
especially her work and behavior at work. He underscored the enormous physical 
burden of doing laundry and the circumstances that contributed to a laundress’ 
reputation for being bawdy and sexually available. The idea that laundresses were 
bawdy also mirrored the notions of gender and work at the time; if women 
undertook indelicate labor that required strength they were going against their 
nature and were outside of the gender norms.86  
Edgar Degas represented laundresses in an urban environment in his 
paintings. In contrast to the more idealized images of laundresses in the 
countryside, washing clothes beside a river or the ocean, these laundresses were 
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always depicted in groups preserving their respectability. Degas’ images held 
erotic overtones. Often he depicted laundresses alone; they were open to the male 
viewer’s gaze and possible advances. He also painted them drinking which also 
represented vulnerability. Judith Hannah noted that the middle and upper class 
men looked at working women as a way to entertain themselves.87 Both Zola and 
Degas were middle-class men who were titillated by the idea of laundresses and 
their milieu. Yet, the representations of laundresses as being outside of the social 
order and eschewing rules of gender propriety did not affect the ideas or motives 
regarding the regulation of the laundry business. This dissertation will show that 
instead, ideas about modernizing Paris and regulating the use of public space 
motivated the Préfets de la Seine to control the laundry industry, while the desire 
to control diseases drove the reforms suggested by the Conseil de Salubrité and 
Conseil d’Hygiène.  
This study will take a chronological approach in examining shifts for the 
work of laundresses and the laundry business in Paris, as well as the attempt to 
make the occupation invisible which was crucial for implementing the precepts of 
hygiene becoming so important. The various political regimes and Préfets de la 
Seine wanted all references to poverty washed away. This included all visible 
signs of laundry, clothes on the river banks, bateaux-lavoirs on the river and 
laundresses in the city. They wanted all laundry, regulated and behind closed 
doors. No one wanted to see how they cleaned clothes, the dirt and the physical 
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effort; they only wanted their product. Similar to the relegation of emptying 
cesspools to the night, no one wanted to see or smell the filth they had produced, 
they only wanted the result.   
The first chapter will investigate the beginning of the relationship between 
politics and laundry that limited laundresses’ access to resources in Paris. It 
begins with a series of regulations in the first decade of the nineteenth century 
that, for the first time, regulated the laundry industry in Paris and had 
repercussions for laundresses. The regulations of city administrators attempted to 
cut off laundresses’ free access to the river Seine within Paris and force the 
women to use only the bateaux-lavoirs. In addition, small laundry establishments 
began to come under the scrutiny of administrators and public hygienists. The 
government set forth a rubric for regulating hazardous businesses in Paris that 
presented a health risk. The classification of hazardous businesses concerned 
laundry facilities for two reasons: the business drained used and fetid water, thus 
potentially producing so-called miasmas; it also created an obstacle by draining 
water on the public way. The law on classification of 1815 obligated potential 
owners of laundry establishments to obtain permission before the business could 
open legally. In addition, the law on classified businesses created a direct link to 
the burgeoning public hygiene commission, which linked medical concerns with 
the occupation of laundering and the potential hazards of laundry. The law created 
problems opening business in certain neighborhoods and made finding places to 
launder more difficult. This chapter will investigate the consequences of the new 
legislation from 1805 to 1840 on the laundry occupation and laundresses. The 
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advent of regulations for laundry in Paris coupled with rising rents made moving 
out of the city attractive for business owners and deprived laundresses of places 
near to them. 
 Chapter two will investigate the growth of terrestrial laundering facilities 
in conjunction with the public hygiene movement in Paris from 1840 to1860. The 
chapter will also examine the Préfets’ inconsistent treatment of lavoirs in the 
banlieue and in Paris and explore the exceptional political support that terrestrial 
laundry facilities enjoyed during the Second Empire, exemplified by the building 
of the Lavoir Napoléon. The expansion of laundering facilities demonstrated that 
the continued growth of the Parisian population necessitated more places to 
launder linens for both the bourgeoisie and the poor. The Conseil d’Hygiène 
required laundry establishments to conform to its suggestions for drainage of used 
water. The hygienists’ requirements made it difficult to open laundry facilities 
because the businesses were responsible for solving their drainage issues without 
sewers. The facilities available to poor women continued to diminish within the 
city, essentially leaving the bateaux-lavoirs on the Seine to meet the laundering 
needs of the poor in the center of Paris. Since laundry facilities on the ground 
were complicated and expensive to establish, the bateaux-lavoirs experienced a 
renaissance. The owners of the blanchisseries had already began moving out of 
the city to build from scratch, where land near the Seine in the banlieue was 
inexpensive, and where they could obtain all the required water, plus easy 
drainage into the river. The outskirts of Paris represented the only places where 
the blanchisseries could find land inexpensive enough for their business to be 
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profitable while also fulfilling the requirements that the public hygienists set 
forth.  
 Chapter three will examine the bateaux-lavoirs and the campaign against 
them beginning in 1865 and ending in the 1880s with the final orders on when 
each boat was to be destroyed or moved, although it was a staggered process so 
the very last boats did not disappear until 1910. The acceptability of bateaux-
lavoirs in the center of Paris underwent a similar evolution as the laundresses. As 
ideas about health and the city changed, the bateaux also found themselves out of 
place in Paris during the 1850s and 60s. Requests to construct or repair bateaux-
lavoirs grew while property became even more expensive within Paris because of 
Haussmannization. The bateaux represented the perfect solution to problems that 
plagued facilities on the ground. Water was free, the lack of a sewer system for 
drainage posed no problem, and they required minimal fees to be stationed on the 
Seine, as opposed to skyrocketing rents in Paris and in the center of the city; they 
were the only choice for laundresses. Most of the bateaux-lavoirs had an enclosed 
chassis made of glass, which also served the purpose of canalizing laundresses out 
of sight. They were also the facilities laundresses preferred because they were 
larger than operations on the ground, had more airflow and light, and importantly, 
were less expensive since water taken from the river was free. The bateaux solved 
laundry problems for the poor in the center of Paris; however, they also presented 
many problems to the city administrators as the city changed. When the Conseil 
d’Hygiène accepted Pasteur’s germ theory in the early Third Republic, the 
bateaux came under scrutiny for their potential to spread microbes through 
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contaminated laundry water.  Even before microbes, they were out of place 
because Haussmann had a different vision for the use of the river as it traversed 
Paris. He envisioned the Seine as an important thoroughfare to move goods and 
people through the city, and the bateaux-lavoirs were obstacles to enacting his 
plans. In 1867, by order of Haussmann in his function as Préfet de la Seine, no 
one could establish a new bateau-lavoir or make unauthorized repairs; moreover, 
the city would not accept any requests for repair that was meant to extend the life 
of the bateau.  He wanted the laundresses and the bateaux-lavoirs to disappear 
and for terrestrial facilities to be the only choice for laundry. However, attesting 
to the importance of the bateaux-lavoirs for the inhabitants of Paris, they had an 
informal stay of execution until 1905 when the city towed the last one out of Paris 
for destruction.  
 The public hygienists were significant antagonists toward the small 
laundry facilities that served the poor in Paris. Chapter four spans the decades 
from 1880-1910 and will investigate the effects of public hygienists on laundry 
and laundresses in Paris after the medical and public acceptance of scientific ideas 
about the danger of microorganisms. It will also examine the growing power the 
hygienists enjoyed because they could pinpoint the source of some infectious 
diseases that threatened the Parisian population. Both the lavoirs publics and 
bateaux-lavoirs – while they existed – presented a risk of contamination. This 
represented a change from the tacit acceptance enjoyed by the bateaux-lavoir 
until 1885.  Public hygiene focused on small and clandestine laundry facilities 
since they rarely adopted the measures hygienists set forth to stop the spread of 
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disease. In Paris, it was difficult to operate large lavoirs publics; thus, it was 
mainly the small facilities that remained in the city. The hygienists favored the 
larger facilities that could integrate all the hygiene regulations. Poor women faced 
a difficult situation; as the administrators phased out the bateaux, they had fewer 
choices and frequented the clandestine facilities that had no safeguards for their or 
the publics’ health. The hygienists’ influence produced more mechanization in the 
blanchisseries, which the small facilities could not imitate. The law of 1905 on 
the manipulation of dirty linen made the facilities and laundresses criminals 
because they went against the law and threatened the health of Paris by not 
following hygienists’ prescriptions. The owners established legal facilities on the 
outskirts of Paris, not in its center. As knowledge of the germ theory progressed, 
public hygienists pointed at laundresses as actual contributors to the transmission 
of disease, not only the facilities. The1905 law on the manipulation of used linen 
written by public hygienists targeted laundresses as possible incubators for the 
contagious diseases of their clients which they could then transmit to their family 
such as diphtheria, measles, and tuberculosis.  The goal for hygienists was to 
completely mechanize the process of laundry so that laundresses were not in 
control of the occupation and the cleaning process, but a machine approved by the 
hygienists, which illustrates the process that rendered laundresses, not only out of 
place in the city of Paris, but even potentially dangerous to the city’s health.  
 Chapter five investigates the blanchisseries surrounding Paris that seemed 
to provide the answer to several problems. Laundresses would be out of sight, 
hanging laundry would no longer conjure images of poverty and pollution, and 
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the businesses would be able to incorporate the latest developments in public 
hygiene. Hygienists in particular championed the improved health and hygiene 
standards of the industrial establishments. They touted the blanchisseries as the 
answer to the city’s problems with laundry businesses; the problems with 
pollution of the Seine by bateaux-lavoirs and the possibility of epidemics coming 
from the small laundry boutiques that could not adhere to prescriptions on 
manipulating dirty laundry. However, the blanchisseries presented new problems. 
The chapter examines the investigations on the adherence to the law of 1905, 
regulating the manipulation of dirty laundry in view of contagious diseases like 
tuberculosis, typhoid and diphtheria. The investigation revealed that the 
blanchisseries were not havens of cleanliness as the hygienists had argued when 
trying to close the bateaux-lavoirs. Dirty clothes were still being sorted in rooms 
with clean clothes and workers were still exposed to dangerous contagious 
diseases. The investigations on the adherence to the 1906 law requiring a rest day 
on Sunday revealed that the owners of the blanchisseries did not necessarily 
follow the law. The work structure of the industrial blanchisseries, in which 
women were simply employees with no personal stake in the business except that 
of wage worker, meant that they conceived themselves as workers with rights to 
be fought for. In this chapter their agency is revealed through the historical record 
in ways that was not possible when studying other types of historical sources for 
the other chapters. The working conditions were different from the lavoirs and 
bateaux-lavoirs and were not safer as the owners of the establishments introduced 
more industrial machinery. These changes allowed the laundresses to conceive of 
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themselves as workers with rights; sources like socialists newspapers show that 
they went on strike to fight for their rights. The chapter illustrates that the 
hygienists’ ideas about the qualities of the blanchisseries stemmed more from the 
public policy of making them invisible and sweeping them out of public spaces 
than any health improvements for the city or the laundresses.  
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Chapter 2 
THE BEGINING OF LAUNDRY REGULATIONS IN PARIS: 1800-1840 
 Burgeoning during the Consulate period, the regulations concerning 
laundry and the physical environment of Paris reflected the emerging ideas about 
the uses of public space and inextricably linked public hygiene to laundry in the 
city. The city administrators sought to reorganize the uses of public space, i.e., 
roads and the Seine, to enable the circulation of people and goods around the 
capital. The public hygiene movement targeted laundresses as transmitters of 
disease who presented a danger to the health of Paris’ residents. As Mary Douglas 
has argued, being associated with pollution and disease signified a transgression 
of societal norms. In order to correct the transgression, the society in question 
needed to eliminate the dirt or transgressor –laundresses and laundry – from their 
midst to purify and reestablish equilibrium. 88  Searching for a new balance in 
Paris, the city administration attempted to sweep the obstacles and pollution out 
of public city space. Examining laundresses and the regulation of their occupation 
sheds light on how and why the administrators of Paris changed the uses of city 
space and how that change negatively affected poor women in the city.   
 Beginning in 1800, the reorganization of the chief of police’s duties to 
include the safety of public thoroughfares and cleanliness of the city prompted 
more regulations regarding laundry in Paris. Increased concern for the city 
environment led to the public hygiene movement. One can trace the advent of an 
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organized community of physicians, scientists, architects and social commentators 
with the appearance of the Annales d’Hygiène publique et de médecine légale 
started by the leader of the movement, Louis-René Villermé in 1829.89 It also 
contributed ideas that the Conseil de Salubrité used to create a series of 
regulations limiting the use of the river and the building of laundry facilities 
within and surrounding Paris, which negatively affected laundresses. By 1830, 
public health officials and city administrators began a campaign to clean the 
laundresses out of city space.  
 The early connection between health and the reorganization of the urban 
environment affected Parisian laundresses in multiple ways. At the beginning of 
the July Monarchy as Préfet de la Seine, Claude-Philibert Barthelot de Rambuteau 
sought to improve the functioning of Paris. City administrators connected 
laundering with health dangers like stagnant water creating so-called miasmas 
which was the Conseil de Salubrité’s primary preoccupation.90  Examining 
laundresses and the legislation which sought to control them in the first half of the 
nineteenth century illustrates the development of the public hygiene movement 
and its adverse effects on an occupation done by poor women.                                                                         
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The Laundering Process  
Whether they were professional laundresses or women doing their 
household chores, most women – if they lived near the Seine – used the river to 
wash laundry. They used the river banks to hang their laundry and waded into 
deeper sections of the river, taking stones to create pools for washing. In the 
summer months, when the river was low, boat captains could see the stones, but 
they were still obstacles. However, during the times when the river was higher, 
the stones became dangerous because the river submerged them. In any case the 
stones reduced the navigability of the main water way through Paris. In 1805, an 
ordinance prohibited women from using the river for washing or hanging clothes 
on the banks and required that they only use bateaux-lavoirs.91 The use of the 
Seine and its banks for laundering purposes presented an obstacle to those 
wanting to navigate the river; in 1813 an order from the Préfet de Police made 
this practice illegal and required bateaux-lavoirs owners to prevent women from 
using and altering river banks.92  
 Urban laundering was a complicated process due to lack of access to space 
and water, particularly after the 1805 ordinance and the Préfet de Police’s order in 
1813. Each process in a non-mechanized facility took at a least one day, if not 
                                                 
 
91 Archives Préfecture de Police de Paris, hereafter cited as APP, DB 336, 
Navigation, Ordonnance : Interdictions d’étendre linge ou de placer ustensiles sur 
les berges. Aucune femme ne peut venir laver du linge sur le bord de la rivière, 9 
mai 1805. 
 
92 APP DA 336, Navigation. Ordre émanant de la Préfecture de Police chargeant 
les propriétaires de bateaux à lessive de s’opposer à ce qu’aucune femme ne 
vienne laver du linge sur le bord de la rivière et qu’elle y apporte des pierres 17 
mai 1813. 
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multiple days. First the laundress passed the clothes through a pre-soak in tepid 
water without any cleaners for twenty-four hours to forty-eight hours. Although 
the laundress could leave the laundry soaking at the bateau-lavoir or lavoir, the 
soaking step could take place virtually anywhere, including her apartment, if 
space allowed. This operation created the most problems and was usually done at 
the laundresses’ home to save money; they would then bring the soaked clothes to 
the boats or the terrestrial lavoir.93 The linens became very heavy once wet, so 
women sometimes skipped this process. Further, the pre-soaking process was not 
always practiced because it was too indiscreet to soak the clothes in public 
establishments. It was indiscreet because this was the only process where the 
stains could be easily seen. The laundresses would be working on lifting the stains 
or the laundry was boiling in a cauldron. Only women who had facilities at home 
still practiced the pre-soaking step. Women’s habits changed as they adapted to 
washing with strangers. If the lavoir had a private room to soak, women would 
use it; otherwise the practice was obsolete.94 After the soaking, the next step was 
soaping and scrubbing the laundry. The laundress would combine the soaping, 
scrubbing and rinsing by taking the laundry to a facility where there was space to 
lay the laundry flat to clean it and then enough water available to do the rinsing. 
Then, she placed the laundry into a boiling vat before going to the bleaching or 
azure processes, which she used to make dark-colored clothes retain their color. 
                                                 
93 APP, DA 337 Navigation, Rapport par Dr. Gerardin, L’altération des eaux de la 
Seine par les bateaux-lavoirs établis dans la traversée de Paris, 4 Décembre 1885, 
38.  
 
94 APP, DA 336 Navigation, Gilbert Pouchet « Réponse au rapport de M. 
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After completing the water processes, she could then take the laundry back to her 
home to dry it in multiple trips if there were large quantities or, if available, she 
could use a dedicated drying area at the facility which was included in the price.95 
 Laundering involved various evolving locales in Paris. The terms 
buanderies and lavoirs are used interchangeably in archival documents to mean 
terrestrial laundry establishments. The buanderie was the place laundresses used 
specifically and uniquely to boil laundry; the soaking, washing, bleaching and 
drying processes would be done somewhere else. This study will use the term 
lavoir which was a more general facility where the soaking, boiling, and washing 
could be done. If the lavoir used anything mechanized, the most common 
machine was the chaudière à vapeur (steam engine) that burned coal to produce 
both hot water to wash and pressure to run a mechanized arm – that turned 
laundry while it was boiling – or a spinning machine to spin excess water out of 
the clothes and enable them to dry faster. These mechanized facilities generally 
had a man who oversaw operations and checked on the steam engines that many 
facilities used to heat the water, to pump water from underground wells, and to 
power the spinning machines that were in common use after 1830.96  
                                                 
95 I have compiled a description of the complete laundering process from the 
following reports studying the pollution of water by laundry facilities. APP, DA 
337 Navigation, Rapport par Dr. Gerardin, L’altération des eaux de la Seine par 
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In the small ateliers, the situation was more complicated because limited 
space and air flow led to a longer drying time. The small ateliers had a – justified 
– reputation among public health officials for having no ventilation and very 
humid conditions, which they estimated were dangerous breeding grounds of 
illnesses.97 Spinning machines only came into use in the mid-nineteenth century, 
so the clothes would be dripping wet. There were also problems created when 
women took their customers’ laundry to their own apartments to dry. They would 
hang them outside where the laundry would rest against the buildings causing 
water to leak into the apartments below or seep into the façade of the building.98 
Women who were professional laundresses and women who did their own 
laundry faced new challenges when trying to do laundry in the city. The lack of 
acceptable space to carry out the activity, especially the drying, was a major 
obstacle.  
Until 1870 when Haussmann had built the majority of the sewers, there 
were few laundry establishments that did not take water from, and drain into, the 
Seine. Most laundry was done outdoors on the banks of the Seine. Laundresses 
who took stones out into the river to create pools for soaking and rinsing 
exasperated the city administrators who preferred the Seine free of obstacles to 
ensure the navigation on the river. The women soaped and beat the linen to 
dislodge the most stubborn dirt on the river banks where they had small wooden 
                                                 
 
97 APP, DB 226 Blanchisseries. Henri Bunel « Rapport au Conseil de Salubrité: 
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98 L.M. Lefort, Buanderies publiques pour remplacer tous les bateaux à lessives 
(Paris: chez l’auteur, 1823), 10. 
  57 
boxes with a rounded end to make kneeling more comfortable and protect their 
clothes from the water and mud. However, working in the water with wet linens 
made it almost impossible to stay dry. Laundresses were outside in wet clothing, 
subjecting themselves to arthritis, rheumatism, and skin diseases, but also making 
them tantalizing objects of an eroticized discourse.99 In addition, they would get 
cold and sometimes develop pneumonia. By good weather, they could hang the 
clothes along the river banks, until the administration forbade it 1805.  
Although they were subject to all types of inclement weather, bateaux-
lavoirs, which came into use in the early seventeenth century, provided places for 
laundresses that were more comfortable than kneeling at the river bank; 
laundresses were not obliged to enter into the water to access the pools they 
constructed for soaking and rinsing. In the 1820s, the bateaux-lavoirs owners 
began building wooden frames on the boats to protect the laundresses and laundry 
from the weather, making the boats more comfortable and efficient for drying 
clothes, which attracted more business. The bateaux-lavoirs with a chassis could 
have up to four levels, with the manager’s apartment on one and rooms for drying 
on the top, which were ventilated for maximum air flow. The bateau-lavoir had to 
be far enough in the river to take advantage of its current to take in water and to 
flush away the used water. This system necessitated that the bateaux-lavoirs could 
float since they were, at times, away from the banks of the river. There were 
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various occasions when the bateau came away from its moorings and floated into 
other property on the river, or when the bateau was not kept in good condition 
and sank, or was destroyed by ice or flooding. Laundresses also had to pay for a 
place on the boat. The bateaux-lavoirs were on city property, and the owner paid 
a small rent fee for their mooring place. Being on city property made the bateaux-
lavoirs, like the laundresses on the riverbanks, vulnerable to any changes to 
usages of city space. Women would carry their customers’ laundry to the bateaux-
lavoirs – after having retrieved it from them as part of the regular service of a 
laundress – or brought their own laundry to wash. This meant the bateaux-lavoirs  
were used by women in the neighborhoods close to the river; before Haussmann 
rebuilt the city, l’Ile de la Cité and the left bank included housing for the poor.100 
Laundresses brought everything they had to wash to the bateaux-lavoirs.  
There were very few terrestrial lavoirs between 1800 and 1840. Owing to 
drainage problems and river-front property being more costly, small ateliers could 
not obtain permission from the Conseil de Salubrité to construct away from a 
water source. In addition, drying space was at a premium in every laundry facility 
including bateaux-lavoirs. Since the facilities were not large within Paris, there 
was rarely enough space for all who wanted to wash at their neighborhood 
facility, especially since the bateaux-lavoirs served both professional laundresses 
and women doing their own laundry. Customers who gave their clothing to a 
laundress using a small lavoir or bateau-lavoir could expect a delay of six to eight 
                                                 
100 David Jordan, Transforming Paris: The life and Labors of Baron Haussmann 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 187.  
  59 
weeks in the winter, and three to four weeks in the summer. The washing 
processes could take up to a week, while drying time was also a large factor in the 
delay. 101 Laundresses would keep the laundry in their rooms until there was space 
in the facility.102 
 This short examination of the laundering process in Paris underscores the 
lack of space and resources necessary for the task; even without the regulations 
and limitations the city administration added the occupation was difficult and 
costly.    
Historical Antecedents to Laundering in the Nineteenth Century 
 Laundresses and other working women occupied city spaces in the Old 
Regime.103 Since water was difficult to obtain in dwellings and other 
establishments not connected to a natural water source, laundresses were a fixture 
of any space that had access to water near fountains or on a river.104 However, the 
city administrators gradually began to limit the physical spaces available to 
laundresses, though before the Revolution, there was only one piece of legislation 
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concerning laundresses and their presence on the Parisian waterways. The Arrêté 
of 1763 instructed laundresses not to bring rocks to create pools to wash in, or to 
place tonneaux along the banks or in the river without permission; the tonneaux 
were barrels set into the river bank used for collecting water and washing 
laundry.105  At that time, the regulations did not forbid access to the waters, but 
limited how laundresses used the surrounding space like the 1805 regulation. 
Laundresses continued to use the river for laundering. Yet, there was already a 
tension developing between city administrators and the women’s use of space. 
In 1792, reacting from boat captains’ grievances during the Revolution, 
the Administrateur des Subsistances et Approvisionnements complained to the 
Préfet de la Seine that laundresses presented a danger to themselves and those 
who navigated the Seine.106 Laundresses would wade into deeper parts of the river 
where the current was faster and take stones into the river to create pools to wash 
in. The boat captains were worried about hitting the stones that would become 
submerged when the water level rose or become obstacles when the water levels 
dropped. The organization and use of public space was already a concern which 
restricted the laundresses’ use of the river banks.  
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Distinct factors contributed to the growing river traffic reported by the 
Administrateur des Subsistances et Approvisionnements in 1792: increased food 
shipments associated with the severe food shortages occurring in Paris; France’s 
declaration war on Holland and Britain necessitated food and weapons for troops 
leaving the capital. As the government wanted to change the usage of the Seine to 
a thoroughfare for the movement of goods and people, the laundresses saw their 
access to the river restricted because they were obstacles to navigating the Seine. 
However, it was only in the beginning of the nineteenth century that there was a 
concerted effort to remove the women completely from using the space around 
the Seine in Paris and move them inside laundry establishments.                                                                                           
Legislating Laundry: The Early Stages 
As the Napoleonic Consulate came to power in 1799 and began re-
ordering France, the bureaucracy of the city grew. After the tumult of the 
Revolution, the Consulate turned its attention to bringing in more tax revenue and 
re-ordering Paris. The Consulate created a series of prefects to head the various 
departments beginning with the Arrêté of 1 juillet 1800, which outlined the Préfet 
de Police’s duties. He was to ensure the safety of the public thoroughfares and the 
cleanliness of the city. His duties also extended to regulating any businesses on 
the waters of the department de la Seine, in addition to possessing the authority to 
require repairs of the businesses, the ports, or quais. This regulation formally 
placed the laundresses – and anything relating to laundry – under the control and 
surveillance of the Préfet de Police. However, the system required he also 
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communicate any decisions to the Préfet de la Seine; if there was any dispute in 
the decision, the Préfet de la Seine had the veto power.  
Starting in 1800, a year after the Consulate came to power; the 
functionaries turned their attention to the use of public space, which included 
rivers. Laundresses in the center of Paris who did not have other means of 
accessing water used the river Seine and the smaller river Bièvre, located to the 
south, in what is now the 13th arrondissement. The southern communes 
surrounding Paris consisted of working-class neighborhoods where many 
laundresses lived.107  Numerous leather-tanning establishments, cloth dyers, as 
well as laundresses used the Bièvre, which had a reputation for foul odors and for 
being essentially a stream where manufacturers dumped their waste products. 
However, with the increased attention to the Parisian rivers, the acceptability of 
laundresses using the Seine and the Bièvre inside of Paris began to shift, 
reflecting the new government’s impetus to reorganize France and its capital. In 
1801 the Napoleonic consulate introduced a new set of regulations that focused on 
laundresses using the river Seine and the Bièvre. 
In July of 1801, Louis Nicolas Dubois, the newly created Préfet de Police, 
in charge of regulating everything connected to the river and ports, developed 
specific regulations on tonneaux; no one could install a tonneau without 
permission, which the owner had to renew every year.108 Before this regulation, 
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the Bièvre was open to all who wished to establish tonneaux, at no charge. On the 
river Bièvre, one could put a tonneau permanently in the bank and own a bit of 
space for laundering. Since the Bièvre ran through predominantly working class 
neighborhoods, it was a vital source to poor women for free laundering. The 1801 
regulations also meant that the women who wanted to establish new tonneaux 
would need to be able to read and write to make an application, or pay someone to 
write the application for them, thus creating circumstances where it would be 
much more difficult for women to build their own washing facilities while the 
administration closed other previously free and available places such as the 
Seine.109  Then, in 1803, the Napoleonic regime taxed the tonneaux already 
installed and created a legal framework for pursuing those who did not pay their 
taxes on time on their tonneaux.110 Now, the laundresses who used them were 
under a financial obligation. The taxes made it possible for the government to take 
                                                                                                                                     
tonneau ne doit être placé sur la rivière Bièvre sans une permission qui doit être 
renouvelée tous les ans. Tonneau were barrels set into the river bank that could be 
used for washing. 
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The numbers do not reveal the literacy rates specifically for poor women in Paris; 
however, from these statistics, the literacy rates were not high among poor women 
until the advent of compulsory primary school in the Third Republic. Istaván 
György Tóth, Literacy and Written Culture in early-modern Central Europe, 
trans. Tünde Vadja and Miklós Bodóczky (New York: Central European 
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redevables de la Bièvre en retard de payer.  
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ownership of the tonneaux. These barrels provided crucial access to water for 
laundering to poor women; the government was limiting the free places to wash 
laundry in Paris in its quest to bring all areas of the city under regulation and 
augment its revenues with new taxes.  
The Parisian bateaux-lavoirs were the next laundry facilities to come 
under the scrutiny and regulation of the Préfet de Police as part of his mandate to 
regulate matters on the rivers. The Ordonnance of 9 may 1805 set new terms for 
using city space for laundering. For the first time, the law required a prospective 
bateau-lavoir owner to obtain permission from the Préfet de Police to establish 
their business and place a boat on the river. Under the Old Regime, one had 
petitioned the king to establish commerce on the Seine.111 The law on bateaux-
lavoirs of May 1805 stated, for the first time, that it was illegal to hang linens on 
the river banks. It also reiterated that any implements the laundresses used to 
launder in the river - boards, rocks, and perches - were illegal, and river inspectors 
would take them away. The law also obliged the boat owners to provide places for 
indigents with cards from the mayor of their arrondissement.112 In requiring the 
bateaux-lavoirs owners to provide places for the indigent, the law recognized that 
restricting access to the river would limit the poor women’s ability to wash 
laundry.                                                                                                             
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Terrestrial based laundering in Paris was a complicated process because 
there was little water-based infrastructure such as sewers and water distribution 
points. Hence, there were few terrestrial laundry establishments. For the first time, 
in the winter of 1810, terrestrial laundry facilities attracted the attention of city 
bureaucracy due to drainage problems. This wave of attention from administrators 
began with the classification of dangerous businesses targeting laundry facilities 
on the ground. Even if there were few of them, they were noticeable by the 
inconveniences they produced and governmental scrutiny and regulations added 
another set of obstacles to those that existed. These facilities caused problems 
when they drained dirty water into the roadway; it froze in the winter and, in the 
summer, it stagnated and began to give off foul odors.  
In 1810, Paris had a very rudimentary system of underground water 
conduits, which emptied into the nearest river, canal or underground tank.113 The 
lack of available sewers complicated the laundering process on the ground with 
the need to drain large amounts of water. Many laundry facilities resorted to 
draining their laundry basins into the street. Various citizens, mostly business 
owners, wrote to the Préfet de Police and Préfet de la Seine, complaining that the 
lavoirs were impeding traffic because they dumped waste water on the roads, 
which discouraged customers from using their businesses because the road was 
thick with ice.114 The Préfet de la Seine commissioned a report to study the worst 
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cases and reiterated that it was the responsibility of the laundry owner to channel 
its drainage to the rivers. 115 The Préfet de la Seine asked that the Préfet de Police 
investigate the worst offenders and report back to him. If the transgressors did not 
change their practice, they could be fined.116 The action taken by the Préfet de 
Police assisted in meeting the goal of reorganizing public roads to improve 
circulation of goods and people. In the following decade, lavoirs and 
blanchisseries would move outside the city to take advantage of still-inexpensive 
land by the Seine to take care of their water and drainage needs and build larger 
facilities. The affluent chose to send their clothing to blanchisseries. These were 
the largest establishments with the most modern equipment and practices. 
Laundresses could not use blanchisseries unless they were employed by the 
establishment.  
In response to the complaints engendered by the drainage issues of lavoirs, 
and as part of a general series of reforms, the government appointed the Préfet de 
Police to regulate businesses within Paris. As part of regulating businesses in 
Paris, an ordonnance in 1815 placed lavoirs in a classification of businesses 
considered dangerous, harmful, or a public nuisance.117 The complaints regarding 
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the laundry businesses up to that time focused on redirecting drainage off the 
public thoroughfare.  
 To better regulate businesses in the city and encourage the desired uses of 
public space- reserving roads and the river for circulation- the new regulation 
obligated the owner of a classified business, including laundries, to apply for a 
permit from the Préfet de Police. The application required a study of the impact 
of the business on public hygiene and any inherent problems the physical 
emplacement contained. The rubric of the study also requested the investigator to 
question the neighbors of the proposed facility and to report any known problems 
to the Préfet de Police.118  If the business did not have permission to open, the 
Préfet de Police could close it. In the poorer neighborhoods, laundry facilities 
could appear and disappear quickly when residents tried to create their own 
business. Many had no authorization from the Préfet de Police with the requisite 
studies. Problems could arise, like water draining into the foundation of a 
building, making it unstable or the street becoming muddy and impassable. These 
were some of the problems the inspectors for the Préfet de Police reported.119 By 
1815, all the laundering spaces within Paris - tonneaux, bateaux, the river banks, 
and lavoirs - were under the control and surveillance of the Préfet de Police.   
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Attempts to Change the Usage of the Seine  
In 1823, Louis XVIII awarded L.M. Lefort a patent for his idea of a public 
lavoir that would move the women inside, out of the public regard, and rid the 
city of the bateaux-lavoirs. Lefort proposed the king invest in a series of public 
lavoirs that his business would then construct and administer throughout Paris. He 
proposed building public establishments that would bring together all the steps of 
laundering in one place. In fact, the bateaux-lavoirs were the least expensive way 
to do the soaking and boiling steps in Paris for poor women. Yet, throughout the 
pamphlet Lefort described the sight of the bateaux-lavoirs and laundresses as the 
most troublesome aspect of laundry in Paris and used polemical terms to convince 
the city of the need to build his public lavoirs, as a way to remedy the problem. 
His idea to rid the Seine of bateaux-lavoirs coincided with ideas about changing 
the uses of urban space. To draw a contrast with what Lefort called the 
“disgraceful” bateaux-lavoirs, he highlighted the monuments of Paris such as the 
Louvre, the bridges over the Seine, and the architecture, which he identified as 
“grand and elegant.”120 He expanded upon the artistic values of the city which, in 
his words, were the envy of the world. The only part of the scene that did not fit 
the sumptuous and important surroundings, in his estimation, were the bateaux-
lavoirs and the laundresses. He argued that seeing these women was not 
acceptable because they were contrary to the beautification of the capital. 
Describing how they would disgust the traveler with their scenes of poverty, 
                                                 
120 APP DA 336 Navigation,  Lefort, Buanderies publiques pour remplacer tous 
les bateaux à lessives actuellement établis sur la Seine qui gênent la navigation. 
(Paris : Chez l’Auteur Rue des Prouvaires 10, 1823) 15.   
  69 
Lefort exclaimed that the bateaux in fact defaced Paris of its culture and beauty: 
“when visitors crossed these floating rags they must doubt that they are in the 
capital of civilization.”121 Being out of sight, “the streets and river banks would 
no longer offer an undignified spectacle in the majesty of the capital.” 122 Lefort 
emphasized that to provide the laundresses with better conditions was not a 
philanthropic enterprise but a means to clear out the “disgusting” bateaux-
lavoirs.123 This was an example of modernizing impulses happening much before 
Haussmann. As Nicholas Papayanis described, the river was already a focal point 
in the 1820s for those who would re-conceptualize Parisian space.124 The visible 
laundresses were personae non gratae; Lefort described them as “unhappy women 
who wash laundry themselves at the river” and that the women “bring back the 
laundry more soiled than they got it, washing near the outlets of sewers.”125 His 
discourse about laundresses was characterized by scenes of poverty and 
ignorance. He accused the bateaux-lavoirs of impeding the navigation of the river 
by commercial boats that would, in his words, “make much better use of the main 
artery of the capital of France.”126 He implied that the women were ignorant of 
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the difference between clean and dirty. The laundresses used dirty water to 
launder and, in turn, “polluted the waters around the most beautiful monuments in 
the world like the cathedral of Notre Dame.”127   In his view, laundresses were 
just poor women fouling Paris blocking better uses of the Seine. Moreover, they 
were not even really cleaning the clothes they washed. Laundresses were out of 
place among the monuments to triumph and culture in Paris.                                                                                  
Lefort used the three arguments that made the laundresses, and laundry 
facilities in Paris matter out of place for the duration of the nineteenth century: 
they exposed the poverty in Paris; they impeded navigation on the river Seine; 
and they soiled the waters of the river. Lefort’s proposal, which the office of the 
Préfet de Police reviewed, outlined the places and facilities the business would 
construct. He proposed to build lavoirs in four areas, all close to the Seine, for 
drainage and water needs. He argued that while the buildings would be open to 
both laundresses by trade and women who did their own laundry, the two distinct 
users would not cross paths thus preserving the women from the laundresses 
“indecent language.”128 The attitude that the ménagères needed to be protected 
from those whose occupation was that of a laundress illustrated the paid 
laundresses’ general low social status. Lefort reported that the residents of Paris 
had all been favorable to the project. However, Louis XVIII did not implement 
Lefort’s idea, possibly due to his declining health beginning in 1823 and his death 
in 1824. Moreover, Gaspard de Chabrol, Préfet de la Seine, was also preoccupied 
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with other public works like building the canal Saint-Martin and Saint-Denis and 
finishing l’Ourcq, paving roads and building the beginnings of the Parisian sewer 
system.129 These projects required considerable funds, and Louis XVIII gave him 
a patent for his idea but not the required money.  
  Louis XVIII’s death left Lefort bereft of royal support, so he 
concentrated on stockholders to fund his venture into public lavoirs. Two years 
later, in 1826, in order to advertise his company for individuals to buy stock in it, 
Lefort reprinted the sections of his pamphlet in the daily newspaper the Journal 
de Paris, which was interested in public health matters, as well as other topics.  
that underlined the problems the bateaux-lavoirs created for navigation and the 
negative images the of the bateaux compared with the grandeur of Paris.130 Lefort 
planned to build the first facility in the St. Michel neighborhood (current 5th 
arrondissement) in what was, and still is, a working-class and student 
neighborhood in central Paris. Lefort’s proposal thus recognized the needs of 
poorer areas of the city to have access to facilities where women could wash 
laundry for themselves or customers. The same article also appeared in the 
Moniteur Universel.131 However, he was not able to draw private investment and 
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there was no discernable government reaction to his attempts to attract attention, 
and his businesses never opened.   
 Despite Lefort’s pamphlet132 underlining the many faults of bateaux-
lavoirs, primarily their appearance in the center of Paris, the Préfet de Police still 
permitted the boats to make repairs and in one case, to entirely replace a boat that 
had rotted.133 For example, a port inspector brought to the attention of the Préfet 
de Police one boat that was in an unstable state upstream of the Louvier island- 
which was just east of the Ile St-Louis.134 An inspector visited the eastablishment 
and recommended that it close.135 After this recommendation, a relative of the 
owner wrote to the Préfet de Police to fight the decision, underlining that the 
owner was eighty years old, and had already finished a round of work to make it 
ready for laundresses. The Préfet de Police contacted the Préfet de la Seine to 
advise him of the decision. In this case, the Préfet de Police left the final say to 
the Préfet de la Seine since there was reclamation against the original ruling. The 
Préfet de la Seine upheld the original decision, but allowed the boat to be sold to a 
Monsieur Petit who owned another bateaux-lavoir, proposed to enlarge his 
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business, and was able to carry out the necessary repairs.136 This case illustrates 
that the bateaux-lavoirs were still welcomed in Paris and that the Préfet de la 
Seine could overrule decisions over the wishes of the Préfet de Police, the 
navigation engineers and the Conseil de Salubrité. Another bateau-lavoir near the 
St. Bernard port, located in the 5th arrondissement upstream of Pont de Sully, 
highlights the goals of city administrators. This boat was able to make extensive 
repairs with the enthusiastic approval of the inspector for the Préfet de Police. 
The owner wanted to refurbish the boat completely, replace the bottom and install 
a frame over the boat so that it would be enclosed with a wood framework and 
glass. This improvement would allow for more comfortable washing since the 
laundresses would be protected from the weather. Moreover, the frame had three 
levels which comprised a residence for the manager of the boat, but also included 
a covered drying space to dry the clothes more quickly and keep the clothes clean 
and away from any soot or smoke coming from the steam engine that pumped 
water and powered the clothes-spinning machines. The inspector for the office of 
the Préfet de Police supported the changes the owner applied for in a report to his 
superiors because “the new model perfectly hides the laundresses from public 
view.”137 This instance confirms the new aesthetic ideology which focused on the 
uniformity of public space where city administrators attempted to reorder what 
was becoming out of place in Paris. The office of navigation did not have any 
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problems with the owner replacing and adding a few meters onto the length of his 
new boat. The concern was not for clearing the river yet, but making the public 
space reflect an image of uniformity by supporting new boats, and even better, 
ones with a chassis, hiding anything that was not in keeping with its surroundings.  
Public Hygiene and Water issues: Access, Drainage and Sewers 
In 1828 the office of the Préfet de Police investigated the first complaint 
that a lavoir was the source of a large amount of stagnant water that gave off foul 
odors which were not conducive to public health. Neighbors often denounced the 
clandestine laundry facilities because of drainage problems. The used water 
would become fetid with the soluble matters washed from the laundry stagnating 
in the court. 138  Alain Corbin found that the sensitivity to foul odors inspired the 
administration to engage in a “topographical toilette” to rid the city of noxious 
odors that, since the 1740s, were no longer acceptable to urban dwellers: 
disinfection was deodorization.139 As Donald Olsen described, “domestic piped 
water came late to Paris…which lacked the luxury even of defective sewer of 
[English Victorian towns]. It is a measure of the foulness of its streets and 
dwellings that English visitors, their expectations lowered and their sensibilities 
coarsened by the sanitary conditions of their own towns, were invariably horrified 
by the stench and filth of Paris.” 140  
                                                 
138 APP DB 226,  Inspecteur de Préfet de Police 10 avril 1828.  
 
139 Ibid., 89.   
 
140 Donald J. Olsen, The City as a Work of Art (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1986), 37. 
  75 
The Parisian drainage systems were varied. Yet, none dealt effectively 
with the waste water of Paris without the concurrent inconveniences for the 
Conseil de Salubrité. There were three types of drainage systems: the first 
involved cesspools, which were sealed or draining pits; the second type were 
canals in the middle of the streets or on the sides that directed waters either to 
cesspools or underground canals which eventually emptied into the Seine; and the 
third type consisted of underground cesspools.141 A leading medical theory 
posited that foul smells, especially those coming from excrement, carried disease 
that could infect anyone who breathed in the foul odor.142 In fact, fecal matters 
stored in cesspools emptied – directly or indirectly – into gutters, whose water the 
poor scooped for personal use.143 Thus, the scarcity of water distribution points in 
Paris and the unavailability of sewers greatly related to disease and mortality. 
The inattention to the project of building lavoirs publics may also have stemmed 
from the inadequacy of the sewer system in Paris. 144 Louis-René Villermé began 
his career as a public hygienist with his extensive study on drainage and miasma 
and the connections to death. 145 Yet, the Conseil de Salubrité could do nothing 
else but suggest improvements since the sewers were under the management of 
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the Préfet de la Seine, not the Préfet de Police, to whom the Conseil reported.146 
Haussmann completed nearly the entire sewer system by 1867, although there 
were areas like Belleville that had to wait until the Third Republic to have a 
completed sewer system in their neighborhood.147 The process of building a 
complete sewer system for Paris was not completed until the twentieth century.148 
Every Préfet de la Seine until Haussmann had his own project to ameliorate the 
waste disposal sewers. However, despite the personal projects of the Préfets de la 
Seine, the water delivery system was not able to meet the demand from a 
constantly growing city. Water in general was difficult to manage for the 
antiquated Parisian system. 149 The laundry business and laundresses were caught 
between the Conseil de Salubrité’s quest to control the drainage of waste water 
and the inadequacy of the infrastructure to supply and drain the necessary 
amounts of water. 
 Despite the critique leveled at the bateaux-lavoirs, and the women who 
worked in them, for allegedly ruining the appearance of Paris, the laundry 
facilities for public use on land presented other types of problems that the Conseil 
de Salubrité were more concerned about. In March of 1828, the Préfet de Police 
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sent out a memorandum to all the mayors of the arrondissements of Paris and 
surrounding communes of the Departement de la Seine about granting permission 
to establish public or private laundry facilities.150 The main problem the Préfet de 
Police outlined was water drainage. Since there were very limited sewers in place 
within Paris and almost none in the surrounding communes at this time, the 
laundry business was responsible for building the pits or tanks to drain water into. 
However, if the owners left the water to stagnate and it did not drain, the water 
would develop a strong, unpleasant odor, which in his view “happened more often 
than not if one saw all of the complaints my office received.”151 Gaspard de 
Chabrol, The Préfet de la Seine at the time, first reminded the Conseil de 
Salubrité that all laundry establishments needed to be approved by the office of 
the Préfet de Police since Napoleon’s ordinance classed them as dangerous or 
insalubrious establishments. According to the Préfet de Police, the solution to all 
of the problems the terrestrial laundries presented was to only allow them to build 
on or near the river, so they could drain their water directly into it. The inter-
office memorandum suggested he would not consider any request that was not 
near the river.152 Building next to the river was also preferable because the water 
delivery systems in the city were rudimentary and never met the needs of laundry 
establishments alone. In Paris, building or opening a lavoir with easy drainage 
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next to the river was nearly impossible since the laundry business was not very 
profitable. High rents would make the business untenable. In 1828, the same year 
that the Préfet de la Seine circulated the memorandum, two laundry 
establishments – which had had problems with the public hygiene inspectors the 
year before because of their drainage systems – were inadequate, and neighbors 
had complained about the odors emanating from their drainage pits in the Quartier 
des Invalides. The lavoir owners then petitioned the mayor of Grenelle to move it 
just outside the limits of Paris and to construct a new state-of-the-art 
blanchisserie.153 Drainage would not be a problem because the facility could be 
built next to the river, away from the center, where property was not as expensive. 
Moving out of Paris into the surrounding communes would become a trend for the 
larger establishments looking for more space to build large facilities that could fill 
the laundry needs for hundreds of customers in Paris, as opposed to the smaller 
establishments in basements or courtyards of apartment buildings that 
characterized the facilities within the city limits. Laundry pick-up and delivery 
was one of the functions provided by professional laundresses. The larger 
establishments had their own horse-drawn carriages to make delivery even 
faster.154 The mayor of Grenelle also received an application for a dual-purpose 
private and public lavoir of grand proportions, a reservoir of forty meters with a 
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lavoir public around the reservoir with a steam pump feeding the reservoir from 
the Seine, for a total of one hundred and sixty meters of lavoirs publics and 
another building to take in customers’ laundry. The owner was moving his 
business from the Quartier des Invalides in central Paris to a large property on the 
Plaine de Grenelle where there was room to build pits to drain water into.155 
 These lavoirs publics moving out of Paris expose the problems businesses 
had operating within the constraints of the city. The migration of laundry facilities 
towards the blanlieue again limited the places a laundress could do her 
occupation. The mayor of Grenelle granted all of the requests to establish laundry 
facilities with no opposition presented. These cases illustrate the problems that 
laundry facilities encountered trying to operate in the city and the ease with which 
they could move out of the city and find a location with easier operating 
conditions. In the long term, the facilities that moved out of Paris in the 1820s 
became part of Paris in the 1860s. Yet, there were still laundresses and other 
women who needed the facilities who lived in the central arrondissements. With 
the message from the Préfet de Police discriminating against any laundry 
establishment that could not drain into the river, going outside of Paris was 
attractive for owners. As more lavoirs left Paris, laundresses had to rely on 
clandestine businesses that had not obtained permission to open from the Préfet 
de Police.  
                                                 
 
155 ADS DO9 23 Etablissements insalubres, Mairie de Grenelle au Préfet de 
Police, 4 juin 1828. 
  80 
 To have a clearer idea of the state of washing facilities and the need for 
government intervention, the Préfet de la Seine sent a request for information on 
their lavoirs to the communes of the arrondissement of Sceaux which was the 
largest arrondissement outside of Paris and contained forty-two communes, many 
of which made up the banlieue of the south and east of the city such as Vaugirard, 
Montrouge, Gentilly, Ivry, Bercy, and Saint-Mandé. The information was to 
elucidate how other near-by communes had resolved laundry issues Paris was also 
grappling with.156 The rubric for the responses from the mayors was to include the 
amount, the location, how they were supplied with water, if they were the official 
communal lavoirs, and if the commune had ever made a profit from them. Most 
of the communes replied negatively; only the communes of Bagneux, Bry-sur-
Marne, Châtenay, Clamart, Issy, Orly, St. Maur, Sceaux, Vanves and Vitry 
replied in the positive. These communes all had natural water and drainage 
sources feeding their lavoirs, either in the form of rivers, creeks or springs, and 
significant working-class populations. The mayors who responded describe the 
usefulness of the lavoirs to the poorer residents of their communes.157  
 Geography and economics were significant variables associated with the 
presence of lavoirs. Archival information is richer with respect to the reasons why 
communes did not build or own a lavoir public than to the reasons why the 
communes decided to provide a lavoir public to their population. Some of the 
mayors answered that their inhabitants had no need for it because they were 
                                                 
156 ADS DM5/5 dossier 11, Enquête sur les lavoirs des communes de 
l’arrondissement de Sceaux, 1828.  
 
157 Ibid.  
  81 
located next to a river, creek, or some other natural source, or that there was 
already a privately owned lavoir in place. A natural water source always fed any 
laundry establishment, whether privately owned or owned by the commune, 
underlining the difficulty in procuring water by any other means inside or outside 
of urban centers. Geography often explains the location of communally-owned 
lavoirs . The communes of Vanves, Clamart, Châtenay, Bagneux, and Sceaux did 
not have a river within or bordering their territory. Being deprived of a large 
water source like the Seine or Marne may have propelled the government to 
provide other facilities. However, this does not explain why the communes of 
Vitry and Orly, bordering the Seine, or Saint Maur bordering the Marne, invested 
in a communal lavoir.  The availability of public funds in the communes or 
another private facility may have also tamped down the appetite for building a 
communal lavoir. There might be another reason for not investing communal 
money: Those lavoirs that were part of the communal government had never 
made a profit.  Completed in 1828, this investigation illustrated a few elements: 
the government was interested in how the lavoirs worked, where most of them 
were built since there were rudimentary water delivery systems, and if the 
government could make money from the business. In the conclusion of the 
investigation, the Préfet de la Seine commented that government-run lavoirs 
offered an answer to the problem of laundresses using public space and the 
bateaux-lavoirs. The laundresses could be removed from the river, and the 
bateaux-lavoirs spoiling the city could be done away with as well. However, it 
quickly became apparent that there was little money in running a lavoir public 
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since every mayor in Sceaux answered that there was no revenue coming from 
such facility. Hence, the government would be responsible for its financial 
upkeep, and having a facility in the center of Paris would only be a drain on the 
city’s coffers. 
Despite the financial burden it represented, there was nonetheless great 
public utility in establishing a lavoir. The term utilité publique denoted a public 
service that was provided by the government or a private establishment that was 
not-for-profit. The mayor of Charenton-Le-Pont – a commune outside the city that 
Haussmann later annexed – described the building of the lavoir public in his 
commune as a charitable event in which the local business people pooled their 
money out of concern for the women washing at the river in all weather and 
deprived of a place when the river froze or was too high, and therefore dangerous 
to use.158  The mayor of Bercy, - another commune that Haussmann would annex 
- used the opportunity to complain about the privately-owned lavoir in his 
commune and the problems they had had to contend with because the lavoir 
drained its water on the road, impeding traffic.159 This echoed the complaints 
about lavoirs within Paris that they obstructed traffic and thus the organization of 
the city with their improper drainage. The Bercy lavoir demonstrated the same 
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problem that dogged the establishments in Paris. If the lavoir was not built on the 
river, there was no perfect solution for drainage. Although the Seine borders the 
communes of Bercy and Charenton-le-pont, not all establishments were able to 
build on the riverfront and had to contend with the lack of drainage possibilities 
just as those within Paris. The investigation on lavoirs also illustrated that the 
laundry establishments were not used frequently in the less populated areas 
outside of Paris because laundresses preferred using the rivers or springs. Only 
fifteen communes had one or more lavoirs, and these were never far from a 
natural water source, underscoring the problem with building one in Paris. A 
lavoir would have to be built on valuable, water-front property, and yet was never 
going to be profitable. After the investigation, the subject of government-run 
lavoirs around Paris was not brought forth again until Napoleon III. Even if the 
government were interested in building lavoirs in Paris, it did not have time to do 
so, as the reign of Charles X came to an end and that of the Préfet de la Seine, 
Gaspard de Chabrol who had served both Louis XVIII and Charles X.  The 1830 
revolution ushered in a new king.                                                                                                                                           
The Role of the Restructured Conseil de Salubrité 
  Meanwhile, cholera was also progressing towards France. Influencing 
health issues of the city and its surrounding communes, the development of the 
public hygiene movement during the 1820s completed its integration with the 
government during the cholera epidemic. In 1831, the Préfet de Police, in his 
responsibility for maintaining the public health, gave the Conseil de Salubrité new 
investigative powers in every neighborhood “…in an effort to obtain an 
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assainissement of the localities when a serious epidemic threatens.”160 Before, the 
Conseil de Salubrité operated exclusively under the rubric of the inspection of 
classified establishments however in 1831 the Conseil could take up any 
investigations that concerned public health and disease. The idea was to gather a 
group of experts in chemistry, biology, medicine, and businessmen to give 
suggestions to the government in how to manage and control public health 
problems in each neighborhood.  These groups answered to a central group for 
each arrondissement, and then answering to the commission appointed by the 
Préfet de Police.161 He further explained that in the past, there had not been 
enough local surveillance in the neighborhoods. The creation of the Conseil de 
Salubrité meant a much more organized approach to public health in the face of 
the coming epidemic.162 The new organization also meant that there would be 
much more scrutiny of laundry establishments. The laundry facilities were a part 
of the third class of potentially hazardous businesses which opened the door for 
the Conseil de Salubrité to target the lavoirs within Paris. 
 The growth of the importance of public hygiene following the cholera 
epidemic also meant more scrutiny and critique from the Conseil de Salubrité 
regarding water and laundry in the city, contributing to the idea that laundry had 
to be contained and regulated because it was dangerous to the resident’s health. 
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Beginning in late 1831, the Conseil de Salubrité turned their attention to the 
coming cholera epidemic and watched the disease progress from Asia towards the 
West. In 1833, possibly in response to the cholera epidemic, the Conseil de 
Salubrité sought to bring the Parisian lavoirs under compliance. Under a general 
hygiene plan, they intended to stop the “odors that were so inconvenient to the 
health of the dwellings in the neighborhood of the lavoirs” and the Conseil de 
Salubrité organized expeditions searching for businesses out of compliance in and 
around Paris.163 Lavoirs in Paris and in the surrounding communes were some of 
the most visible sources of stagnant water which, to the Conseil de Salubrité, had 
the possibility of creating another epidemic. The Conseil de Salubrité complained 
that the open pits the lavoirs drained waste water into did not properly drain and 
gave off odors. The laundry establishments not located on the river became a 
target for the assainissement program that began in hopes of stopping the cholera 
epidemic.  
 The Préfet de Police had not invested in a system of inspectors for every 
neighborhood until he commissioned the Conseil de Salubrité in 1831, which was 
in response to the threat of cholera. The lack of inspectors made it easy to open 
clandestine establishments that had not been investigated for health threats. 
Gaining the appropriate permission to build a lavoir was the responsibility of the 
owner. In 1833, with the epidemic fresh in the minds of the Conseil de Salubrité, 
the inspectors of the neighborhoods found many establishments that had been 
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operating without the proper permit.164 Since there were no sewers to remedy the 
major problems like open pits and drainage into the streets, the inspectors 
recommended granting permission to continue operating in circumstances where 
the neighbors were favorable to it. However, even in the cases where the 
neighbors were favorable, the inspectors were still wary. In his report to the 
Conseil de Salubrité, one inspector recalls that, although there were no complaints 
about the business, the neighbors were all in the laundry professions themselves 
and would not bring a complaint against one of their own to protect themselves in 
case they would go through the same investigation.165 The inspector continued 
with his own observations on the general state of lavoirs: the situation was much 
the same all over the city, but the suppression of the establishments would be 
disastrous for the families who had used them for years in security.166 The lavoirs 
concerned were located mostly in the southern part of the city, near the Bièvre, 
which was a working-class section. The inspectors’ reports reflected the limits to 
which they could request changes and deny someone the use of their business. 
Many were provisional permissions with the caveat that, as soon as the city built 
proper sewers, the businesses needed to start using them.167 The Conseil de 
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Salubrité requested plans for proposed sewers and made notes where they would 
go back in order to ensure the businesses followed the rules.168 However, the 
Conseil de Salubrité admitted that the tolerances were indefinite since they could 
not predict exactly when underground sewers would be built in any 
neighborhood.169 If the lavoir owners could not comply they could have their 
businesses closed by the Conseil de Salubrité at any time, and the women of the 
neighborhood would lose a resource. For the remainder of the decade of the 
1830s, the Conseil sought to find the cause – and control the effects – of such a 
large outbreak of cholera, and attributed part of the blame on the laundresses.  
 In 1840, the Conseil de Salubrité produced a scathing report on the 
dangers of laundry facilities in Paris.170 They compared the waste waters from 
laundering to the féculairies (businesses that turned human and animal waste into 
fertilizer) which they considered dangerous to the health of those who lived and 
worked around the businesses for their ability to produce foul odors that could 
cause disease.171 The solutions to the lack of underground sewers did not satisfy 
the Conseil de Salubrité. They complained about the open pits that were supposed 
to act as a filter and drain the waters while leaving the foreign bodies from the 
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soiled linens to decompose in the dirt. However, the bottom of the open pits often 
became impermeable from the different soaps and oils that accumulated on linens 
being washed, which according to the Conseil de Salubrité “would let infection 
spread throughout the neighborhood.”172 Streets and gutters would direct the 
water towards open pits. This was the only long-term solution the Conseil de 
Salubrité had. They discussed how to treat the water with various mixes of clay 
and plasters to form a type of lime that degraded and did not cause insolubility. 
They also suggested laundry water be mixed with lime which clarified the water 
and then, in their opinion, could be used for another round of laundering.173 The 
article commented that the hygiene council was preoccupied with lavoirs and 
water drainage so that the businesses could stay open, intimating that without 
their intervention the city would drown under the waste water. Yet, they could not 
influence building new sewers but confined themselves to making suggestions on 
how to contend with open sewers. The article concluded by explaining the 
different, sometimes complicated and costly measures lavoir owners had to 
undertake in order to remain in compliance, but without the help of sewers. One 
owner constructed an underground holding tank so he did not have to use the 
gutters in the road, which in the winter created lakes of ice on the thoroughfares 
and impeded traffic. Another owner dug an underground canal three kilometers, 
sloping with the contour of the Parisian basin to eventually drain down to the 
Bièvre. Twice in the article the Conseil de Salubrité underlined that it was willing 
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to approve diverse measures so as not to impede the industry. However, these 
measures were costly and in some cases fairly difficult to execute. Not every 
lavoir owner could make their own infrastructure; yet the residents of the city 
needed laundry facilities. The only facilities that the Conseil de Salubrité 
approved of were the blanchisseries that could afford to build their own drainage 
canals. This impasse between the needs of the residents and the regulations and 
ideas coming from the Conseil would last until the end of the nineteenth century 
when the sewer system was in place.  
Conclusion 
Laundering in early-nineteenth-century Paris became increasingly difficult 
as the city administrators began to exclude laundresses from operating in public 
space, and the Conseil de Salubrité created more regulations to safeguard public 
health. In many instances, the Conseil de Salubrité was unrealistic, demanding 
drainage and water treatments that the city was not equipped to support and 
business owners could not afford, especially from laundry businesses which the 
government noted to be unprofitable in their earlier investigation. In discourses 
about the visual appeal of the city and the proclamations about safeguarding the 
public’s health, laundresses and laundry were increasingly out of place in a city 
trying to deodorize space and put dirt out of the public view. The concern with 
rubbish and dirt in public space reflects Alain Corbin’s findings that by 1827 
“there was heightened anxiety about filth and waste in urban space.”174 The 
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myopia of the Conseil de Salubrité and Préfet de Police regarding the needs of 
laundresses and other women illustrates that the city administrators thought the 
women were of little consequence compared to their desires regarding city space 
which resulted in making laundering much more difficult. The negative 
assumptions about their morality only increased in the second half of the 
nineteenth century when there were greater numbers of laundresses making them 
even more visible. However, the Préfet de Police and Préfet de la Seine created 
regulations based on their efforts to reorganize the use of urban space and not 
based on representations of laundresses. In the first half of the nineteenth century 
the administrators virtually ignored laundresses and concentrated on the 
hazardous waste from their professional activity and their unappealing aesthetic 
presence. Laundresses had no ability to represent or protect themselves in the face 
of these changes until at the turn of the century when their profession became 
organized.175 
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Chapter 3 
CHANGING USES OF URBAN SPACE AND HOW THOSE CHANGES 
AFFECTED THE LOCATION OF LAUNDRY FACILITIES: 1840-1860 
 Chapter two reviewed how laundering and laundresses became matter out 
of place within Paris, as evidenced by the new regulations restricting access and 
use of the river Seine and its banks within the city. The regulations fit the new 
political exigencies of the Napoleonic regime and his quest to reorder the 
administration of Paris. Additionally the cholera epidemic of 1832 focused 
attention on classified businesses and the control of anything that could be a 
health threat. Parisian administrators applied new regulations to change the uses 
of the river. The regulations rendered laundering within Paris much more difficult 
and necessitated the construction of other establishments to meet the needs of the 
poor women. The regulations – meant to maintain cleanliness in the urban 
environment –created obstacles for the owners to open or maintain lavoirs, which 
resulted in fewer establishments being available within Paris to meet the 
laundering needs of laundresses and poor women. They were the only places that 
poor women could go to do their laundry inexpensively if they did not have the 
means to heat water in their own home or lived close to the Seine and a bateau-
lavoir.  From 1810 to 1830, the hygienic discourse focused on the danger of 
lavoirs and buanderies to the health of Parisians and the functioning of the city, 
paying no attention to the health of the laundresses themselves. Concerned by the 
drainage of used water, the Conseil de Salubrité was anxious to bring the existing 
establishments into compliance with the regulations associated with the 
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classification of dangerous businesses. In 1833, the Préfet de Police launched a 
series of expeditions to enforce the regulations relating to lavoirs and 
buanderies.176  
Beginning in the 1830s, shifts in governmental policies reflected the 
changes in the meaning and purpose of the urban public space: from stationary 
activity – the narrow, saturated and multi-functional streets enabling multiple 
users (street vendors, street performers, narrow ateliers, animal convoys, etc.) – to 
flux, movement/circulation of people to facilitate economic growth and enable 
traffic and improve hygiene. This shift constitutes the preparatory phase of 
Haussmannian work.177  
 Organized in a chronological order, this chapter will describe multiple 
examples of the city administrators’ shifting position – their attitude, discourse 
and actions – in the treatment of the applications to open laundry facilities, 
whether in the banlieue or in the center of Paris, as well as exceptional 
interventions into the lives of the poor under Napoléon III. The decisions from the 
administration and the Conseil de Salubrité revealed a differential tolerance of the 
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lavoirs based on their location. Anxiety about controlling lavoirs in the center 
Paris led to permissiveness toward lavoirs established in the banlieue. These 
shifts in governmental attitude clearly affected laundry practices. From an 
economic perspective, it was sensible to export the lavoirs into available and 
inexpensive areas. From a political standpoint, facilitating the exile of laundry 
facilities and laundresses outside the center of Paris suited the goals of the city 
administrators including the Conseil de Salubrité – pushing the lavoirs into the 
banlieue near accessible drainage systems – while matching the cultural vision of 
the city. Moreover, reducing the availability of laundry establishments illustrated 
the prevailing political attitudes of the time: keeping the government small and 
limiting social expenditures.178   
This chapter argues that shifting attitudes from the July Monarchy to the 
Second Empire affected the treatment of lavoirs within Paris and the banlieue and 
that exporting the dirt out of Paris served to exile what was matter out of place. 
Under the July Monarchy, with the reigning idea of political economy the 
government was not willing to intervene in the lives of the poor as Napoléon III 
was to do. In order to establish a cleaner city, the Conseil de Salubrité was only 
interested in moving the dirt, disease and poverty associated with laundering and 
laundresses outside of the center of Paris into the banlieue. While, under the 
Second Empire, changing attitudes towards the poor as reflected in Social 
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Catholicism, and the example of Napoléon’s lavoir along with technological 
advances enabled the Conseil d’Hygiène to accept lavoirs within Paris.  
Paris: Lavoirs and Drainage in the 1840s 
While Claude-Philibert de Rambuteau as Préfet de la Seine did increase 
the sewers during the 1840s, they still did not adequately meet the drainage needs 
of the laundry facilities in Paris. The Conseil de Salubrité, which was responsible 
for inspecting classified businesses and approving their establishment, required 
owners to provide for the drainage of their buanderie.179 Building canals to the 
river or sewer meant extensive building and proximity to the river or sewers. The 
problem was that land was too expensive near the Seine and that the city’s sewer 
system was inconsistent and limited until 1910. The Conseil rejected many 
requests to open lavoirs publics and buanderies in the neighborhoods without 
sewers, which was a considerable portion of the city.180 In 1832 -1833, in 
response to the cholera epidemic, Préfet de la Seine Pierre de Bondy oversaw the 
installation of 14 kilometers (8.7 miles) of sewers in central Paris.181 By 1853 
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there were fewer than 100 miles of sewers compared to 260 miles of streets and 
were located in central Paris around the Seine. The collectors for the drains were 
small and often were clogged and overflowed when there was a heavy rain.182 In 
1854 Haussmann started making plans for the sewer system. By 1870, 
Haussmann had completed 348 miles of sewers, but could not accomplish his goal 
of drainage for every street. With annexed communes, the total mileage of Paris’ 
streets added up to 500 miles.  The poorer neighborhoods of the annexed zones 
remained unserved.183  The Third Republic, by 1910, finished the main sewer 
lines in the previously unserved areas adding 406 miles of sewers. The sewers 
totaled 1,214 kilometers (754 miles) by 1911, which eliminated the drainage 
problems posed by laundry facilities.184   
There were two concurrent reasons why the Conseil – with the consent of 
the Préfet de la Seine – tried to push lavoirs out of Paris in the 1840s: First, the 
Conseil followed the directives of the Préfet to order the city space with regard to 
hygiene and appearance. The second reason was practicality; Paris had very 
limited space on the river banks, and lavoirs’ owners could not afford to build 
their business next to the water – since the Seine was still the only efficacious 
drainage system before the extension of sewers.  
Several elements contributed to an evolving situation for laundry 
establishments in Paris. The Préfet de la Seine, Rambuteau, concentrated on 
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building fountains to provide clean water to residents throughout the city. 
However he neglected drainage systems. Building fountains only responded to 
one part of the needs of the growing population of Paris. Meeting the hygienic 
needs of the population and providing laundresses with places to work required 
laundry facilities which, in turn, made the development of a sewer system 
essential.  However, the drainage and water delivery systems were only in limited 
areas; otherwise, residents relied on rivers for water and drainage.185 Indeed, part 
of the delay in building a comprehensive sewer system rested with the cultural 
notion that open sewers were preferable to enclosing them – due to the perceived 
risks associated with confluent fumes, as opposed to open sewers that could be 
cleaned and maintained more easily.186 Then, coupled with the scrutiny of laundry 
businesses and the enforcement of regulations from the Conseil de Salubrité on 
the drainage of water, the reluctance to build sewers in areas other than the center 
of the city succeeded in pushing any new lavoirs into the banlieue through which 
flowed natural drainages such as the rivers Seine and Bièvre.  
The poor were in a predicament; to be part of society they could not stink. 
As Alain Corbin has pointed out, in the 1840s the mores of society had changed to 
value cleanliness and sweet smells.187 Yet, the establishments to launder were 
scarce in the city. The women who did not have the means to send their laundry to 
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the blanchisseries outside of Paris, and did not have enough clothes to send them 
to a local laundress when they had to wait six to eight weeks to have them 
returned, greatly needed public lavoirs. Laundresses resorted to washing in 
buckets in the only room the family had. For the Conseil de Salubrité, this 
practice was unhealthy because the women heated the washing water, making 
steam which dampened the walls and the drainage of the water was not 
regulated.188  
At the beginning of 1841, the general work report published by the 
Conseil de Salubrité illustrated the growth in the laundry business. The report 
examined permissions given to classified businesses as well as persistent public 
hygiene problems; the most popular classified businesses to open were laundry 
establishments.189 The Préfet de Police gave a total of ninety-two permissions to 
open buanderies, yet only six were to be within the limits of Paris.190 Those six 
facilities were concentrated around the Bièvre. The state of the sewers and the 
Conseil de Salubrité’s concerns about drainage necessitated having many lavoirs 
                                                 
188 APP, M. Lasnier, ed. Rapport général sur les travaux du Conseil de Salubrité 
de Paris 1843-1846 (Paris : Boucquin Imprimeur de la Préfecture de Police, 
1850), 256. 
 
189 ADS, VD6/4 Dossier 16 , « Rapport général sur les travaux du Conseil de 
Salubrité 1840-1843 » Annales d’Hygiène Publique et Médecine Légale, série 
première, tome 10. Juillet 1847 : 18. The second largest number of applications to 
open a classified business came from tanning businesses with thirty two 
applications. A classified business was one that fell into one of three classes based 
on danger to the public. Lavoirs were in the third and least dangerous 
classification which meant that the owner had to apply for permission to open the 
business form the Préfet de Police. 
 
190 As mentioned earlier, archival documents used the term lavoir and buanderies 
interchangeably, though the term buanderie implies the utilization of steam.  
 
  98 
grouped where the Seine flowed outside of Paris and around the Bièvre, which 
until 1860 was outside of Paris, although these areas were not the only places 
where the poor lived; indeed, poor neighborhoods were scattered throughout 
Paris.191  The report from 1842 illustrated the same trend: there was one lavoir 
opened legally in Paris against twenty-eight in the banlieue.192 In 1843, one lavoir 
opened in Paris versus eleven in the banlieue.193 The Conseil de Salubrité noted 
that lavoirs of all sizes had been constructed in the banlieue but the business had 
not taken hold in Paris.194 Evidently, the lavoir and buanderie owners found a 
more hospitable environment for their businesses in the suburbs, to the detriment 
of the poor women who still lived inside Paris. 
Despite the obstacles they were facing in the city centre, the poor women 
in neighborhoods far from available laundry facilities were resourceful and found 
different methods for washing. One particular method caught the attention of the 
Conseil de Salubrité and sparked their intervention. In the work report of 1841, 
the Conseil de Salubrité highlighted the problems linked to the use of machines 
run by steam pressure. Businesses using steam-powered machines were required 
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to drain the excess hot water and redirect the steam the process produced. 
However, many business owners who employed steam driven engines used the 
streets for their draining ground and aired the steam without building chimneys to 
direct the hot air up and away from other buildings. The Conseil de Salubrité 
received complaints from boutique owners in the central area of Paris because 
steam was entering their shops and damaging their merchandise. The drainage 
issue caused a different problem: the streets in central Paris that had paving stones 
were especially prone to be used as impromptu lavoirs publics, as the hot water 
drained from the steam machines and conveniently flowed down the gutters, 
which poor women readily used to do their own laundry.195 Consequently, the 
Conseil de Salubrité signaled that it was necessary to require the businesses to 
cool the water before they drain it to prevent these women from using the hot 
water.196 While the Conseil de Salubrité were concerned with soapy water in the 
public thoroughfares stagnating, there was no recognition that the women used the 
water out of necessity because there was no way to get enough water to their 
homes and then heat it, and that having laundry facilities nearer to their 
neighborhoods would have improved the hygiene of the poor and stopped this 
practice. The Conseil seemed more concerned with hiding the poverty in Paris 
than addressing the women’s needs which would have done more to promote 
hygiene. This solution would have necessitated government intervention. 
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However, the prevailing political discourse of social economy argued against this 
option because it required government intervention.  
 Problems from steam-powered machines preoccupied the Conseil de 
Salubrité during the early 1840s, which contributed to moving laundry 
establishments to the banlieue. Moving laundry establishments to the banlieue 
was an easier solution to the drainage problems creating hygienic concerns in the 
Paris than building an extensive sewer system. Consequently, moving to the 
banlieue also moved laundry establishments away from laundresses and the poor 
in the city. Steam-powered machines were smaller and less expensive that those 
used at the beginning of the century and filled a vital function for lavoirs; the 
machines heated water and were able to pump water from wells because the water 
delivery system, where it existed, could not produce enough water for the needs 
of a lavoir.197 The fuel the owners used in the machines represented a chief 
concern because of the smoke the machines produced. The 1841 work report from 
the Conseil de Salubrité underlined the complaints engendered by the machines 
used by lavoirs.198 Those using oil in their steam machines produced thick smoke 
that would disturb other neighborhood residents or other lavoirs that had hung 
their laundry to dry. They would have to rewash the laundry because of the black 
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marks left by the smoke.199 For hygienic as well as practical reasons, the Conseil 
de Salubrité prohibited everything but the use of houille de Ham-sur-Sambre in 
Paris, but had not yet prohibited the use of other combustibles outside of Paris. 200 
They remarked that there had been no new complaints after the imposition of the 
new rule on combustibles.201 However, the other oils that produced more smoke 
were less expensive than the houille. Since there was no regulation on 
combustibles to run the steam engine in the banlieue, the smoke and soot was 
much worse where the greatest concentration of laundresses existed. Although the 
new regulation about steam machines intended to make employees and residents 
healthier and laundry cleaner, it also made it more expensive to operate a lavoir 
because the required combustibles were more expensive. Effectively, it 
contributed to the scarcity of laundry resources for poor women.  
In 1842, the Préfet de Police established regulations for steam machines 
used in lavoirs.202 The machines using steam at high or low pressure necessitated 
an inspection of the condition of the machine accompanied by a map indicating 
the proximity of other residences and the possible danger the machine could 
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create. The Préfet de Police also communicated his wish that all lavoir owners be 
tested on their competence in running steam machines.203  
 Drainage was still imperfect within and around Paris with sewers 
appearing only sporadically and not connected to any type of filtering system so 
water would return directly to the Seine.204 Knowing that the drainage issues 
would persist because of the undeveloped state of the sewer system, the Conseil 
de Salubrité refused most applications to build lavoirs within Paris with the only 
exceptions being owners who were willing to build their own underground 
drainage systems, which most could not afford. While this equation nearly 
excluded building a lavoir within Paris, the Conseil de Salubrité was willing to 
tolerate diverse means of drainage in the banlieue.  In every report, the Conseil de 
Salubrité admitted that the current sewer system of Paris did not allow for 
drainage and that it was the owner’s responsibility to create either a pit to drain 
water or a canal to the nearest natural drainage.205 As the Mairies of the banlieue 
paved streets, the Conseil de Salubrité allowed lavoir owners to direct used water 
to the street gutters which would then drain into a river or stream, which they 
would not tolerate in Paris.206 When the facilities were in the communes of the 
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banlieue, the discourse about lavoirs became less anxiety-laden, and the Conseil 
de Salubrité treated the applications in a less detailed manner, which illustrated 
that their concern was for Paris. David Jordan argues that the bourgeoisie’s 
conception of Paris was limited and parochial.207 This narrow vision contributed 
to the sense that sending an inconvenient business outside of Paris was a solution 
to the problem. Added to that were the new walls surrounding Paris that Adolphe 
Thiers supported in 1840 to protect Paris. Jordan points out that “the walls also 
became a tax-exempt haven for the poor…and a socially threatening band of 
poverty was penned outside of Paris.”208   
In 1843, the approval of a lavoir on Rue de la Glacière just outside of the 
then 12th  arrondissement illustrated the difference in the attitude of the Conseil 
de Salubrité towards projects outside of Paris. The owner proposed to use a 
puisard, an individual pit designed to channel and drain water, which was already 
located on his property. Although the inspector who checked the drainage area 
deemed it insufficient, he allowed the lavoir to open and to let its owner decide to 
dig another pit if the first one did not meet his needs.209 The inspector visited the 
site six months later and noted that the owner was emptying his used water into 
the street. The inspector simply reminded him not to drain water into the street 
until it was paved.210 This tone differed drastically from the earlier report 
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concerning Parisian lavoirs draining their water left from the steam-powered 
machines into the paved street. The report supported the complaints of the 
boutique owners and criticized the women washing in the street. The Conseil, as 
soon as the practice had come to their attention, had demanded it stop 
immediately. The Conseil used so-called health concerns to stop a practice that 
was actually improving the hygiene of the poor because such a sight in the center 
of Paris was out of place and thus forbidden. The Conseil de Salubrité was more 
interested in keeping up appearances, hiding poverty and maintaining order in 
Paris while anything went in the banlieue. Maintaining order in Paris was the 
priority after the 1832 revolution. Bourgeois property owners were not necessarily 
interested in making living conditions better for the poor but in preserving 
property values and keeping the social order in tact.211 
 The permissiveness associated with certain laundry practices in the 
banlieue drastically contrasted with the discrimination of the same practices 
occurring in the center of Paris, though both were ostensibly for the sake of 
hygiene. The following example highlights this hypocrisy. In Passy, close to the 
city limit, two men sought permission to open lavoirs.212 The owners were to 
construct a small paved canal - a gutter - in the dirt street and let possibly hot, and 
definitely dirty, water drain into the street to the nearest stream or larger paved 
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street that also had a gutter. From the hygiene inspectors’ standpoint there was no 
problem, in the banlieue, letting used water drain into the street because the 
administration was neither trying to control how the space looked, nor who 
occupied it. Up to this point, the Conseil de Salubrité had not acknowledged that 
the lavoirs filled a vital service for meeting personal hygiene needs of the poor. 
They were more concerned with keeping the city in working order and protecting 
bourgeois property interests by limiting more open drainage pits that could 
diminish property values. Paradoxically, on the one hand, doing laundry was 
hygienic because people had clean clothes and linens; on the other hand, certain 
laundry practices were fraught with unhygienic methods, and laundry facilities 
were removed from areas close to poor women. The Conseil de Salubrité had 
concentrated on the inconveniences lavoirs caused instead of supporting the 
owners and calling for an improvement of the sewer system. Moreover, their lack 
of attempts to push the Préfet de la Seine into specific actions to ameliorate the 
sewer system confirms that political considerations trumped hygiene needs. They 
were more interested in following the lead of the Préfet de Police than striking out 
and exposing his failings in terms of advancements in hygiene.   
  By the mid-nineteenth century, people in search of work migrated from 
rural areas of France to Paris, making city housing overcrowded.213 This growing 
indigent population moved to the city after the economic depression of the 1840s 
when failing harvests drove them into Paris for work. Overcrowding drove rental 
prices up in the city and made it very difficult to profitably operate a buanderie or 
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lavoir in the central parts of the city. Without governmental help, the lavoirs were 
closing within Paris. The Conseil de Salubrité’s minimal support for a business 
that facilitated hygiene for the urban poor continued. The Conseil d’Hygiène 
lamented the lack of available laundry facilities in the city to address the needs of 
the poor, and yet made it almost impossible for someone to open a laundry facility 
by requiring them to construct their own sewer. While women met their laundry 
needs by various methods like capturing hot water running down the street or not 
doing laundry for extended periods of time.  
The Conseil de Salubrité pointed out that the numbers of lavoirs increased 
as a consequence of the growth of the population. The Conseil’s discourse 
highlighted ideas that the migrants were making the city unsafe because they 
instigated the building of laundry establishments. However, the facilities were 
approved in the areas outside of the city that the affluent residents of Paris used.  
The Conseil was not prepared to make allowances for the hygiene of the migrants 
– coming in from the rural departments – who were attracted by the higher 
salaries and the demand for artisanal work to supplement the consumer economy 
of Paris.214 The 1844 general work report, detailing the actions and decisions 
taken by the Conseil de Salubrité, showed that complaints about, laundry 
businesses had given rise to the largest number of reports handled by the Conseil. 
The Conseil declared that, “while others applauded the gathering of all the 
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laundry processes under one roof; it was the Conseil de Salubrité that previewed 
the problems the businesses created.”215 They questioned whether any lavoirs in 
Paris was a good idea in light of the state of the Parisian sewer system. The report 
proposed that, every time there was a question about drainage, the lavoir in 
question should be obligated to construct an underground conduite, or draining 
pipes, until the existence of a sewer.216  
 The general work report for 1846 reflected the disconnect between the 
discourse of the Conseil de Salubrité presenting the idea of lavoirs as a public 
utility juxtaposed with the  negative discourse about fitting the actual facilities 
into the urban landscape. There were thirty-two applications to open lavoirs, of 
which twenty-four were barely within the limits of Paris, again grouped around 
the Bièvre at the edge of the city.217 They were large facilities that allowed up to 
fifty women to launder. The report described how the water seeped into the floor 
boards and walls, rendering the building insalubre.218 Another way for poor 
women to do laundry was to walk to the bateaux-lavoirs but, the walk to the 
bateaux would have been difficult with water-logged laundry. The Conseil de 
Salubrité admitted that “the lavoir introduced incontestable advances in the 
hygiene of the working class and laundresses.”219 Yet, they presented so many 
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problems for the city that the gains in working-class health and cleanliness were 
not worth the sacrifice. Regulation of lavoirs remained a problem, as clandestine 
workshops continued to open without the hygiene inspectors’ control; the 
drainage was not assured, and women brought wet laundry back to dry in their 
room because the lavoirs only had space outside to dry which only functioned in 
warm, dry weather. Yet, the article concluded with the idea that the Conseil de 
Salubrité should encourage lavoirs, which had been the prevailing discourse the 
whole time, yet in practice they were hesitant to let any open in Paris.220 The 
discourse about the utility of lavoirs for the poor did not prompt the Conseil de 
Salubrité to try to reconcile drainage with the needs of the poor residents. The 
Conseil did not put these ideas into practice before 1846 unless the lavoirs were 
outside of Paris. Poor women’s only options were to go without laundering or to 
pool resources and launder in a group. The primary obstacle to laundering was 
space and materials, i.e., water, large cauldrons and enough heating material to 
boil water for two to three hours.  
 In 1846, the Parisian population of Paris, reached one million, accounting 
for the growing demand for washing facilities. The applications to build bateaux-
lavoirs also increased in 1846, as space became less available for terrestrial 
lavoirs, owing to migrants and new commerce.221 There had not been an 
application to open or repair a bateau-lavoir since 1830. In 1846, in response to 
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the increased demands from the residents of the banlieue of Paris, there were four 
applications to build bateaux-lavoirs just outside of Paris in the communes of 
Bercy and Passy on the river Seine. The mayor of Bercy commented that his 
commune was in need of more facilities to accommodate the waves of migrants 
moving to the area. Outside of Paris, the navigation authorities approved of the 
bateaux-lavoirs, so the office of the Préfet de Police allowed the installation.222 
According to the Conseil de Salubrité, they were irreproachable because they had 
the most efficient water drainage. These were not small facilities; the two in 
Bercy were twenty-five and thirty meters long respectively. Although they were 
working outside – in plain view – laundresses did not evoke concern outside of 
Paris. The bateaux-lavoirs did not present the drainage issues that the lavoirs did 
because they could drain the dirty water from laundering into the river. The 
Conseil was willing to give the bateaux-lavoirs permission when they would not 
allow the same for land-based lavoirs. The navigation engineers reported no 
opposition from businesses who could have been affected by the presence of the 
bateaux.  
 The increased demand for washing facilities also extended to the tonneaux 
à lessive, on the Bièvre within Paris. These had not been the subject of new 
applications until 1847 when the office of the Préfet de Police received one 
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hundred ninety.223 The new owners of tonneaux complained to the Préfet that the 
price of notary stamps that signaled the permission to build a tonneau rose in the 
last year, making the permission too expensive to obtain.224 In the economic 
depression of 1846-1848, the administration conceded to the reclamations and 
made a special provision: it would be sufficient if one paid the tax on the 
placement; the payment for the permission itself was not mandatory. The 
permission also highlighted that those who were using the tonneaux to run a 
laundry business were not making much income if the owners were having 
trouble paying a two-franc timbre indicating permission. However, the Préfet de 
Police was not willing to forgo all payments because the tax on the right of 
placement was “in the interest of order and conservation of the Bièvre.”225 The 
tonneaux did not present any complicated construction for water drainage since 
they were located on a water source, unlike the lavoirs; therefore, the 
administration was willing to make allowances. Moreover, there was no 
commentary from the Conseil de Salubrité on the dangers that using the polluted 
Bièvre posed for laundering because the tonneaux were for private use so the 
possible dangers of using waste water from tanneries mixed with the stream were 
limited to those poor and working-class families who used the tonneaux. As the 
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tanning industry in Paris grew to meet consumer demands in the 1840s and 50s 
the problems with water pollution in the Bièvre became more pressing. It was 
only in the second decade of Third Republic that the Préfet de la Seine closed the 
Bièvre for laundry and made it a drainage canal. The individuals still using the 
Bièvre to launder were only hurting themselves. The tonneaux were not large 
enough to enable multiple families to use them and they only had cold water 
which was only part of the washing process. The boiling step would still have to 
be finished elsewhere.  In contrast, for the Conseil de Salubrité, the lavoirs 
presented problems for the entire population.  
Governmental Policy Shifts during the Second Republic  
 The February 1848 revolution produced a change in attitudes towards 
government intervention in the living conditions of the poor. The economic 
depression of the 1840s resulted in workers – skilled and unskilled – losing work. 
For the first time, in April 1848, the Provisional Government made allowances for 
the poor to receive assistance to wash their laundry.226  The city administration 
planned to buy coupons from the lavoirs in Paris to distribute to the indigent. The 
coupons were good for one package which amounted to five shirts. During the 
economic downturn, more women were using the bateaux-lavoirs on the Seine 
within Paris to wash their family’s laundry, and did not give it to laundresses or 
laundry establishments to wash. While the Provisional Government was 
concerned with social needs, the office of the Préfet de la Seine who administered 
the program, also underlined that the purpose of the coupon was not purely social. 
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The Bureaux de Bienfaisance in every arrondissement were to distribute the 
coupons with the understanding that the individual women were to use the lavoirs 
instead of the river. Even in a time of turmoil, which characterized the Provisional 
Government, the sight of women using the river was not acceptable.  
 During the political upheaval of 1848, another devastating cholera 
epidemic raged in Paris. The cholera epidemic of 1848 did not affect the laundry 
facilities and laundresses in Paris directly. However, the Préfet de Police took the 
opportunity to reorganize the Conseil de Salubrité in hopes of finding a solution 
to the epidemic. The Conseil de Salubrité changed its name to the Conseil 
d’Hygiène Publique et de Salubrité,  and there would be a Conseil d’Hygiène – 
composed of seven to fifteen members – in every arrondissement.227 The Minister 
of Agriculture and Commerce and the Préfet de Police would appoint the 
members. The changes to the Conseil brought it closer to the politicians which 
made it more difficult to be an independent body outside of politics making 
recommendations for hygiene. The reorganization of the Conseil meant a larger 
presence in every arrondissement, which indicated a more concentrated presence 
for the surveillance of classified businesses like lavoirs.  
 Contrasting with the concept of political economy that characterized the 
previous regime, and for the first time in Paris, a government would intervene to 
create a laundry facility in the center of Paris for the urban poor. In line with the 
ideas outlined in the treatise L'extinction du paupérisme published in 1844, Louis 
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Napoléon was interested in ameliorating the lives of the poor.228 Although he 
never explicitly discussed laundry facilities in his treatise on pauperism, being 
odor-free was now considered healthy,229 and Louis Napoléon funded the building 
of a lavoir. In 1849, Louis Napoléon created a commission to study the 
organization of lavoirs in England.230 The head of the commission, Gilles Netlam, 
illustrated the novelty of this project in his statement to Louis Napoléon after the 
group finished its study. He stated: “This is a heavy burden to bring these services 
to the classes laborieuses considering the poor conditions in Paris the laborers 
live in. The lavoir renders important services to the working population and I 
have seen their tendency to use these establishments in my neighborhood in the 
twelfth arrondissement. Your goal is truly to bring hygiene to the people.”231  
Netlam also traveled to England, where he was able to acquire different models of 
lavoirs designed to meet the needs of hundreds of women laundering as well as 
professional laundresses per day. It was only after the coup d’état – when Louis 
Napoléon made himself emperor – that he was able to see his grand project 
realized.  
                                                 
228 Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte, L'extinction du paupérisme, quatrième ed. (Paris : 
imprimerie Lacrampe et Fertiaux , 1848), 15.  
 
229  Alain Corbin, The Foul and the Fragrant: Odor and the French Social 
Imagination. trans. Miriam Kochan (Leamington Spa, NY: Berg, 1986), xii. 
 
230 Archives Nationales, here after cited as AN,  F21 dossier 1347 Bains et 
Lavoirs publics 1853-1865. 
231 Ibid. 
 
  114 
In 1853, at the beginning of the Second Empire, Napoléon III, implement 
the exceptional construction of a lavoir public in a poor neighborhood of Paris – 
in the Quartier du Temple – to remedy the scarcity of laundry establishments for 
the poor and to contribute to the hygiene of the urban poor.232 This lavoir was one 
of only a dozen lavoirs publics in central Paris. This was an attempt to win over 
the working classes and make them loyal to their imperial benefactor since he 
needed their political support due to the new universal male suffrage Napoléon 
had instituted.233 He bought the land and paid the construction costs with money 
from the purse of the Maison de l’Empereur.234 However, he wanted the lavoir to 
be run privately and for profit.235  Napoleon’s idea closely resembled that of the 
Social Catholics who were influential during the Second Empire and supported 
the idea of private charity taking care of social needs. They did not believe that 
poverty was the fault only of the poor, but also of the rich whose duty it was to 
help the less fortunate of society.  
Impressed by the English model, Napoléon III hired an English architect 
to build the lavoir; the construction began in May of 1853. It was not a simple 
proposition to build a lavoir next to the Marché du Temple, now in the 3rd  
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arrondissement. An investigation of inconveniences caused by the installation 
needed to take place before the construction could begin. The neighbors were not 
excited about having the lavoir in their neighborhood and lodged oppositions with 
the Préfet de Police.236 One neighbor did not want the lavoir because the fuel 
used to operate the steam machines created black smoke that deposited on the 
surrounding buildings and could alter the life of the neighborhood.237 Another 
commented that, as a home owner, he had to protest because the space “would 
have sadness and poverty”238 Another neighbor asked if the surrounding land 
could be turned into parks or gardens in order to inhibit the practice of urinating 
in pots along the wall of the lavoir; indeed laundresses would use the salts 
resulting from the evaporation of urine.239 Yet another was afraid the lavoir would 
lower their property value.240 These reports from the neighborhood illustrate the 
difficulties a private business owner would encounter when trying to build a 
lavoir in a very populated area. They help explain the relative lack of laundry 
facilities in Paris despite a growing indigent population. 
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 The report from the Conseil d’Hygiène was not supportive of the Lavoir 
Napoléon. It highlighted that the importance of the lavoir was found in its 
philanthropic endeavor more than in its actual need, and that Napoléon was 
simply making himself feel better.241 The argument stated that the facility 
overestimated the needs of the indigents.242 The report implied that the urban poor 
would not use the facilities, because they did not care about personal hygiene as 
much as other classes (not because they could possibly not afford it). The 
construction was not greeted with excitement in finally being able to address the 
hygiene of the indigents in the center of Paris. Rather, it provoked some 
skepticism about how poor residents would use the facilities and what their 
presence would bring to the neighborhood.  
Nevertheless, the construction of Napoléon’s lavoir began in August of 
1853. The plans addressed all the concerns of the neighbors, including a chimney 
reaching thirty meters above the roof to direct the smoke, and a urinal to be built 
on Rue Caffarelli. During the construction, the technological differences between 
England and France came to the forefront. The water heaters were English built, 
but tested in Paris.243 Although the heaters did not operate at the correct pressure, 
the Conseil d’Hygiène granted them an exceptional authorization because it was 
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the emperor’s pet project. The engineers complained the English had constructed 
them without consulting with them first, but the Conseil d’Hygiène and engineers 
forged ahead, and the builders completed the lavoir in two years. The costs of the 
land, building, machinery and furniture came to two hundred thousand francs.244              
This was an immense amount of money to spend on a lavoir compared to the 
daily wage of a laundress who could expect to earn 1.05 francs per day of 
work.245 As discussed in chapter one, lavoirs were not very profitable businesses, 
which underlined the philanthropic nature of the project.  
The construction of the Lavoir Napoléon attracted attention from a 
commune in the banlieue, Bercy, where there was a large proportion of bateaux-
lavoirs and lavoirs and a large working-class community extending from the 
twelfth arrondissement. The mayor wrote that he was inspired by the work of 
Napoleon and in 1853 the commune began constructing a lavoir that would be 
free-of-charge or at reduced prices. He also commented that the poor of the 
community needed access to laundry facilities at reduced prices.246 The commune 
acquired the land at a discounted price and applied for an allocation of state funds 
of twenty thousand francs. The owner of the company building the lavoir would 
lend the remaining forty thousand francs to the commune, and in thirty-three 
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years the lavoir would become the property of the commune.247 Bercy then 
developed subsidized laundering to accommodate the needs of its large working-
class community. At that time, without government intervention, poor women in 
Paris had to fend for themselves.248  The government intervention into the lives of 
the poor in this fashion was unheard of during the July Monarchy and underlined 
the shifting attitudes about government intervention under Napoléon III.  
Haussmann and Changes for Lavoirs in Paris  
In 1853, Louis Napoléon appointed Georges Eugène Haussmann as Préfet 
de la Seine who began a transformation of Paris’ streets, buildings and sewer 
system. During the entire July Monarchy, the Préfet de la Seine was Rambuteau, 
who had been concerned with the reorganization and hygiene of Paris as well.249 
Haussmann continued Rambuteau’s project and enlarged it. Rambuteau had 
focused his priorities on improving the circulation of traffic and opening up the 
city, just as Haussmann would do for his planned renovations.250 Haussmann 
sought to reorder Paris to render it cleaner and more functional to enable business 
and to prevent epidemics. There were also changes to the structure of the Conseil 
d’Hygiène in keeping with the concern to ameliorate the city in terms of hygiene. 
Physicians, chemists and architects interested in public hygiene continued to 
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dominate Conseil; however, the Préfet de Police created the position of Secretary 
General, which would allow the administration to have a representative in every 
meeting and bring the Conseil even closer to the city administration.251  
 Because the rents in Paris rose during the Haussmannization of the city, 
the numbers of lavoirs continued to grow in the banlieue during the second half of 
the 1850s, which would be annexed in 1860. There was only one small lavoir 
opened on Rue des Tournelles in the third arrondissement of Paris during the last 
five years of the decade that could provide places for ten women.252 Haussmann 
forged ahead with the reorganization of Paris, which had gathered momentum by 
mid-decade. He cleared slums in the center of Paris in order to widen and 
straighten streets to bring light and air to the dwellings. The restructuring gave 
rise to land speculation.253 The property developers soon realized that building 
affordable housing was not as lucrative as high-end dwellings. Consequently, the 
slums Haussmann had razed were not being replaced by other alternatives for the 
popular classes or the poor. Thus, many inhabitants of Paris went to the banlieue 
in favor of lower-cost housing.254   
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 The migration to the banlieue is indicated in the records for laundry 
establishments. As the rents increased in Paris, the barely profitable lavoirs 
continued to leave Paris in favor of less expensive rents and more tolerant 
neighbors. The lavoirs found a hospitable environment in the less affluent 
neighborhoods and between 1855 and 1857, six lavoirs opened in La Chapelle. 
The most popular sites for lavoirs were in the communes of La Chapelle and 
Belleville with six new establishments each, which were located just outside of 
the walls of Paris and would be absorbed into the city in 1861. These were 
working-class sections and the authorizations to open lavoirs indicated that there 
were no oppositions from the neighbors for any of the establishments.255 While 
Haussmann dug new sewer lines for drainage and built separate lines to deliver 
potable water in Paris, increasing the sewer system by fifty kilometers, he largely 
ignored the working-class neighborhoods.256  One of his critics charged that he 
had done the easy work in the center of Paris while avoiding the areas most in 
need like La Chapelle, La Villette, Bercy, Vaugirard and Grenelle, which were all 
areas that had a higher concentration of laundry facilities that needed improved 
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sewers in order to operate in accordance with hygiene regulations.257 However, 
the authorizations indicated no special instructions for the drainage of waste 
waters for those establishments opening in La Villette.258 The inspector charged to 
investigate an application to open a lavoir on Rue de Constantine indicated that 
the business “…is well located and will fit in well with its surroundings.”259 The 
authorizations for the commune of Belleville had the same salutary tone; the 
Conseil d’Hygiène approved all applications without demanding they build 
underground canals or even pits, which they had been so adamant about in the 
beginning of the decade and in the 1840s. The only application that was denied 
was because of the neighborhood, not the water drainage. The owner had wished 
to locate his business at Place Ménilmontant.260 The neighbors had not submitted 
any opposition, but the inspector for the Conseil d’Hygiène decided that the 
location of the lavoir would be “prejudicial” to the place since there was also a 
church there, the Notre Dame de la Croix.261 He stated in his report that the 
inevitable noise coming from the lavoir would disturb the church services. The 
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laundresses were not appropriate neighbors for a church because of their 
reputation for being loud and immodest. There was no opposition to the four 
lavoirs built in La Villette during the last five years in the decade because it was a 
working-class neighborhood whose residents were employed by the lavoirs. In 
Charonne, the only prescriptions from the Conseil were to build chimneys high 
enough not to inconvenience the neighborhood with smoke.262 Because they were 
in the banlieue and there was no opposition from the neighbors the Conseil was 
willing to let the lavoirs open.263   
 In contrast to the eastern banlieue, which had a primarily working-class 
population, the western outskirts of Paris hosted wealthier residents who had 
moved out of the city to build grand houses. Consequently, Haussmann increased 
his attention to the western banlieue because its residents were more influential 
and because the commune of Passy enjoyed sewer services.264 The lavoirs had no 
problems with authorizations because there was an underground canal that ran the 
length of Rue St. Denis and connected to the Rue de Longchamps, which was part 
of the Parisian sewer system.265  
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 To the consternation of the laundry establishments, the sewers did not 
always function properly. In the commune of Gentilly, for example, the 
construction of the waste deposit tank in the Quartier Maison Blanche was meant 
to be a step forward in the hygiene of Paris and the banlieue toward which the 
Bièvre flowed.266 The city administration decided that the cost of building the 
tank could be assigned to the funds for building and repairing the sewers. The 
tank served to keep waste water out of the Bièvre and stop it from giving off 
putrid and rotten odors.267 The problem was that the Bièvre could not be dredged 
easily to allow the water to flow more swiftly. The bed of the river was mud and 
sand and gave off horrible odors when the sewer services had tried to dredge it. 
The engineers argued that the tank would present no inconveniences and would 
improve the smell of the Bièvre.268 The engineers supervised the building of the 
tank, completing it in November 1857. In June of 1858, the office of the Préfet de 
la Seine received a petition signed by three hundred laundresses and thirty male 
owners of blanchisseries located on the Bièvre.269  They complained that since the 
addition of the sewers in the Quartier Maison Blanche, all types of impurities 
infected the river and gave off a fetid odor. One owner stated that the impurity of 
                                                 
266 ADS, D4S3 dossier 8, Service hydraulique. Gentilly, Pétition au service de 







269 ADS, D4S3 dossier 8, Service hydraulique. Gentilly, rapport de l’ingénieur 
ordinaire des ponts et chaussées. 11 novembre 1857. 
  124 
the water did not allow him “…to serve the public health” using the discourse of 
the Conseil d’Hygiène to better gain their attention.270 They appealed to the 
antiquated theory of miasmas, claiming that when the sewermen emptied the tank, 
a passerby could suffocate and the odors could make the neighbors ill; reducing 
the problem to the most vital, they argued that the situation was simply untenable 
for their businesses.271 The engineer Gilles Petit, working in service of the Préfet 
de la Seine answered the petition in August of 1858. He reiterated that the 
problem the blanchisseries workers were unhappy about – the sewer system 
baking up into the water they took out of the Bièvre – was not because the sewer 
was built incorrectly. Rather, the problems stemmed from the Bièvre needing to 
be dredged – which no one wanted to finance – and not the sewer system itself.272  
One solution the engineer proposed was to direct the sewer water into the dead 
arm of the Bièvre. However, this option was – admittedly – not a viable solution, 
since he later stated that the dead arm of the Bièvre was already infected and 
drained directly into the Seine. He then used a different tone, underlining that the 
businesses on the dead arm of the Bièvre were much larger and more important 
than the petitioners, the owners of the blanchisseries. The engineer further 
explained that the problem could be fixed by hooking up the waste deposit tank to 
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other sewers that emptied into the Seine, which would cost at least Fr 100,000.273 
In the closing sentence, he scoffed at the idea of improving the water for the 
laundry establishments who “everyday infect the water of the Bièvre.”274 The 
chief engineer shared his opinions and chose to deny the petitioners any recourse 
for their problem. This attitude from the city administration on this problem 
reflects the idea that the laundry establishments were nuisances that did more 
harm than good; they did not merit the same type of considerations as other types 
of businesses. Moreover, there was no discussion of the water quality affecting 
the health of the laundresses or their clients.  
 In contrast, when faced with Napoléon III’s lavoir, the Conseil d’Hygiène 
was more supportive of laundry establishments. The general work report of 1859 
chronicled the Lavoir Napoléon and the benefits it presented for the poor and 
working classes in central Paris.275 The report underlined that although the plans 
for that particular lavoir came from England, it was actually France that built the 
first lavoir in 1837, compared to the English model of 1842 first seen in 
Liverpool. The Conseil reported that it had always been supportive and interested 
in laundry facilities multiplying in all the neighborhoods of Paris and that the new 
lavoir provided a model for others to build from. Yet, upon examination of the 
responses and conditions for authorizing lavoirs within Paris, this rhetoric seems 
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hollow. When circumstances where not perfect, the Conseil would not approve 
the business unless the owner made costly changes to the environment, or the 
facility was not approved at all based on complaints from neighbors. The Minister 
of Commerce wrote that the city needed to support the lavoirs that were of great 
importance to the poor by reducing prices of terrain and giving concessions for 
water; this support had yet to be demonstrated by the end of the decade.276  This 
discourse confirms that the ideas of Ministers and the Emperor did not always 
translate into action for individual lavoir owners.  
The Lavoir Napoléon and the Acceptance of Laundry Facilities  
 New ideas and regulations for lavoirs emerged from the building of the 
Lavoir Napoléon, as well as from new advances in technology that would shape 
the business in the coming decades. The Lavoir Napoléon was under more 
scrutiny than a private facility because the Conseil d’Hygiène used it as a model 
in which to observe the laundresses and the uses of the facility. The Conseil 
d’Hygiène counseled against using the most corrosive chemicals for laundering, 
like chlorure de chaux, which had been in free use since the advent of lavoirs, but 
left the enforcement of what types of chemicals laundresses used to the 
establishments.  The Conseil also pointed out the benefits of heating water and 
washing in one space, instead of having the process spread out in around the city 
in dwellings that were crowded. They argued that the steam was not good for the 
lungs of the inhabitants or the buildings where the steam could penetrate the walls 
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and break down the building materials.277 The Conseil d’Hygiène indicated that 
the drying rooms supplied with hot air dried the clothes more quickly and enabled 
the women who used the lavoir to take home dry clothes instead of drying them in 
their own rooms, coming back to the problem of water damage.  
In the last paragraph of the 1862 report of the Conseil d’Hygiène, it 
heralded a new technological advance for lavoirs. A lavoir on Rue Popincourt in 
Belleville, which became part of Paris in1860, had begun using machines that 
completely mechanized the washing process. The owner had equipped the large 
tanks that the laundresses used for the hot water portion of laundering with an arm 
at the bottom that agitated the laundry the entire time it was in the hot water. The 
hot water process usually took about ten or twelve hours with laundresses taking 
turn agitating the laundry with a long wooden paddle. The agitator meant the time 
the process took could be cut in half to around six hours; the tanks could be much 
larger since there was no laundress needing to reach the bottom to agitate all the 
linens properly; it only took eight people to do one thousand kilograms of 
laundry. These machines were put to use primarily in large establishments like 
blanchisseries who had clients with large-scale needs such as hospitals and 
restaurants. The agitator also made destructive processes – like brushing with stiff 
brushes that eventually caused holes in the laundry – obsolete.278 The Conseil 
d’Hygiène favored the mechanical additions immediately, pointing out the health 
advantages of cleaner laundry. There is no evidence that these changes were 
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welcomed or shunned by laundresses. However the machines made laundering, 
which was back-breaking work- a bit easier. It would be easy to surmise that they 
were not disappointed if the lavoir a professional laundress or a woman doing her 
family’s laundry used incorporated this technology.     
As the decade came to a close, there were four petitions to establish 
bateaux-lavoirs in the banlieue illustrating that the increase of lavoirs in all areas 
surrounding Paris had taken the rest of the inexpensive properties bordering the 
Seine and Bièvre; the only place left was the river itself. However, the need for 
laundry facilities was not diminishing. Rising standards for bodily hygiene added 
to the increasing population made laundry facilities more in demand than ever.279 
The navigation engineers had no reservations about allowing these facilities to 
grow and approved all the applications for their establishment. Yet, the proposed 
bateaux-lavoirs were not small; they averaged twenty-six meters in length. The 
mayor of Bercy, for example, welcomed the establishment of a bateau-lavoir in 
his commune.280 He stated: “I look forward with pleasure at the projected 
establishment. This bateau-lavoir will do Bercy well in light of its tremendous 
growth in the last five years. It will facilitate cheap washing for poor families. In 
consequence we are taken to welcome this project favorably.”281 It cost five 
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centimes per hour or forty centimes for the day to wash at this facility.  This was 
the same mayor that used communal funds to build a lavoir that would provide 
laundering facilities at a reduced price modeled after the Lavoir Napoléon.  
 Not every bateau-lavoir was welcomed as warmly as that in Bercy. In the 
western communes, the concern was keeping the property values intact, 
confirming the differences that had arisen between the eastern half of Paris and 
the wealthier western areas. The mayor of Neuilly approved the application for a 
bateau-lavoir in that city, but only with reservations. The attitudes about uses of 
urban space prevalent in Paris began to influence the banlieue. The engineers 
approved the boat with a glass chassis to protect the laundresses from the 
elements, but turned down the request to hang clothes on the river banks 
explaining that “…it would be an alienation of public domain and even in a place 
not frequented it would produce a disagreeable effect for the view.”282 The 
engineers were concerned that hanging laundry on the river banks would, in 
effect, be a tacit approval for private businesses and individuals to use public 
property for their own purposes. In Paris, the restriction on hanging laundry on 
the river occurred during Napoléon’s reign. Concerns about how the laundry 
would affect the appearance of the river bank reflected the changes to the use and 
look of urban space already taking place inside the city.   
  The bateau-lavoir proposed in Courbevoie had a more hostile reception, 
not from the mayor or navigation engineers, but from its future neighbor, a private 
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resident.283 The mayor denied the original place requested because it would be too 
far from the center of the town and therefore too hard to observe it and ensure the 
business followed regulations. The owner agreed to move the requested 
placement, which happened to be in front of a private residence. The mayor saw 
nothing wrong with this place, but the resident was very opposed to it.  He wrote 
to the mayor on more than three occasions to find a solution more suited to his 
taste. He argued that the bateau-lavoir “…would destroy the spirit of amelioration 
that has taken hold on the western side of Paris.”284 He further stated that “the 
river is not for the establishments of individuals and one should respect the rights 
of the residents first, then the locale and its improvement. We want to attract the 
affluent population who will not live next to such an establishment. There is a 
large development happening in Paris near the Bois de Boulogne and a beautiful 
road to connect the Porte de Sursesnes, making a loop back to the Bois. I don’t 
think it is right to sacrifice such a bright future to this bateau-lavoir, an industry 
so inconvenient.” 285 The resident’s argument echoed the mayor of Neuilly’s 
decision regarding public space and its use for private business. As long as the 
bateaux-lavoir did not use the banks for hanging laundry the mayor responded 
that for reasons of regulation enforcement, he saw no impediment the bateau-
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lavoir would be stationed at the pre-determined place.286 The mayor in the 
banlieue would only accept the boat in his commune if he could make it conform 
to standards of appearance for the area. He recognized that some residents needed 
the facility, however he was not willing to have the installation if it meant 
drastically decreasing the aesthetic value of his commune.  
Conclusion 
The exportation of laundry facilities out of Paris suited the goals of the 
Préfet de la Seine and the Conseil d’Hygiène: First, to control the development of 
a potentially dangerous industry that required drainage Paris could not 
accommodate and move it to locations that could. Second, to move the poverty 
associated with the lavoirs outside of central Paris. The needs of the changing city 
contributed to making the presence of the poor out of place in the city at the very 
time their numbers in the city had swelled. Once the facilities were outside of the 
city, the Conseil d’Hygiène was less concerned about water drainage issues. For 
laundry services inside the city, Napoléon III had to fund the lavoir at the Marché 
du Temple with his own money, which included building an underground canal to 
the Seine for drainage. Most lavoir owners did not have this kind of capital and 
thus moved to where construction was easier, outside of the city. Moving out of 
Paris meant the owners of blanchisseries could build new buildings on large tracts 
of land, which facilitated large buildings to house the many washing processes 
plus heated rooms devoted to drying, as well as taking care of water drainage by 
                                                 
286 Ibid. 
  
  132 
having drainage fields. Haussmannization did not remedy the issues the laundry 
facilities faced; there was still a rudimentary sewer system both inside of Paris 
and in the banlieue, which would not be completed until the Third Republic. The 
problems with laundry establishments had not been solved; they were simply 
moved out of sight and further from the poor women of Paris who were left in 
need. Chapter four will show that shifts in uses of urban space persisted. It will 
also reveal that changes in attitudes towards the bateaux-lavoirs mirrored changes 
in the conceptualization of the uses of the Seine in Paris.   
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Chapter 4 
POLICY SHIFTS TOWARDS THE BATEAUX-LAVOIRS AND THE 
PREFETS DE LA SEINE: 1860-1885 
 Chapter three explored the inconsistencies of the Préfet de Police and 
Préfet de la Seine in the treatment of lavoirs in the banlieue and in Paris. 
Compared to the applications to open lavoirs within the city of Paris, which were 
difficult to obtain, the authorizations to build lavoirs in the banlieue did not 
reflect the same anxiety about water issues. The authorizations and rejections, 
which differed under the regimes reflected the prevailing ideas about government 
intervention for the poor. The Conseil d’Hygiène supported the lavoirs in the 
banlieue because they wanted to move the laundry establishments outside of the 
city which the Préfet de Police, who directed the Conseil, supported. The Conseil 
contended that the establishments were health threats that did not belong in Paris. 
They moved the matter that was out of place in the city to its outskirts, where 
laundry establishments would fit. Ironically, these areas that were outside of the 
city in 1820-40s, became part of Paris under Napoléon III. The Préfets allowed 
the segregation of lavoirs because the Conseil contended that they would spread 
disease with their poorly drained water. The city administration was less 
concerned with the banlieue because it had a lower population density than 
central Paris before mid-century. However, the prime land in the banlieue to build 
terrestrial facilities became scarce quickly because the one hundred lavoirs built 
between 1849 and 1859 took the inexpensive land with convenient places next to 
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natural drainage.287 To the contrary, in Paris, the inflexible stance of the hygiene 
inspectors towards applications to open lavoirs, the opposition of the neighbors to 
have such an establishment nearby, and the rudimentary state of the sewer system 
to service facilities remote to natural drainage, made opening a lavoir in central 
Paris very complicated. These factors contributed to a shortage of laundry 
establishments for the poor in the central arrondissements. The Conseil 
d’Hygiène’s stance on lavoirs in central Paris resulted in restricting access to 
laundry resources for the poor – laundresses and poor women alike. The bateaux-
lavoirs were the only inexpensive laundry facilities serving the center of Paris. 
However, Eugène Haussmann, the Préfet de la Seine at the time, sought to 
eliminate the bateaux-lavoirs within the city to free the river Seine of objects that 
sullied its appearance and obstructed other commercial traffic. Haussmann gave 
no thought to the many women who lived near the Seine who would be left 
without a place to launder. 
 This chapter will demonstrate that the political context and power of the 
Préfet de la Seine was crucial in deciding the fate of the bateaux-lavoirs. Ideas 
about the bateaux-lavoirs shifted with the Préfet de la Seine’s political agenda of 
the time. During his préfecture (1853-1870), Georges Eugène Haussmann wanted 
to create a clear thoroughfare for commercial traffic and align the appearance of 
the river, the symbol of Paris, with the changes he made to the appearance of the 
city. He supported the “Bateaux Omnibus” a municipally-operated public 
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transportation company – that did not do laundry – over the bateaux-lavoirs. In 
contrast, Ferdinand Duval, the Préfet de la Seine from 1873 to 1879, did not 
enforce Haussmann’s ordonnance and supported the bateaux-lavoirs because they 
had public utility. He approved the repairs of old establishments and was 
favorable to new establishments. From 1879 until 1883, the following Préfets 
followed the same trend, which indicate that the idea of what presented an 
obstacle was in the attitude of the politicians rather than the physical impediments 
of the bateaux-lavoirs. However, as political needs changed, the bateaux-lavoirs 
came under threat again after the last decade of the nineteenth century. Eugène 
Poubelle’s préfecture (1883-1896) focused on hygiene and order, continuing 
Haussmann’s vision. The Conseil d’Hygiène contended that the facilities were 
polluting the river and should be eliminated for public health. Poubelle agreed 
with the Conseil and decided to enforce Haussmann’s ordonnance. This chapter 
will also uncover some of the representations of laundresses set in the Second 
Empire and Third Republic that contributed to negative attitudes regarding their 
places of work. The representations in this chapter mirror the discourse about 
laundresses discussed in the second chapter in regards to eliminating the bateaux-
lavoirs. They were disgraceful to Paris because they showed poverty.  
The Troubling Presence of Bateaux-Lavoirs in Paris 
 The Préfets’ treatment of all types of laundry facilities for the poor 
revealed their ambivalence between providing for the needs of less affluent 
residents of Paris and developing businesses not associated with poverty, unlike 
laundry. Moreover, lavoirs in the center of Paris did not get built to fill the 
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lacunae that the bateaux-lavoirs would leave if the city administration eliminated 
every laundry establishment on the river. From a legal perspective, eradicating the 
bateaux-lavoirs also meant violating the residents’ right to use the river for 
domestic purposes, which had been outlined when Louis XIII gave concessions to 
the bateaux-lavoirs .288    
 As Haussmann sought to reconstruct Paris, gentrifying the city, the 
bateaux-lavoirs did not fit with his aims. He accused the boats of presenting an 
“…aspect disgracieux;” the bateaux-lavoirs would not survive unless they 
conformed to his vision of the river.289 In Paris, he began to regulate the bateaux-
lavoirs on the Seine according to the appearances of the bateaux. He created 
guidelines regarding their size, color and shape. Haussmann ordered that the boats 
should present a uniform appearance to fit with his new standards elsewhere in 
the city.290 For example, in 1862, he approved the replacement of a boat stationed 
at Pont St. Louis on the grounds that it measured no more than eighteen meters in 
length and five meters wide, stipulating that the owner was to paint the hull of the 
boat in black with the top in grey.291 The prescription of regularity for the façade 
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of the boats reflected his previous commitment to unify the façades of the 
buildings lining his new boulevards. 
 The bateaux-lavoirs encountered fierce opposition from their would-be 
neighbors on the river and the river banks, which reveal the negative attitudes 
regarding bateaux-lavoirs from the people who did not use them. This attitude 
stemmed from the idea that they did not fit in Paris and were not welcome on the 
Seine.  For example, a proposed bateau-lavoir at the limit between Bercy and 
Paris initiated resistance. An examination of oppositions to the bateau-lavoir 
revealed that the neighbors just behind the establishment had lodged a complaint 
that it would pollute the Seine with all types of organic materials and noxious 
smells.292 However, the inspectors for navigation asserted that there was another 
laundry boat just twenty meters away that had operated for more than a decade 
without complaints. They defended the proposed bateau, stating that, because the 
waters of the Seine did not flow as swiftly in that area, it did not preclude the 
laundry establishment from being built and stationed there when “it is recognized 
by everyone as in the public’s interest.”293 The Préfet de Police initiated another 
examination in the week following the navigation inspector’s investigation, which 
defended the utility of the establishment in terms of women’s safety and ability to 
access water to launder with. The report revealed that the bateau-lavoir was 
                                                 




  138 
“incontestably in the public utility despite the oppositions.”294 He indicated that, 
in contrast to the communal lavoir, which was fed by a stream that did not flow in 
the summer season, the boat would create a sheltered place to wash in all 
conditions and in all seasons. Without it, the women would be required to walk to 
the Seine and wash on the banks, which was formally illegal since 1827.295 
Furthermore, the river was dangerous for laundresses in this area because the 
haulage ropes operating just outside of the city sometimes came into the area and 
could throw them into the river. The antagonists’ arguments concentrated on the 
undesirability of attracting more laveuses –washerwomen – to the area, intimating 
that there would be more unacceptable behavior, and that it would ruin the 
industry of blanchissage that both men and women worked in because more 
women would do their own laundry.296 The Préfet de Police decided to allow the 
bateau-lavoir.  
 The Lavoir Napoléon closed in 1862, demonstrating the difficult nature of 
running a lavoir in the center of Paris and the unwillingness of the city 
administration to keep it open despite it being built and financed by Napoléon III 
himself, and despite its usefulness for the poor. Indeed, only two years before its 
demise, the hygiene and safety inspector had remarked – in the application for 
more water boilers – that “the establishment rendered immense services to a 
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population without means.”297 The lavoir closed after the family who rented it 
went bankrupt.298 The family reported that it had been difficult to keep the 
establishment running with the high price of water subscriptions and building 
rent.299 Napoléon had commissioned an English family to operate it for the first 
six years; later, the Amable family rented the building and operated the lavoir. 
However, their tenure only endured three years until the family breached their 
lease.300 Following an incident involving the Amable family, the Préfet de Police 
opened an investigation into their management of the lavoir. According to the 
Commissaire de Police’s (Police Chief’s) report, five or six members of the 
family were fighting in the street over who was really in charge of the lavoir.301 
The laundresses who witnessed the fight reported that the brothers had hurled 
insults at them. The Commissaire added that “the public had accustomed itself to 
considering the direction of this establishment as directly tied to the house of the 
Emperor. Unfortunately, they have a position that puts them in contact with the 
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public, especially the public of the working class.”302 Haussmann, Préfet de la 
Seine, took the opportunity to expropriate the property to build the Mairie of the 
third arrondissement of Paris.303 Haussmann selected to use the property for his 
own administration – turning the space into a service for the government – instead 
of maintaining the laundry business to support the working class in central Paris.  
In theory, the Préfet de Police and the Préfet de la Seine supported terrestrial 
lavoirs; in practice, the facilities were scarce within the city due to oppositions 
from neighbors and water drainage problems, and because the businesses could 
not charge enough (despite their high frequentation, its users were unable to pay 
higher prices to launder) to cover their costs (high overhead of property taxes, 
costly maintenance, expensive rents in central Paris).  
 In 1865, the general report from the Conseil d’Hygiène highlighted the 
obstacles to opening public laundry facilities in Paris. The report outlined that the 
quantity of lavoirs in Paris did not compare with that of blanchisseries being 
opened in the banlieue.304 Unsurprisingly, the lavoirs were not being built in the 
city to replace the bateaux-lavoirs since the former enjoyed little support from the 
Conseil d’Hygiène. Blanchisseries were the choice of laundry establishments for 
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the affluent. These establishments were able to get the laundry back in a matter of 
days because they had larger cauldrons in which to wash, and had drying rooms 
and ironing services attached to the business. The Conseil d’Hygiène rejected 
three applications for lavoirs within Paris because the lavoirs were contiguous 
with a school or apartment building and thus presented problems, namely being 
too noisy and producing steam that could seep into the building’s walls.305 The 
report concluded that there was more opposition from the neighbors to open a 
lavoir in Paris than in the rural communes because it would be in close proximity 
with their neighbors, bringing undesirable elements like laundresses with it.306 
The report summarized the number of lavoirs within Paris compared to those in 
the banlieue. In 1860, there were twelve establishments within Paris versus forty-
one in the banlieue; by 1865, there were only five within the city compared to one 
hundred-fifty outside the city’s new boundaries.307  
 The difficulties in establishing lavoirs in Paris meant that bateaux-lavoirs 
remained the only real solution to the problem of access to laundry facilities in 
central Paris by the working class. Although the city administrators like the Préfet 
de la Seine, Préfet de Police, and the Department of Navigation had entertained 
the idea of eliminating bateaux-lavoirs within Paris since the second decade of the 
nineteenth century, the Préfet de la Seine begrudgingly allowed a new bateau-
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lavoir to be stationed on the Quai d’Anjou in the fourth arrondissement, in the 
very heart of Paris in 1865.  Haussmann also placed a condition on the 
establishment that the owner could not repair it without permission, or if he did, 
he would risk having the boat removed at the owner’s expense.308 Haussmann 
then extended his Arrêté for the bateau-lavoir at the Quai d’Anjou to all other 
bateaux-lavoirs being purchased and sold, on the condition that the owner obtain 
permission before repairing.309   
Bateaux-Lavoirs under Attack: The Defense against Haussmann 
 Increasing the restrictions he placed on bateaux-lavoirs owners within 
Paris during the 1860s, Haussmann decided that it was time to rid Paris of the 
bateaux-lavoirs and banish the establishments. In 1867, Haussmann requested 
that the Préfet de Police investigate the impediments to creating a larger 
“Compagnie des Bateaux Omnibus” with more stops and larger boats. The Préfet 
de Police had created the company to serve the Exposition Universelle twenty 
years before. The Bateaux Omnibus was a city-owned company. The Préfet de 
Police decided on the number of boats, the hours and tariffs.310   The city was 
trying to close private businesses to make way for a municipally-owned business 
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which underlined the politically sensitive nature of the report on the bateaux-
lavoirs.   
In 1867, Haussmann wrote a new arrêté concerning the bateaux-lavoirs 
inside of Paris.311 At the time, there were seventy five bateaux within Paris from 
Bercy to Pont Iéna.312 In addition to the terms that no repair or modification can 
take place without prior permission, the new rules stipulated that the Préfet de la 
Seine would not approve any repairs that would extend the life of the laundry 
establishment. The section that troubled the owners above all was the stipulation 
that the government could eliminate the boat without any indemnification. If 
executed, this arrêté signaled the end of a business that began in Paris with 
concessions from Louis XIII 16 September 1623.313  
 Consequently, a group of twenty-two bateaux-lavoirs owners immediately 
pooled their money and hired a lawyer in an attempt to strike the law down. The 
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case went to the Cour de Cassation  – the highest appeal’s court, equivalent to the 
U.S. Supreme Court –  and then the Conseil d’Etat for a final decision.  
Their lawyer, Christophe Mazeau, worked as the avocat au Conseil d’Etat and at 
the Cour de Cassation from 1856 to 1869. He wrote a detailed report detailing the 
defense of the owners.314  
 Mazeau used four arguments in his appeal to attack Haussmann’s 
arrêté.315 The overarching argument in the report was that, by creating the arrêté, 
Haussmann had overstepped the legal boundaries of his powers as Préfet de la 
Seine.316 The first argument supporting the bateaux-lavoirs owners against 
Haussmann drew on the original concession given by Louis XIII. In the report, he 
argued that the concessions for the two original concessionaries, La Grange and 
Marie, stipulated that they were to maintain the banks and build a bridge across 
the river Seine where they decided to place their bateaux-lavoirs.317 The Pont 
Marie in Paris took his name from the bateau-lavoir Marie. The concessionaries 
had the right to pass the concession on to their heirs or anyone who bought their 
business. In effect, there were twenty-two descendents or concession holders of 
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either La Grange or Marie still operating bateaux-lavoirs on the Seine within 
Paris. Since the concession held the owners responsible for the upkeep of the 
banks and building bridges, their concession was à titre onéreux, which meant 
they were entitled to an indemnity if the government seized or destroyed their 
business on the river for any reason.318 In Haussmann’s arrêté, he stated that there 
would be no indemnity for anyone. This was legal for other bateaux-lavoirs 
which had been established later, but not for the descendents of La Grange and 
Marie. Moreover, there was no time limit specified in the concession; thus, it 
could never expire. Mazeau further argued that, even during the Revolution, the 
revolutionaries had respected concessions for other businesses including the 
bateaux-lavoirs.319 There had been other threats to the existence of the bateaux-
lavoirs earlier in the nineteenth century. However, they were always saved by the 
municipal council of Paris, which would not go against precedent and deny the 
royal concession.320 The position had been reified by the Napoleonic government 
who created a new tax regime which the bateaux-lavoirs owners paid to the Préfet 
de Police who controlled the river and ports. The taxes were specifically for the 
upkeep of the banks and ports. Being taxed strengthened their legitimacy as being 
lawful and contributing to the good of the city.321 Lastly, only the head of state 
could take away a royal concession.322 
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 Mazeau’s second argument was that the Préfet de la Seine had not 
consulted the Préfet de Police before he wrote the arrêté, and, in doing so, had 
abused his power. Thus, it was legally null since it did not have the approval of 
the Préfet de Police. The changing structure of power in the administration of 
Paris under Napoléon III played a role in the changing treatment of the bateaux-
lavoirs. The sharing of administrative duties between the Préfet de Police and the 
Préfet de la Seine had, in reality, given the Préfet de la Seine power over both 
offices.323 In this atmosphere, the Préfet de la Seine could administrate the 
bateaux-lavoirs directly and without regard to the Préfet de Police who had not 
legislated against the establishments and had even protected them against 
opponents. Mazeau connected the mission of the Préfet de Police, set out by the 
Napoleonic regime, to safeguard the cleanliness of the city, which was in the 
original description of the post.324 The bateaux-lavoirs offered laundry services to 
the poor and, therefore, ensured the cleanliness of the poor and, by extension, 
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Paris.325 According to his argument, the bateaux-lavoirs should only be 
administrated by the Préfet de Police. He added that the Préfet de Police had 
required the bateaux-lavoirs to have first-aid kits, ropes, life boats and a guardian 
who could swim well. Thus, they were ensuring the safety of the river, as well as 
the nearby terrestrial inhabitants and the laundresses on the boats while also 
ensuring the hygiene and safety of the poor and Paris.326     
 Mazeau’s third argument further highlighted that the decrepitude of the 
bateaux-lavoirs would make them unsafe to their users. Haussmann’s arrêté 
stated that the owners of bateaux-lavoirs could make no repairs without previous 
permission from the Préfet de la Seine and that, if one did repair without 
permission, it would cause the immediate destruction of the business.327 Mazeau 
argued that the arrêté would endanger those using the establishments and that 
jurisprudence did not support the arrêté. No business had ever been subjected to 
this type of restriction. Anyone could be injured, or worse, drown if the boats 
could not be repaired in a timely fashion.328 He pointed out that even in cases 
where a factory or mill completely obstructed the river there was never any 
injunction on repairing the businesses.329 In effect, the arrêté devised a 
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completely new sanction: the immediate destruction of a private business. Since 
there was no jurisprudence to support the new law, Mazeau charged Haussmann 
as being arbitrary and against business.330  
 In the fourth section of the report, Mazeau argued that no power could 
alienate a natural right from the people of Paris which, in this instance, was the 
use of water from the Seine for domestic purposes.331 Natural rights were not 
contingent upon any particular law or government, but universal and inalienable, 
contrary to legal rights which derived from specific governments. Allen Wood 
argued that during the nineteenth century there was a decline in the validity of the 
idea of natural rights as a reaction to the French Revolution. The following 
governments were much more interested in establishing legal frameworks 
particular to their own ideas about rights.332 There was already a ban on washing 
laundry on the banks of the river Seine within Paris.333 The only legal place to 
wash laundry was on the bateaux-lavoirs. Therefore, if the banks were forbidden, 
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and there were no more bateaux-lavoirs, the people would be alienated from 
using the water of the Seine for domestic use.334 
 The argument for the public utility of the bateaux-lavoirs did not sway 
Haussmann who only viewed the boats as impediments to economic growth and 
eyesores which denigrated the capital. On the opposite side of the argument, 
Mazeau debated that it was Haussmann’s decrees that hindered industry and 
economic growth. Unsurprisingly, neither antagonist even considered the rights of 
the poor women an issue. According to Mazeau’s report, the bateaux-lavoirs 
would remain more efficacious and efficient than the terrestrial lavoir; the current 
of the river provided a more thorough rinse with cleaner water than in the lavoir 
where the laundresses rinsed many kilos of laundry coming from different 
customers in the same water.335 Since Napoléon III took English lavoirs as the 
model for the Lavoir Napoléon, the bateaux-lavoirs could be viewed as a point of 
pride because they presented an advantage to the population that London did not 
posses; it only had terrestrial laundries which cost households ten centimes more 
per kilo than in Paris on the bateaux-lavoirs.336   
 The Conseil d’Etat’s response to Mazeau’s report reflected the reigning 
political attitude towards the bateaux-lavoirs. In the meeting of 22 July 1870, the 
Conseil voted to continue the suppression of the facilities. They rejected the claim 
                                                 
334 APP, DA 336 Navigation. Mémoire pour les propriétaires des bateaux-lavoirs 
établis sur la seine, 1868, 67. 
 




  150 
that the Préfet de la Seine had taken too much power; the Ordonnance stipulated 
the shared powers of the Préfets were vague, and thus, Haussmann could not be 
charged.337 However, the administration would uphold the claim to indemnities to 
those holding concessions from La Grange or Marie.338 Surely, it was upholding 
the jurisprudence in regards to protecting business owners that mattered to 
Mazeau, not defending the rights of poor women to have access to the river to 
wash.  
A New Life for the Bateaux-Lavoirs from the Siege of Paris until Poubelle 
 By the end of the Second Empire, the Parisian and French administration 
was soon to be disrupted. On 15 July 1870, France declared war on Prussia. The 
invasion of Paris by Prussian troops was a traumatic event. During the four-month 
siege of the city, the Prussians destroyed or blocked the water delivery system; 
consequently, the bateaux-lavoirs took on a new significance. They represented 
the only laundry facilities for Paris during the siege. The capture of Napoléon III 
and French troops at Sedan in September 1870, coupled with the siege of Paris, 
led to the surrender of France and the end of hostilities in January 1871. The 
surrender led to the formation of the Third Republic and to changing attitudes 
towards the bateaux-lavoirs based on the whim of the Préfets de la Seine. The 
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service the bateaux-lavoirs had rendered during the siege spared them from 
further threats during the Commune.  
The Prussian siege changed the way the Préfets would think about the 
bateaux-lavoirs until the mid 1880s. This change in attitude demonstrated that the 
boats filled a vital function to the city and the administration, which was 
unwilling to continue the campaign against the bateaux-lavoirs that Haussmann 
had started. In September of 1871, Léon Say, the new Préfet de la Seine, decided 
that he would not take any measures against the bateaux-lavoirs owners who went 
against the prescriptions of Haussmann.339 For ten years after the siege, the Third 
Republic tolerated and even supported the bateaux-lavoirs.   
The negative attitude toward the bateaux-lavoirs within the city continued 
until the Second Empire ended. For instance, in 1871, the bateau-lavoir operated 
by the Prochon family requested to move to Ivry, just outside of Paris.340 The 
report outlined that Ivry was a popular place for bateaux-lavoirs and many had 
requested to be stationed there since it was in a working-class area and could still 
serve the residents of Paris who lived in the 12th and 13th arrondissements.341 This 
may have been an overestimation of their use because the geography of the 12th 
arrondissement did not lend itself to easy access to the river. However, it did 
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highlight the importance of the bateaux-lavoirs to the working-class area of Ivry. 
Jules Ferry, the Préfet de la Seine underlined that many bateaux-lavoir owners 
had made requests to be in that area, which he had denied. However, since the 
Prochon boat was a serious impediment within the city, Ferry was in favor of 
giving it preferential treatment and allowing it to station at the port of Ivry.342  
 During his préfecture (1871-1872), the Préfet de la Seine Léon Say was 
unwilling to arbitrarily eliminate a vital service to the poor of Paris. Say was 
avowedly against Haussmann and his strong-arm methods of reordering the city. 
Though the difficulties poor women faced were not necessarily relevant to him, 
he was a Liberal and supported the rights of small businesses. This shift of 
attitude from Haussmann also revealed that the bateaux-lavoirs were victims of 
the previous Préfet de la Seine who based his campaign on their appearance with 
no regard to the service they rendered or the establishment of businesses. The 
Préfet de la Seine, Say, authorized two new establishments in 1872.343 In one 
instance, he gave permission to a bateau-lavoir owner stationed at the Port de 
Grenelle in the 15th arrondissement to extend his boat another fifteen meters.344 
This permission was over the objections of the navigation inspectors who 
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complained that the administration had suddenly changed opinion because the 
bateaux-lavoirs had rendered service during the Prussian siege of Paris.345  
 However, not everyone was pleased with the new tolerance towards 
laundry establishments. An article in the Journal de Paris chronicled the 
complaints they received from anonymous residents of Paris regarding laundry. 
“About the buanderies in the open: Hoping that we have a convention that puts an 
end to the universal hanging of shirts and rags, barely washed, in the public roads. 
These articles, floating on for several kilometers offers nothing gracious to the 
eye.”346 The city technocrats, like the engineers of navigation, were not pleased 
with the new tolerance the Préfet de la Seine Say lent to the bateaux-lavoirs. The 
inspectors communicated in reports that the administration had a tolerant stance 
that they found regrettable. Since Haussmann had given them the opportunity to 
clear the river of bateaux-lavoirs, the sudden reversal of opinion left them without 
the power to ameliorate the navigation as they saw fit – though bateaux-lavoirs 
were not actually physical impediments to navigation. Unsurprisingly, the 
engineers’ only concern was to make sure the commercial traffic on the Seine had 
ample room to maneuver and places to dock. The engineers of navigation signaled 
their frustration with the bateaux-lavoirs.347 These boats occupied some of the 
most valuable spaces on the river in terms of tourism and navigation, around the 
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Ile St. Louis and Ile de la Cité; however the stance of the new Préfet de la Seine 
did not deprive the poor residents of these laundry facilities. The inspectors of 
navigation reported that the bateaux-lavoirs owners had taken the opportunity to 
repair, replace and enlarge their establishments during this tolerant period.348 
  The decision of Ferdinand Duval, the next Préfet de la Seine from 1873 
until 1879, illustrated his difficulties in compromising the two opposite 
viewpoints the bateaux-lavoirs presented to the administration. His experiences 
during the Franco-Prussian siege may have contributed to his lenient stance 
towards the bateaux-lavoirs. During the siege of Paris Duval was a captain in the 
Garde Nationale that the government mobilized to protect Paris.349 He witnessed 
the difficulties the residents had during the traumatic siege and the service the 
bateaux-lavoirs rendered. They were the only laundry establishments still 
working. The Prussians had cut the water lines so everyone depended on the river 
for laundry.  
 Duval’s decisions in favor of the bateaux-lavoirs frustrated the engineers 
of navigation who wanted to continue Haussmann’s project and sweep the boats 
off the Seine as it traversed Paris. In 1873, Duval declared that he would follow 
the prescriptions Haussmann had outlined for bateaux-lavoirs in his Arrêté. 
However, the inspector of navigation reported that “the Préfet de la Seine 
renounced, for the moment, taking the measures that would lead to its 
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application.”350  The owner of a bateau-lavoir that was stationed on the Quai 
d’Orléans petitioned to keep the outer structure he had built to protect the women 
washing out of the weather and enclose a drying room on the top. The inspector 
for the Préfet de Police stated that the owner seemed careful and the 
establishment had served the low-income neighborhood around the area.351 The 
inspector also pointed out that laundering with flowing water was much superior 
to any other choice. In the last sentence of the report, he added that he had not 
defended Haussmann’s Arrêté, which, the inspector insisted, was up to the Préfet 
de la Seine.352 The inspector of navigation under the Préfet de la Seine’s engineer 
found that, while the boat did not follow Haussmann’s law, “…it did not seem 
that the time had come for the Préfet de la Seine to depart from the benevolence 
that has made itself a rule in these last years and it is within this frame that we 
accord the permission for this establishment.”353 Then, the report passed to the 
chief inspector who wanted to remind the Préfet de la Seine that “…it would be 
regrettable to the author if this boat becomes larger. The motives that have 
prompted the Préfet [de la Seine] to see the necessity of reducing the numbers of 
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bateaux-lavoirs still existed; therefore, the establishment should be refused 
authorization.” 354 
 The following case further illustrates the Préfet de la Seine’s hesitancy to 
enforce Haussmann’s Arrêté. In 1874, two bateaux-lavoirs owners applied for a 
place within Paris at the Viaduc d’Auteuil (also called the Viaduc du Point-du-
Jour) in the 16th arrondissement.355 In the navigation inspector’s report, he 
recounted the arguments of both owners who had appealed to the public utility of 
the project and the utility of the bateaux-lavoirs for the surrounding inhabitants 
who supported the establishments. The inspector underlined that he had worked to 
reduce the numbers of bateaux-lavoirs on the rivers. He emphasized a facet of the 
problem that the two Préfets de la Seine since Haussmann had to contend with: 
“Once there was a bateau-lavoir on the river it was very difficult to rescind 
authorizations already given and to eliminate an existing establishment even if 
they became a considerable blockage for navigation.”356 He disagreed with the 
argument that the bateaux-lavoirs had a right to exist because they were useful to 
the public: “If the bateaux-lavoirs are useful, they are not indispensible and it is 
possible to give satisfaction to the population by the creation of lavoirs. There is 
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no reason to accord the petition.”357 However, the mayor of Passy supported the 
usefulness of such an establishment in a letter to Duval. The Préfet de la Seine 
sided with the mayor of the 16th arrondissement instead of the navigation 
inspectors and allowed one of the establishments to station at the Viaduc 
d’Auteuil.358 The navigation engineer was trying to follow the prescription to 
eliminate the bateaux-lavoirs within Paris while the mayor decided that it would 
be in his interest to allow the facility. This episode highlighted the political nature 
of where the bateaux stationed.   
 Similarly, on the small arm of the Seine on the Ile St. Louis, the bateau-
lavoir owner Martin petitioned to extend his establishment and re-waterproof the 
hull, which the inspectors of navigation did not approve; indeed, the 1867 arrêté 
restricted modifications that would extend the life of the boat.359 In the 
correspondence, the tone of the engineers towards the bateaux-lavoirs owners 
became more frustrated because the Préfet continually ignored their suggestions 
to stop authorizing repairs of the bateaux-lavoirs and begin eliminating them from 
the Seine. The inspector’s report underlined their own exasperation in working 
towards a goal that all of the Préfets de la Seine of the Third Republic, thus far, 
had refused to execute. According to the inspector, “the request was completely 
contrary to Haussmann’s law, but the circumstances in the last years justified that 
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the Administration has not executed the arrêté. Since the other bateaux-lavoirs 
owners have taken advantage of this tolerance it seems difficult in these 
conditions not to decide in favor of Mr. Martin.” The inspector highlighted that 
the legal principle to eliminate the businesses had already been decided in favor 
of abolishing the facilities and that the administrations had already taken all the 
necessary care and concern for the population that used the establishments. He 
argued that “the administration only prolongs the navigation problems that they 
have the power and the opportunity to ameliorate in the interior of Paris by 
eliminating the parasitic establishments that encumber the Seine.”360 He added 
that, although he understood the administration was lenient with the bateaux-
lavoirs after 1870-71, the circumstances in 1875 were no longer the same, and it 
was time to think about enforcing the law again.361 Even after the impassioned 
pleas of the service of navigation inspectors, Duval decided to go against 
Haussmann’s edict and to approve the application to make the business larger by 
fifteen meters. The Préfet de la Seine chose not to take such an important resource 
away from the working class; he approved the request immediately after receiving 
an appeal from a mayor or petitions from the owner showing the inhabitants 
support the bateau-lavoir.  
 The Préfet de la Seine Duval chose not to execute the law against the 
bateaux-lavoirs during second half of the 1870s either. For instance, on the Quai 
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Malaquais in the 6th arrondissement, Duval granted authorization for a bateau-
lavoir to be completely overhauled along with a new boat to enlarge the 
establishment by thirteen meters.362 In 1877, Duval also accorded permission to 
the bateau-lavoir “Quentin”, located on the Pont d’Arcole in the 4th 
arrondissement, to replace an old boat with a new one and build drying rooms on 
the top. The inspector added his opposition to the request, stating that “it was not 
in the interest of the development of navigation.”363 During the same year, the 
“Picaud” establishment located on the Quai Bourbon on the Ile St. Louis applied 
for permission to replace a boat that was out of service. Against advice of his 
engineers and inspectors, the Préfet de la Seine gave permission to extend the life 
of bateau-lavoir “Martin” in the heart of Paris.364 Duval gave the same 
establishment permission a year later to replace the whole chassis.365 After the 
engineers of navigation had argued for clearing the area around Ile St. Louis 
because it presented difficulties to navigate around the island, The Préfet de la 
Seine decided to allow the bateau-lavoir “Leneru” to be moved near Pont Sully 
                                                 
362 APP, DA 337 Navigation. Service de la navigation, Rapport de l’inspecteur 
ordinaire, bateau-lavoir Guernier,12 novembre 1876.  
 
363 APP, DA 337 Navigation. Direction des travaux, Service de la navigation, 
Rapport de l’ingénieur ordinaire, bateau-lavoir Picaud, 30 novembre 1880.    
 
364 APP, DA 337 Navigation. Direction des travaux, Service de la navigation, 
Rapport de l’inspecteur ordinaire, 6 juin 1879.  
 
365 APP, DA 337 Navigation. Direction des travaux, Service de la navigation, 
Rapport de l’inspecteur ordinaire,  3 août 1879 1879.   
 
  160 
on the side of the island.366  The Préfet de la seine also authorized the bateau-
lavoir Quentin to rebuild the front half of the structure after a boat carrying stones 
hit it in 1879.367 
 The next three Préfets de la Seine from 1879 until 1883 did not make 
serious efforts to change the tolerance that the previous administration had 
exercised during the previous decade; their actions did not result in the diminution 
of the bateaux-lavoirs within Paris. Illustrating the lenient attitude, in 1880, 
Ferdinand Hérold, Préfet de la Seine from 1879 to 1882, gave his approval to 
establish the bateau-lavoir “Gallet” on Quai Malaquais.368 Hérold was engrossed 
in secular reforms including taking religious emblems out of schools and was not 
as interested in city planning issues. While concentrating on republican reforms 
he may have diverted his attention away from the problems the bateaux-lavoirs 
presented. He permitted the owner of the bateau-lavoir “Martin” on Quai Anjou 
to add another boat to his establishment, place a glass chassis onto it, make repairs 
to another boat, and add drying rooms on the top so that the establishment would 
then comprise four boats.369  The Préfet de la Seine, Hérold, also allowed the 
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“Langlois” establishment owners to make extensive repairs after the ice flows 
during the winter of 1879-1880.370 The chief engineer of navigation made his 
opposition clear in his report, arguing that the natural disaster had given the 
administration the perfect opportunity to clear the river.371 The engineer wanted 
the facility to be moved two hundred meters to Quai Bourbon, on the other side of 
Ile St. Louis where there was less traffic.  However, Langlois wrote to the office 
of navigation to dispute the decision. Langlois stated that “the move would lead to 
my ruin since there are many bateaux-lavoirs on the Quai Bourbon and my 
clientele lives in the quartier Latin and would not follow me to the proposed 
place.”372 The Préfet de Police acknowledged that he understood the bateaux-
lavoirs were a cause of trouble for navigation and that the engineers wanted to 
reduce the numbers of establishments. However, this was not the right 
opportunity for that type of action.373 The Préfet de la Seine answered the inquiry 
by taking up the cause of the business owner, stating that “it would be cruel not to 
let him rebuild and stay in his old place.”374 This political stance permitted the 
triumph of small business owners. This reflects what Philip Nord found, that 
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during the depression of the 1880s small business owners unionized and 
successfully petitioned the government for protection against encroachments on 
their ability to run their business.375  Further, larger projects like inculcating 
secularism was more important to him than taking the bateaux-lavoirs off the 
Seine.    
 Located off the Ile St.Louis, the owner of the bateau-lavoir “Prochon” 
petitioned the Préfet de la Seine Hérold to build a second boat with a drying room 
on top. According to the navigation inspector, this would double the size of the 
establishment and cause navigation problems.376 The inspector suggested that the 
Préfet de la Seine reject the application to facilitate clearing the river.377 The 
Préfet then received a letter from the mayor of the 4th arrondissement and 
municipal counselors who inserted themselves into the process. They wrote that 
the addition of the second boat would not hamper navigation.378 The navigation 
inspector then replied that they ignored that the chassis already blocked the vision 
of pilots on the river near the Ile St. Louis where it was already tight. Anticipating 
future problems, the inspector added that the larger the establishment, the more 
difficult it would be to move or destroy. He further added that the other boats 
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navigating the river were missing adequate anchor points because the bateaux-
lavoirs used them all.379 Despite the engineer’s legitimate complaints, the Préfet 
decided to accord permission to Monsieur Prochon.380 Hérold also permitted the 
new bateau-lavoir “Devaux” upstream of Pont St. Michel in the small arm of the 
Seine on Ile de la Cité.381 The owner had applied for a new bateau-lavoir on the 
grounds that there were large numbers of workers in the area with little other 
facilities to serve their laundry needs.382 He added that, in the time when everyone 
was so concerned with hygiene, his establishment could bring benefits to that end. 
While his argument did not convince the navigation engineers, it nonetheless 
persuaded the Préfet de la Seine.383 
 The application to replace the defunct boats of the “Mahy et Trottenat” 
bateaux-lavoirs spanned the terms of Hérold and the next Préfet de la Seine, 
Charles Floquet. During his short préfecture (January 1882 to November 1882), 
Floquet defended the armistice in favor of those who participated in the 
Commune and did not betray his commitments to the working class as he 
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supported the continuation of the bateaux-lavoirs for the workers living in the 
center of Paris. The engineers of navigation argued against repairing the 
establishment with their usual vigor. They reported that the river was already too 
encumbered for proper navigation and that the repairs would prolong the life of an 
establishment that was already in the most inconvenient place, directly behind the 
bateau-lavoir of Langlois on the Quai Bourbon in the passage between Ile St. 
Louis and Ile de la Cité.384  
When the “Bateaux Omnibus” began operating under Haussmann’s 
support the bateaux-lavoirs received even more criticism for obstructing 
navigation. The municipally-operated company “Bateaux Omnibus” had 
complained to the navigation service that they could not operate safely in the 
passage with all of the bateaux-lavoirs. The engineer declared that the argument 
for safe navigation within Paris was the goal of Haussmann’s regulation and the 
“Bateaux Omnibus” company was also serving the public utility.385  The chief 
inspector advised that the bateaux-lavoirs blocked the view of the incoming and 
outgoing “Bateaux Omnibus” and tug boats. He continued advising against the 
overhaul of the “Mahy et Trottenat” pointing out the advantages of clearing the 
passage between the Ile St. Louis and Ile de la Cité.386 However, at the end of the 
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report, he highlighted that the bateau-lavoir “Langlois” had just been rebuilt after 
the ice flows of the previous winter and that, if the administration had to wait until 
that establishment went out of service, it would be unjust to deny the application 
of the “Mahy et Trottenat” establishment.387 The Préfet de Police also opposed 
the renovation of the boat. He underlined that the repairs went against the 
regulations which consisted of making the oldest boats disappear as they went out 
of service.388 Against all advice, the Préfet de la Seine Floquet approved the 
repairs of the laundry boat; yet, he did add the condition that any concession on 
public domain could be rescinded at any time.389 This was the first time a Préfet 
had acted somewhat in line with Haussmann’s project of eliminating the bateaux-
lavoirs. Floquet had ensured that the owner realized that he was operating on 
public space by permission from the government and not by right.  
Resumed Antagonism toward the Bateaux-Lavoirs 
In October 1883, the tolerant attitude of the Préfets de la Seine towards the 
presence of the bateaux-lavoirs ended with the appointment of Eugène Poubelle, 
lawyer, administrator and diplomat, who became known after he established new 
guidelines for rubbish collection and the containers people used for their trash. 
One of his first acts was to deny a petition from the bateau-lavoir “Noël” to move 
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two meters further away from a sewer outlet. The work on the Pont d’Austerliz 
necessitated that the bateau-lavoir move; there was no compromise from Poubelle 
who pointed out that the boat would have its original place in a few months and 
that was enough reward for the owner’s troubles.390 While it was not difficult to 
move the bateaux, this episode highlighted the negative attitude toward the owner 
of the bateau-lavoir by not conceding even the smallest of favors.  
 Poubelle’s priority was to improve the traffic of boats in Paris and the 
hygiene of the river. He was intensely interested in issues of hygiene and may 
have been influenced by the Conseil d’Hygiène’s new vigor to restrain the 
epidemic of contagious diseases, such as diphtheria, typhoid, and tuberculosis that 
were rampant during this time. The Conseil was interested in water and its 
possible role in spreading dangerous diseases, and in 1886 commissioned a report 
that accused the bateaux-lavoirs of being responsible for putting the Parisian 
residents’ health in jeopardy by polluting the Seine with diseases from infected 
clothes.  In the first month of occupying his new post, he denied an application to 
place a new bateau-lavoir downstream of Pont Royal, indicating that he had 
cleared that place in the river to make a dock to access the municipally-operated 
“Bateaux Omnibus”.391 The “Bateaux-Omnibus” had no potentially health-
threatening pollution. His decision marked a visible change from the previous 
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Préfets de la Seine who had demanded that the private transport company 
compromise and share the public domain with other businesses that served the 
public utility. In contrast, Poubelle made the decision to give priority to the 
passenger transport company instead of the business that served the poor of Paris. 
Another reason Poubelle began to discriminate against the bateaux-lavoir was the 
Conseil d’Hygiène’s argument that the bateaux-lavoir could be dangerous to the 
health of Paris.  He denied the request of bateau-lavoir “Martin” to make one boat 
five meters longer.392 His action diverged from the previous Préfets de la Seine 
who had allowed Martin to add a new boat and replace an out-of-service boat 
earlier in the Third Republic. Another bateau-lavoir owner applied to move into a 
space on the Quai d’Horloge, a request that the Préfet and navigation engineers 
sharply rebuked. The report from the navigation engineer stated that “it seems 
useless to examine such requests and why they would not work when looking at 
the present difficulties navigation has.”393 He also underscored that the 
administration had purposefully begun to clear the river of such establishments 
and had already given the passenger boats the places, for which they would build 
docks shortly.394  
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 The navigation engineers exposed the views of the new administration 
towards the bateaux-lavoirs, stating that clearing the river had really begun with 
the new Préfet de la Seine, Poubelle, who finally supported the opinion of the 
navigation engineers.395 Henri Godard, a navigation engineer working in the 
office of the Préfet de Police, stated that the bateaux-lavoirs had no more reason 
to exist now that the city was fully equipped with underground sewers which 
would permit the establishment of lavoirs in the city.396 Yet, more lavoirs were 
not built during this time. In Godard’s statements against the boats, the engineer 
admitted that until the 1880s, it had not been practical to build a lavoir in central 
Paris with no sewer system, explaining the persistent need for the bateaux-lavoirs 
up until the 1880s. The engineer then utilized the Conseil d’Hygiène’s language 
by accusing the boats of “infecting” the river.397 This discourse will be further 
explored in the next chapter, which will examine how the public hygiene 
movement of the next decade associated all laundry operations with pollution and 
disease, rendering everything associated with laundry matter out of place that 
needed to be outside of the city.  
 The current city administration (1883-1886) had officially stopped 
tolerating bateaux-lavoirs within Paris. In addition to being influenced by the 
Conseil d’Hygiène, Poubelle also wanted to support the circulation of boats on the 
river to move people, making the city function better. When a boat owner 
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requested to move his bateau-lavoir to the Pont d’Arcole, he received a negative 
response to his request. The engineer of navigation indicated that the 
administration sought to give priority to the passenger boat companies on the 
river. He expressed some excitement that the service had finally made a place for 
the new navigating boats, the Bateaux-Expresses.398 He also commented on the 
bateaux-lavoirs that still resided on the Seine: “…they dishonor the river that is 
one of the beauties of Paris. They dirty the water and are hazardous during 
epidemics.”399 The engineer used the dual points of pollution and disease to make 
an argument that they did not belong in Paris. However, there were no plans to 
move or close the bateaux-lavoir upstream of Paris, nullifying the points about 
pollution and disease. This revealed the underlying reason the administration 
renewed the campaign against them; they were once again out of place in Paris.  
 Similarly, bateau-lavoir owner Maciet met a negative response to his 
request to build a walkway down to his establishment on the Pont Neuf in 
1883.400 The owner requested this modification because the banks were shallow 
for twenty meters until the place where the boat could be stationed. Maciet 
claimed that a floating walkway would be dangerous for the women who carried 
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heavy loads; therefore, he wanted to build a solid walkway.401 He added that the 
walkway would not block the view of the bridge and the river, acknowledging 
that the appearance of his business was an argument against it.  The engineer 
argued against the permanent walkway on the grounds, stating that “it would spoil 
the entrance to the small square that was carefully renovated the year before.”402  
 In 1885, the requests that the Préfet de la Seine Poubelle approved for 
bateaux-lavoirs in Paris all involved reducing the size of the establishments. Two 
establishments on Quai Voltaire petitioned to repair their boats.403 One, bateau-
lavoir “Chauchefoin,” agreed for the administration to draw plans that suited them 
and to rebuild his business accordingly. The navigation engineers shortened the 
boats eight meters and required the owner to paint them in the colors Haussmann 
had prescribed in his law, black on the hull and gray for anything above.404 The 
other establishment on Quai Voltaire agreed to reduce the boats by five meters in 
return for permission to make extensive repairs to the hulls of the boats.405 Both 
authorizations also repeated the instructions forbidding any work not preapproved 
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by the navigation service.406 This instruction began to appear on all permissions 
as it had after Haussmann’s law overtly signaling the end of the tolerance for the 
bateaux-lavoirs in Paris.   
Pasteur’s Germ Theory and its Effect on the Bateaux-Lavoirs 
 With the discoveries of Pasteur, the public hygiene movement gained new 
legitimacy. Now, in the 1880s, the bateaux-lavoirs could be implicated as centers 
of contagion and dangerous microbes, putting the establishments within the 
jurisdiction of the Conseil d’Hygiène and hygiene inspectors. The germ theory 
encouraged more intervention by medical professionals who had new knowledge 
of modes of disease transmission. This knowledge would be helpful to the Préfets 
when they again contemplated purging the bateaux-lavoirs from Paris. Added to 
knowledge of microbes, English physician, John Snow discovered that cholera 
was a water-borne illness through mapping the neighborhoods most affected by 
the disease. The social unrest associated with epidemics motivated the city 
administrators to find ways of detecting future generators of epidemics that 
destabilized society.  
 In November 1885, charged with protecting the health of Parisians, the 
Préfet de Police, Jean Garagnon, commissioned a study of the bateaux-lavoirs to 
ascertain the amount of pollution coming from the business, the safety of drinking 
the water and whether the laundry process killed microbes. The goal of the report 
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was to aid in the decision to close the bateaux-lavoirs within Paris.407 Dr. Alfred 
Gérardin, the director of classified establishments and a doctor of sciences, wrote 
the report. He had previously conducted micrographic analysis of the waters 
(drinking wells, reservoirs, distributions pipes) in the commune of Vésinet in 
1877 and 1884, and had published a report in 1874 on the quality of rivers.408 In 
addition to his microbial analysis, his 1885 report provides contextual information 
regarding state of the laundry facilities in Paris. 
 Gérardin’s report begins with lavoirs operating on the ground. As a 
comparison, he exposed exactly the reasons the bateaux-lavoirs existed within 
Paris and survived the earlier attempts to remove them from the river. According 
to his report, there were no terrestrial lavoirs in the center of Paris; they were 
instead located in a ring around the limits of the city, where the old wall was.409 
He blamed the lack of facilities in central Paris on the high rents that would 
preclude profitability for the business. Yet, in places where the population was 
less dense, there would not be enough usage to make the business lucrative. The 
facilities further from the center were less expensive to use, but there was not 
enough population to use them to the maximum.410 Gérardin explained that the 
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lavoirs needed both the service from the city’s water delivery system and their 
own well water to meet the businesses’ water needs. However, the water from 
wells within Paris could not be used for rinsing because they gave off a foul 
odor.411 The water delivery system was an issue that dated back early in the 
century. His study also contradicted the statements the engineers made in their 
reports on bateaux-lavoirs. He claimed that the navigation service used any 
argument they could find to get the bateaux-lavoirs off the river, chiefly, that they 
were a major hindrance to navigating on the Seine. Gérardin argued that it was 
not true since the bateaux-lavoirs were docked on the sides and that the Préfet had 
already eliminated or moved those who were in the way of passenger boat 
debarkation points. The neighborhoods where one could establish a lavoir were 
few in central Paris. Gérardin indicated that there were social constraints in 
opening a lavoir near the center. He wrote that “towards the center [of Paris] the 
lodgings were more demanding; lease terms forbade hanging laundry in windows 
facing the street or courtyard.” The laundresses or women using the lavoir had to 
use the drying rooms which cost thirty centimes per twenty-four hours and the 
spinning machine which was twenty-five centimes for a packet of six men’s 
shirts.412 Laundresses who lived outside of Paris faced none of these restrictions 
and usually did not use the spinning machines since they could hang laundry in 
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their windows, whatever they faced.413 His last point examined the lack of 
comfort of washing in a terrestrial lavoir compared to a bateau-lavoir. He found 
that the women using the boats had access to more fresh air because many of the 
lavoirs on the ground had their washing facilities located in basements to ease the 
water draining. The air was less humid on the boats, and there was usually a great 
quantity of molds in the terrestrial lavoirs, since they could never have enough 
ventilation in the humid basements. 414 Thus the boats seemed more comfortable.  
 Gérardin’s report actually supported the existence of the bateaux-lavoirs 
in terms of hygiene when compared to the terrestrial lavoirs, which the city 
administration championed. In his estimation, a bateau-lavoir on the river did not 
seriously contribute to the pollution of the Seine because the water current diluted 
the concentration of any possible contaminants coming from the laundry. In 1885, 
there were still twenty-two bateaux-lavoirs within Paris, with ten located around 
the Ile de la Cité and Ile St. Louis.415 There were twenty-three hundred places for 
laundering in total on the bateaux-lavoirs, with one hundred and ten places for 
laundresses per establishment. This allowed a few establishments to serve large 
numbers of women who had no laundry service otherwise. The numbers of 
bateaux-lavoirs had continued to grow during the 1870s and 80s while there were 
still restrictions on building lavoirs. Unsurprisingly, the report showed that the 
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bateaux-lavoirs were superior in terms of hygiene than the terrestrial lavoirs. The 
laundresses had more space and air; more water to wash and rinse the laundry 
with resulting in cleaner clothes with less microbes. They could wash more 
laundry because there were more quantities of water with larger washing caldrons. 
The drying places were five centimes compared to thirty in the terrestrial lavoirs. 
Because the conditions were better on the bateaux-lavoirs, they catered to 
laundresses who served all the neighborhoods surrounding the business. 
According to Gérardin, the terrestrial lavoirs could only count on the women from 
the neighborhood in which it was located. Another favorable point he exposed 
was the smaller unemployment rate among the owners of bateaux-lavoirs than 
among the terrestrial lavoir owners because they pulled clients from farther, and 
their clients were more loyal. It was also less expensive to run a bateau-lavoir; 
there was no cost for water, no worries about drainage and canalizations and 
fewer complaints from the neighbors. 416 
 The microbial concentration of the bateaux-lavoirs was inferior to the 
water coming from the terrestrial lavoirs. The pre-rinse in the bateaux-lavoirs , 
the operation that posed the most problems, was usually done at the laundresses’ 
home to save money.417 Gérardin then underlined an essential problem: much of 
the drainage system of the city dumped directly into the river Seine; therefore, 
there was really no way to know what polluted the water more, households, 
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(bateaux)lavoirs, factories, or hospitals.418 He also reported that most laundresses 
skipped the pre-soak step and brought the clothes dry to go directly into the 
boiling step, so the danger from it was attenuated.419 The laundresses performed 
the boiling step from seven pm until five am the next day to be able to do the 
finishing processes in the daylight. In his studies, he found that the microbes 
could not live in water at this temperature for ten hours.420 After this step, the 
laundress carried out the soaping and then rinsing which had no effect on the 
safety of the used water.421 He also reported that the passenger boat companies 
that used the river and dumped debris from their steam engines into the river, 
which in Gérardin’s estimation, had a more negative effect than the operations 
from the bateaux-lavoirs.422 Indeed, his report showed that there was no 
measurable trace of the used waters coming from the bateaux-lavoirs after two 
hundred meters.423 The report exposed the positive effects the bateaux-lavoirs 
demonstrated for the economy, the hygiene of the population of central Paris, and 
argued that the establishments had no major negative effect on the water quality. 
This report underlined the capricious nature of the renewed campaign against the 
bateaux-lavoirs. Indeed, the bateaux-lavoirs did more to promote public hygiene 
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than to erode it, according to the report. Naturally, Gérardin’s final analysis was 
in favor of the bateaux-lavoirs since he was writing to justify and support their 
existence. Yet, he made some points that the hygiene service and Préfet had 
ignored regarding the working conditions for laundresses who used the facilities 
and the methods of washing that needed more water than many of the lavoirs 
could provide. Despite evidence that the bateaux-lavoirs provided useful hygiene 
services and did not pose a health threat, Poubelle continued his program of 
eliminating them to ameliorate the appearance of Paris and make room for 
increased passenger and commercial traffic.  
Conclusion  
 This chapter described the decisions about the presence of bateaux-lavoirs 
in Paris from 1860s to the 1880s. When Haussmann sought to reorganize the city, 
his plans also included refashioning the river to look and function like one of his 
new boulevards with priority given to circulation and regularizing the appearance 
of the banks. After trying this strategy, he decided that the bateaux-lavoirs could 
not co-exist with his remodeled city. He created a law which aimed at reducing 
the numbers of bateaux-lavoirs by not allowing repairs. However, his law was 
ineffective since the subsequent Préfets did not enforce it. After the Second 
Empire and the Commune, in the 1870s the Préfets de la Seine emphasized 
keeping the bateaux-lavoirs and showing tolerance for the business owners. In 
contrast, in 1883, the new Préfet de la Seine, Poubelle, decided that he would 
enforce Haussmann’s prescriptions as part of his campaign to enforce hygienic 
measures. He operated within the resurgence of the public hygiene movement. He 
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sought to bring a new level of cleanliness to the city by establishing regulations 
for trash collection. It was in that spirit that he commissioned an enquête to clear 
the bateaux-lavoirs from the waterways of Paris. As the arguments for/against 
bateaux-lavoirs changed with the shifting policies from each Préfet, their fate also 
rested upon the attitude of the various Préfets de la Seine, i.e., how they wanted 
the river to look and/or to be used, whether they prioritized private businesses on 
the river, and less upon problems linked to navigation or public hygiene. When 
the bateaux-lavoirs did not serve the Préfets’ goals or match their general policies 
– enabling business owners to continue exploiting the river, appeasing the poor 
population to prevent another uprising like the Commune – the arguments became 
that the bateaux were polluting, disease-spreading detritus that was matter out of 
place in Paris. However, despite the shift in policies, there was a constant 
underlying tension that they did not fit in Paris. The positive reports about the 
bateaux-lavoirs did not change the attitudes about them. Part of the reason 
Gérardin’s report did not sway Poubelle’s program of elimination could have 
been that he had opposition in the Conseil d’Hygiène from one Dr. Émile 
Jungfleisch; while Gérardin was the head of classified establishments and not 
directly implicated in hygiene matters. Chapter five will illustrate how Pasteur’s 
discovery of microbes became the new weapon for the Préfets de Police and 
Préfets de la Seine to rid Paris of unwanted laundry establishments. Eager for 
their ideas to be heeded in regards to regulating the city, the Conseil d’Hygiène 
provided the tools to banish laundry from the city. The only laundry facilities 
approved by the Conseil d’Hygiène were industrial laundry facilities located 
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outside of Paris, to which the poor could not afford to send their laundry. Pushing 
laundry facilities out of Paris made standards of hygiene more difficult to attain 
for all but the affluent of Paris.   
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Chapter 5 
DANGEROUS LAUNDRY OR A DISTURBING BUSINESS? 1885-1905 
 The previous chapter examined the inconsistent treatment of bateaux-
lavoirs by the various Préfets de la Seine between 1860 and 1885. The shifting 
attitude and motivation from the Préfets towards the laundry establishments 
trumped the recommendations from engineers and hygiene inspectors who 
consistently argued against the bateaux-lavoirs in order to rid them out of Paris by 
relocating them to the banlieue. The temporary support for the bateaux-lavoirs 
confirmed the importance of these laundry facilities in the city, though not 
explicitly to help the poor of Paris – laundresses and other poor women of the 
city. After the Commune, the next seven Préfets de la Seine did not take the risk 
of eliminating the bateaux. It was only during Poubelle’s public hygiene 
campaign that the city administrators resumed their discourse about bateaux-
lavoirs as major obstacles to the growth and cleanliness of Paris. The bateaux-
lavoirs became a symbol of pollution, litter on the Seine, to be swept out of Paris 
with the Conseil d’Hygiène providing the tools in the campaign against them.  
 This chapter will chart the growing power of the Conseil d’Hygiène after 
the acceptance of Pasteur’s germ theory, as well as the 1886 investigation of the 
bateaux-lavoirs mandated by the government, which produced contradictory 
reports between Émile Jungfleisch and Gabriel Pouchet, two chemists working for 
the Conseil d’Hygiène.424 This chapter will also examine how lavoirs were 
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another focus of the Conseil d’Hygiène’s discourse which did not align with the 
actions the city administration took. I argue that the city administration during the 
Poubelle and Casimir de Selves préfectures merely used the suggestions of the 
Conseil d’Hygiène to implement their governmental policies, namely exporting 
lavoirs to the banlieue and closing bateaux-lavoirs in the city in favor of 
passenger and other commercial traffic. When the hygienic recommendations 
suited their goals, the Préfets de la Seine heeded their advice. Yet, when the 
Conseil d’Hygiène’s advice did not correspond to the Préfets’ policies, the Préfets 
would ignore them. The Conseil d’Hygiène argued that, in order to facilitate good 
hygiene, the city should support building lavoirs throughout Paris which would 
adhere to new hygiene standards. This change in orientation from the Conseil 
came as a result of the epidemic of tuberculosis and other contagious diseases and 
the discovery of the microbes that caused the diseases. The Conseil thought 
increased laundering in sanitary facilities would help stem the tide of illness that 
plagued Paris. However, they demanded that the laundry facilities follow strict 
sanitary standards that many smaller facilities could not implement, which 
resulted in very few lavoirs obtaining permission to open. The Conseil also 
proposed that those who could not follow their prescriptions close.  The continued 
inconsistencies from the Préfet de la Seine indicated that the bateaux were simply 
unwanted in the city, not necessarily vectors of epidemics. The fluctuations of 
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opinion from the Préfets reflected the zeitgeist. After the Prussian siege, when the 
bateaux-lavoirs were the only functioning laundry facilities in Paris, the Préfet 
Duval and his successors were reluctant to follow Haussmann’s program of 
elimination. However, when Poubelle became Préfet in 1883 he wanted to 
continue Haussmann’s plans to change the function of the Seine and targeted the 
bateaux as pollutors. Although the Conseil d’Hygiène and the Annales d’Hygiène 
explicitly targeted bateaux-lavoirs and lavoirs as potentially dangerous centers of 
disease, hygienists of the Annales d’Hygiène or the Conseil d’Hygiène were never 
able to scientifically link laundry or laundresses to the spread of contagious 
illnesses. The gulf – between what the Préfet de la Seine and Préfet de Police did 
and what the Conseil d’Hygiène recommended – suggests that the Préfets were 
not afraid of bateaux-lavoirs and terrestrial lavoirs as purveyors of epidemics. 
During the tenure of Poubelle the goal was to find a way to move the bateaux out 
of Paris and compel lavoirs to follow the sanitary prescriptions of the Conseil 
d’Hygiène.  
 There were a variety of reasons the city administration, the Conseil 
d’Hygiène, and the navigation engineers wanted the laundry establishments 
moved out. First, the neighbors of lavoirs and bateaux-lavoirs complained to the 
inspectors of the Préfet de Police about the unpleasant appearances, smells, and 
noise associated with the bateaux-lavoirs. Then, the Conseil d’Hygiène believed 
that the establishments spread disease, which Poubelle used as a reason to move 
them out of the city. Further, engineers wanted to clear the Seine for commercial 
traffic such as sand barges and public transport. As the city changed, there were 
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fewer convenient spaces where laundry establishments could exist. The Conseil 
d’Hygiène started a new campaign against the bateaux-lavoir and lavoirs based 
on the possibility that infected clothes could transmit diseases, which gave city 
administrators a new impetus to clear the river without having to pay indemnities. 
The bateaux-lavoirs could not be investigated by the Conseil d’Hygiène because 
they were not a classified business. It was only when they became theoretical 
incubators of disease-causing microbes that the Conseil could begin to argue for 
their closure.  
The Bateaux-Lavoirs on Trial: 1886 
 The goal of the city administration was to get rid of the bateaux-lavoirs in 
Paris. Since the Conseil d’Hygiène framed the laundry establishments as 
dangerous, and that microbe theory could provide scientific reasons to banish 
these boats from the city, the administration could then press the issue. It was in 
that spirit that, in 1886, the Préfet de Police commissioned an investigation to 
examine the effects of the bateaux-lavoirs on the water quality of the Seine with 
the intention of using the findings to close the establishments.425 The Préfet de 
Police commissioned the chief chemist of the Conseil d’Hygiène, Jungfleisch, 
who worked directly with the city administration, usually on problems associated 
with hospitals and epidemics. In light of their close working relationship, the 
Préfet de Police chose him to create the report, which should give the city ample 
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evidence to legally close the bateaux-lavoirs.426 Jungfleisch, who authored the 
report, recounted the origins of the study in the opening paragraph. He identified 
the Préfet de Police as the catalyst stating, “Monsieur le Préfet, you have asked 
the Conseil d’Hygiène to advise you on the hygienic effects of bateaux-lavoirs on 
the Seine for the length of Paris, and to advise the Préfet on keeping or closing the 
establishments.”427 The Conseil d’Hygiène published the investigation in their 
annual work report, and Jungfleisch delivered it as a speech during their bi-annual 
meeting.428 His investigation concentrated on the negative aspects of the 
establishments, namely water pollution. Yet, in an investigation on the dangers 
and inconveniences of bateaux-lavoirs six months later, none of Jungfleisch’s 
conclusions were shared by his colleague, hygiene inspector Pouchet – who also 
worked for the Conseil d’Hygiène – who argued that the water pollution was 
minimal and the bateaux-lavoirs provided a healthier environment for women. 
Their disagreements exposed the biased nature of the Jungfleisch report, which 
the Préfet could use – as a hygienic tool – to get rid of the bateaux-lavoirs.  
 Jungfleisch’s report began by outlining the negative aspects of the 
bateaux-lavoirs. First, they were an obstacle to the growth of navigation and 
commerce on the Seine, which was stifling the economic growth of Paris. Then, 
Jungfleisch stated that everyone despised the bateaux-lavoirs. He cited navigation 
reports that chronicled the problems other boat captains on the river had with the 
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establishments and complaints made by neighbors on the river banks behind them 
– that they were noisy and produced smoke that drifted into their apartments. Now 
the administration could count microbes against them. By 1886, there were still 
twenty bateaux-lavoirs within Paris, with fifteen located in central Paris between 
the Ponts Sully and Aléna.429 The city administration was once again on the hunt 
to drive them out of the city because the Préfet de la Seine wanted to change the 
look and use of the Seine in Paris.430 Jungfleisch alluded to the Préfet’s motives, 
facilitating the expansion of the Omnibus boat traffic, a municipally-run business, 
which justified ridding the river of the bateaux-lavoirs (and the dirt and poverty 
their represented) to enable better fluidity through the city. While the bateaux-
lavoirs probably impeded traffic on the river to a certain extent they could also be 
moved to more strategic places and still have room for other traffic.  
 Jungfleisch’s investigation, when compared to a rival report by Pouchet, 
showed that they both were biased since the respective reports presented the issue 
in such opposite terms. The bateaux-lavoirs provided 2,023 places for washing in 
the heart of Paris.431 Jean Moisy, the head of the lavoir owners union, estimated in 
his report on lavoirs in Paris that there were around10,000 places available for 
laundering, particularly around the outskirts of the city; the bateaux-lavoirs 
accounted for about twenty per cent of places to launder in the city.432 However, 
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he did not take into account there were few lavoirs in the center of Paris, most 
being located around the edges of the city.433 Although he attempted to make a 
strong case for the terrestrial lavoirs of Paris, by pointing out that they were more 
numerous and provided more places for laundry, were cleaner and more efficient 
than laundry establishments on water, Jungfleisch weakened his point by 
interjecting that the bateaux-lavoirs had less expensive docking fees than rents for 
space on land in Paris and that the laundry boats had access to unlimited amounts 
of free water.434 His report raised doubts in regards to the superior status of land-
based establishments. Water usage was more expensive on land; therefore, people 
used less water in the lavoirs. Jungfleisch’s investigation failed to provide 
scientific evidence demonstrating that bateaux-lavoirs were greater vectors of 
disease than their counterparts on land. Yet, his report showed contradictions 
regarding the superior sanitary conditions of lavoirs. These contradictions raises 
concerns that it was not driven by scientific motives, but rather connected to the 
Préfet’s expectations of the city – based on its new conceptualization of space – 
that bateaux-lavoirs were obstacles to its flow.  
 The heart of Jungfleisch’s argument was that the lavoirs were classified 
establishments and the bateaux-lavoirs were not. Classified businesses fell into 
one of three categories based on their danger to the public. Lavoirs were in the 
third and least dangerous classification – requiring the owner to apply for 
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permission to open the business from the Préfet de Police which included an 
inspection by the Conseil d’Hygiène. Because the bateaux-lavoirs existed before 
the classification system, they were exempt from regular inspection from the 
hygiene inspectors. Therefore, the bateaux-lavoirs bypassed the inspection from 
the Conseil d’Hygiène; instead, they were regulated directly by the Préfet de 
Police and the department of navigation, which would want to remove them from 
the river for the sake of traffic and commerce. While the lavoirs had to submit to 
inspections and a public enquiry to open and remain in business, the bateaux-
lavoirs could be sold from one owner to another with just a navigation safety 
inspection. Everything about the lavoirs could potentially be regulated; the 
chimneys that produced smoke were to be six to eight meters tall so that noxious 
smoke did not bother their neighbors. In contrast, the bateaux-lavoirs chimneys 
were of varying heights, but always low enough that smoke floated into the rooms 
in the buildings around the river. Jungfleisch argued that on a boat the extent of 
the pollution from the machines could not be measured, whereas in a lavoir 
everything was standardized, which meant that pollution levels could accurately 
be measured.435 Yet, Jungfleisch did not produce comparative data that 
demonstrated that bateaux-lavoirs polluted more than terrestrial lavoir. Since he 
tested the waste water of the bateaux-lavoir it was possible to test the waste water 
from a lavoir.  
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 Jungfleisch’s last argument against the bateaux-lavoirs was directed at 
their relationships with their neighbors and the undesirable culture that these 
establishments cultivated. He concluded by reminding the Préfet de Police of all 
the trouble he had had with criticism coming from the neighbors of the bateaux-
lavoirs: They complained about the smoke coming from the chimneys; the 
bateaux burned coal instead of coke, a much cheaper fuel, which made thick 
black smoke that left deposits on anything outside. The inhabitants of the quais 
also complained about the noise coming from the bateaux-lavoirs, where women 
would yell to each other to be heard above the noise of the spinning machines and 
boilers, while other women were singing and their children screaming.436 
The remainder of the report was an account of the virtues of lavoirs. 
Jungfleisch praised the uniformity in the washing process. The model 
establishments had purpose-built facilities that accommodated every step of the 
washing process in a salubrious manner. He asserted that the used water from the 
lavoir went into the sewer.437 However, the sewer system was not completed until 
the first decade of the twentieth century.438 The best sewer sections were in the 
wealthy new neighborhoods in the western part of the city.439 The water and 
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sewer lines came to the first through third arrondissements only in the last decade 
of the nineteenth century.440 This underlined the problems with building lavoirs in 
the areas that the bateaux-lavoirs served. Jungfleisch’s claims – that lavoirs could 
be easily opened in the central areas of Paris or that the sewers system from which 
they derived their benefit was finished completely – were inaccurate. Although he 
did not write about the problem related to clandestine lavoirs that never obtained 
the proper permits – which the city had little control over – Jungfleisch 
nevertheless readily highlighted the uncontrolled aspect of the bateaux-lavoirs 
again, stating that their used waters went directly into the river, which was 
particularly problematic after a night of boiling with the addition of alkaline 
soaps.441 Yet, this waste water would not have contained dangerous microbes if it 
had a high alkalinity.  
 However, Pouchet’s 1887 investigation of bateaux-lavoirs six months 
later did not come to the same conclusions regarding the dangers of the bateaux-
lavoirs. Pouchet commented that he had lived on many of the quais around Paris. 
His report argued that the presence of the bateaux-lavoirs was overall benign for 
the health of the river and the spread of dangerous microbes in the Seine.442 
Pouchet had studied the practice of pre-soaking and analyzed the microbe content 
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of water used in the pre-soaking process.443 Pouchet’s study found that the 
amount of water in the Seine diluted the amount of microbes down to a safe level, 
especially where it flowed rapidly.444 Although Jungfleisch doubted the efficacy 
of the current in destroying microbes,445 subsequent analyses from a Conseil 
d’Hygiène report confirm Pouchet’s results by demonstrating that the water from 
the lavoirs had a higher concentration of microbes than the bateaux-lavoirs.446 
 Pouchet further argued that microbes from bateaux-lavoirs were no more 
dangerous than the others present in the Seine. The water quality was not a 
problem according to Pouchet who found that the water samples he took directly 
downstream from the bateaux-lavoirs were not dangerous during the first hours 
after taking them.447 Although he did not precise whether he took the samples 
within the first hours after a laundering process, the waters from each process 
were so diluted that they did not constitute a threat.448 It was only after the water 
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stagnated for several hours that the microbes would multiply and would react on 
the gelatin plate used to grow bacteria. These findings helped clarify the ‘bateaux-
lavoirs vs lavoirs’ debate concerning water contamination. They suggest that a 
source of dangerous contamination could originate from the lavoirs’ drainage 
systems, which were known to be faulty; the holdings tanks leaked or would 
become watertight instead of filtering the water, leaving a stagnant pool of putrid 
water. In terms of water hygiene, the bateaux-lavoirs represented a better choice, 
since their used waters were much more diluted in the Seine and would never 
stagnate. Another problem with lavoirs was that the establishments limited the 
amount of water use with different sized buckets. On the bateaux-lavoirs, the 
amount of water was unlimited, so one could wash and rinse with different water. 
According to Pouchet’s evaluation of the dangers bateaux-lavoirs raised, “the 
cleanliness of body and linens are the most essential conditions to good hygiene 
and it is my advice that the administration support, by all means possible, the 
extension of these establishments where ever they exist.”449 Based on scientific 
evidence, terrestrial lavoirs raised many more problematic issues for public 
hygiene than bateaux-lavoirs. Yet, the city administration held fast to the position 
that the boats were a huge problem for the city. Although the administration’s 
ultimate goal was to clear the path for transport and commerce on the Seine, it 
tried to couch the elimination of the bateaux-lavoirs in an argument about health 
and hygiene.  
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  The issue of all the other pollutants of the Seine resurfaced. Pouchet 
exposed the many establishments and individual users who dumped all their waste 
into the Seine. Although navigating boat captains also did their laundry and threw 
their garbage and their chamber pots into the Seine, no one demanded that they be 
removed from the river.450 Added to these pollutants, the hospitals of Paris used 
the river to soak the used linens. This laundry contained more pathogens than 
typical customers’ linens.451 Some bateaux-lavoirs owners asked: “do they have 
an immunity that one refuses to us?”452 
 Jungfleisch admitted that the bateaux-lavoirs were filling a need that 
current lavoirs had not met (because the lavoirs that the city administration and 
Conseil d’Hygiène regularly suggested were not yet built in the city). There was a 
scarcity of lavoirs in Paris.453 By the end of the nineteenth century there were no 
more than a dozen in the central arrondissements of Paris. Indeed, lavoirs were 
difficult to run in central Paris – the area the bateaux-lavoirs served – even when 
the Emperor was willing to cover the costs of building the facility.454 Although it 
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was clear from Jungfleisch’s own evidence that bateaux-lavoirs contributed to 
better public health, in his report the lavoirs’ superiority arguably derived from 
their connection to the sewers. Yet, he never acknowledged that the sewers simply 
carried waste back to the Seine outside of Paris for others to possibly ingest. He 
showed his partiality for the lavoirs by disregarding evidence that they were 
worse for public health than the bateaux-lavoirs. These omissions demonstrate 
that science was not the core motivation behind his report. As chief chemist of the 
Conseil, he owed his appointment, in part, to the Préfet de Police. Thus, his 
investigation and conclusions potentially reflected a personal bias.    
 Despite the top figure of 150 francs per square meter for profitability, 
Jungfleisch claimed that lavoirs could open in the third and fourth 
arrondissements where land was, on average, 232 francs a square meter.455 He 
further added that the presence of the bateaux-lavoirs had naturally pushed the 
clientele away from the lavoirs and thus stopped the lavoirs from developing.456 
Jungfleisch’s analysis did not address a critical point: the public investigation 
when the Préfet de Police registered any opposition to the establishment from 
neighbors. Indeed, opposition from neighbors was one of the most consistent 
obstacles to establishing new – legal – lavoirs in neighborhoods.  
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 Further, Jungfleisch’s report outlined the various sources of pollution for 
the Seine. First, he mentioned that some of the bateaux-lavoirs were next to the 
cold baths where people bathed; laundresses would then use this water for 
laundering. The next source of pollution came from the sewers. Paradoxically, he 
lamented that sewers still drained directly into the Seine. He argued that the 
bateaux-lavoir presented as serious a threat to the river as the sewers.457 This was 
true. At the time, there was one water treatment site at la Villette that used a 
filtration method; the other sewers of the city were not yet connected to treatment 
facilities.458 The proposed lavoirs would have been connected to sewers that 
emptied directly into the Seine as well. By arguing that the water would infect the 
clothes instead of the clothes polluting the water, Jungfleisch implied the bateaux-
lavoirs had a benign impact on their environment, contradicting his own position 
that the bateaux negatively affected the cleanliness of the river Seine.  
 Next Jungfleisch presented the dangers and/or obstacles resulting from the 
transport of used laundry. Although the lavoirs workers also transported used 
laundry without closed sacks and sorted it outside where a passersby could be 
contaminated by it, he associated the open transport and mixing of dirty laundry 
on the quais as a practice unique to bateaux-lavoirs. He added that the engineers 
of navigation had already cited the practice as obstructive for other businesses on 
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the quai. Yet, other business could use the area to load and unload goods as long 
as it did not stay on the quai for an extended amount of time.459 The navigation 
engineers – who clearly wanted the bateaux-lavoirs gone to facilitate commercial 
traffic – were not respecting the right to that space.460 Jungfleisch even tried to 
blame the cholera outbreak of 1884 on the practice of sorting clothes on the quai, 
arguing that the Préfet de Police considered forbidding the practice because of its 
danger to public health. Yet, by that time, cholera was known to be a water-borne 
pathogen, demonstrating again the partiality of his report against the bateaux-
lavoirs.  
 Jungfleisch denied the bateaux-lavoirs had any stationing rights beyond 
what the government had already allowed. He argued that they were under a 
privileged concession that could be revoked at any time. Jungfleisch had not been 
briefed in the legal complexities of the royal concession, since he kept on arguing 
that the owners had no protection against the administration revoking their right. 
As discussed in chapter three, the Préfet de la Seine could not simply revoke the 
stationing rights without indemnity for the few boats that were direct descendents 
of those who had received the concession from the king three hundred years 
before. The concession still held some power.   
 The impact Jungfleisch’s recommendations would have on the women 
who used the bateaux-lavoirs, was indistinguishable from the city 
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administration’s attitude towards them. As for the laundresses and other women 
who used the bateaux, “they will have to find other places to practice their 
profession, and their interest cannot be invoked in favor of keeping the 
establishments.”461 Predictably, the women who were directly affected by 
eliminating this resource were not consulted about what type of facility they 
would prefer or which location would help them the most. Moreover, bateaux-
lavoirs owners declared that the administration’s figures on the numbers of 
available lavoirs were erroneous, arguing that their customers would not walk 
from the center of Paris to Montmartre with a heavy load, and that the 
administration should only count facilities in a two-kilometer radius.462  The 
owners gathered fourteen thousand signatures against the closing of the bateaux-
lavoirs.463 The customers, laundresses and women doing their own laundry, had 
an outlet to express their views on a resource that was important to them. While 
city officials made public policy, the women could finally make their voices heard 
when they signed the petition against the closing of the bateaux-lavoirs that the 
owners had organized.464 The notion that the ones who used the resource had the 
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least say reflected the underlying purpose of the report and the city 
administration’s quest to rid Paris of bateaux-lavoirs. It was not to ameliorate the 
living conditions of those who used the facilities who were among the less-
affluent residents of Paris, but to implement the development of a modern, 
unobstructed city, which did not include laundresses and other poor women in 
public space.  
 In contrast, Pouchet’s investigation focused on the women who used the 
facilities, an aspect that Jungfleisch dismissed as unimportant. He criticized the 
conditions in the lavoirs and focused on the health considerations of the women 
who worked in them. The lavoirs were often in the basement of a building and did 
not have adequate ventilation so the women were breathing humid, hot air for 
sixteen hours a day.465 The spaces in the center of Paris did not accommodate the 
introduction of water wells. As previous chapters have shown, drainage had been 
an issue since people started doing laundry away from the river as early as the 
beginning of the nineteenth century. Unlike the bateaux-lavoirs, the lavoirs in the 
center of Paris were usually in the basements of apartment buildings where 
ventilation and drainage raised complicated issues, and where humidity and steam 
encouraged the growth of mold. In these conditions, many women were 
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thoroughly soaked from manipulating the clothes and standing in puddles of 
water.466 
 Pouchet’s investigation also revealed the existing wariness among the 
lavoirs owners associated with the Conseil d’Hygiène’s plans to further regulate 
laundry facilities; owners already had difficulties running their business, due in 
part to the inadequacy of the water delivery system developed by Haussmann. 
The city water service only provided a limited amount of water that was not 
sufficient to cover the needs of a lavoir. Therefore, lavoirs were obliged to install 
pumps and wells to obtain the amount necessary.467 The lavoir owners as well as 
bateaux-lavoirs owners were afraid that they would be taxed more if they used 
too much water.468 
 The Chambre Syndicale of Bateaux-Lavoirs owners, which were all men, 
also argued that the economic conditions Jungfleisch cited in his report were 
inaccurate. The Chambre Syndicale de Maîtres des Bateaux-Lavoirs organized in 
1867 as Haussmann tried to eliminate the establishments from the Seine. The 
owners decided they needed to protect themselves and organized a lawsuit against 
Haussmann claiming that he had abused his power as Préfet.469 As examined in 
chapter two, an entrepreneur first had the idea of bateaux-lavoirs closing and 
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lavoirs opening to fill their place in 1823; however, this had never happened 
because the business was not profitable in the center. The city charged the 
bateaux-lavoirs that were in the center the same docking fees as in mid-
century.470 The Chambre Syndicale’s report gave the numbers of registered 
lavoirs in the center: In the first arrondissement, none; in the second, none; in the 
third, none; in the fourth, six. Moving away from the center, the numbers began to 
rise dramatically: In the eleventh arrondissement, fifty two; in the eighteenth, 
forty six; in the twentieth, thirty nine.471 These arrondissements had been the 
banlieue and now were newly incorporated into the city. These numbers show 
that the bateaux-lavoirs were the only legal laundry establishments serving the 
poor in the center of the Paris. The report further outlined the financial weakness 
of the lavoirs, pointing to a generally unhealthy business climate with 368 closing 
in the last year around Paris.472 Lavoirs were not a thriving business that was set 
to take the place of the bateaux-lavoirs that served over two-thousand women.  
 Later in the same year, 1886, the Conseil d’Hygiène conducted a report 
intended to examine the health of laundresses through the investigation of the 
amount of space reserved for each woman in lavoirs.473  Henri Bunel, the 
hygienic inspector, found that the average space currently in use was less than a 
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cubic meter. This amount was not sufficient for air flow according to an older set 
of calculations from the construction of the Lavoir Napoléon; consequently, most 
of the establishments would need to enlarge the places and spaces. The pressing 
problem was the humidity of the lavoirs. Since most were underground in 
buildings with the least expensive rent, the ventilation was problematic and the air 
would remain saturated with bleach fumes.474 Laundresses had their hand and feet 
in the water with their clothes wet five or six days a week. The floors were also 
problematic. Sometimes there was only a sand floor or one of bitume; both were 
difficult to clean, and deposits from the water would attach to the floor.475 The 
reporter concluded it was the responsibility of the administration to ensure every 
lavoir provided laundresses with enough space, water and ventilation to not 
provoke arthritis or other diseases.476 
 Moreover, the navigation engineers also argued against the presence of the 
bateaux-lavoirs as well as the Conseil d’Hygiène, which contributed to the tide 
against the bateaux-lavoirs rising still higher. Bateaux-lavoirs owners wrote a 
defense in response to the navigation engineers’ prosecuting scrutiny and their 
will to have the Seine free of bateaux-lavoirs, which had been the department of 
navigation’s wish since Haussmann’s campaign against them. 477 The owners 
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argued that they had conformed to every rule that the administration had devised, 
from the uniformity of their image – all had black hulls with grey upper structures 
– to stopping the practice of drying laundry outside.478 The owners recognized 
Poubelle’s agenda – to clear the water for passenger boats – and fought against it 
in the report they published. The report detailed how the bateaux-lavoirs had not 
taken all the places for embarkation, and there was room to build new 
pontoons.479 The owners also claimed there was more room to build new ports; at 
that time, there was no increase in hauling, which the boats could impede. They 
pointed out that all towing was being handled by steam boats, and hauling by 
horses was falling out of favor.480 The conclusion was that all the developments 
listed in the report supported the idea that the bateaux-lavoirs could continue to 
use in the Seine in harmony with other boats.  
To further build their defense, the bateaux-lavoir owners argued that it 
was the city administration that came to the bateaux-lavoirs owners during the 
siege of Paris to build more facilities for people. Though the current era differed 
from the political situation during the time of the Franco-Prussian war, the owners 
sought to highlight that the working-class population still depended on their 
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establishments.481 The owners of bateaux-lavoirs were not going to let the 
criticisms from the Conseil d’Hygiène and the department of navigation run them 
out of business; their next offensive was to publicize their plight in the journal 
Parole.482 In an article, they defended their businesses and right to be on the 
Seine. The owners made light of the navigation problems engendered by their 
boats, saying that it was the captains of the new steam boats that did not know 
how to drive. Then, addressing the arguments against their appearance, the 
owners defined the scenes on their boats as lively – in contrast to the charge that 
they were too loud to live next to – and happy, not impoverished.483  
 The accusation of polluting the Seine and thus the residents of Paris was 
serious, and the article did not fail to address it. The article in Parole put the city 
administration on trial, accusing it of overpricing the water delivery service and 
stating: “the Administration leases it to me at the price of spring water but it is 
true, I cannot drink it.”484 The article sought to reveal the hypocrisy of the city 
administration by underlining that lavoirs using the sewers was equal to dumping 
waste water in the Seine since the sewers ran straight back to the river. The article 
called into question the biases of Jungfleisch and his methods, indicating that the 
numbers for the cubic centimeters of water passing through Paris were false, 
which made the concentrations of microbes much lower and therefore less 
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dangerous. The article ended with the following sardonic sentence: “Monsieur le 
Préfet, leave the lavandières alone and give us spring water to drink.”485 By using 
the term lavandières instead of blanchisseuses, which was the more common 
term, the author of the article sought to romanticize the scene around the bateaux-
lavoirs.486 The article also emphasized that the owners of the boats – as well as 
the laundresses who used the bateaux-lavoirs – were easy targets and that there 
were much greater threats to the water quality of the Seine; indeed, the article 
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486 In rural settings, laundresses dried the washed linens on lavender bushes, 
where laundry was not something that was out of place. This greatly contrasted 
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Et je lui dis : -" ô lavandière ! 
 
«L' oiseau gazouille, l' agneau bêle, 
Gloire à ce rivage écarté ! 
Lavandière, vous êtes belle. 
Votre rire est de la clarté. 
 
«Je suis capable de faiblesses. 
Ô lavandière, quel beau jour ! 
Les fauvettes sont des drôlesses 
Qui chantent des chansons d' amour. 
 
«Voilà six mille ans que les roses 
Conseillent, en se prodiguant, 
L' amour aux coeurs les plus moroses. 
Avril est un vieil intrigant. 
 
«Les rois sont ceux qu' adorent celles 
Qui sont charmantes comme vous ; 
La Marne est pleine d' étincelles ; 
Femme, le ciel immense est doux. 
 
Victor Hugo, Les Chansons des rues (1865, reprint Paris : Ollendorf, 1933), 151.  
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revealed that the waste from hospitals, slaughter yards, homes and other 
pollutants all flowed into the Seine without treatment.487 
 The investigation of the bateaux-lavoirs produced a clear image of the 
administration’s intentions regarding the establishments on the river. The different 
reports, contradictions, and hypocrisies emphasized one consistency throughout; 
Poubelle wanted the bateaux-lavoirs off the river even if they were better for 
public hygiene – and the health of the women who used them – than the terrestrial 
laundry facilities. This prejudice helped define what was consistent in the interest 
of the city government. The city administration was no longer haunted by the lack 
of water and supplies to launder which were direct effects of the Prussian siege; 
the bateaux-lavoirs could no longer count on their contributions during the siege 
to legitimize their current position. The administration wanted to support other 
types of businesses like the passenger boats at the expense of establishments that 
fulfilled a greater public role for the poor in Paris. The women who used the 
bateaux-lavoirs did not get a voice in determining their fate; however, they did 
vote with their feet and continued to use the facilities. 
 After the Jungfleisch report and the attempted defense from the bateaux-
lavoirs owners, the city administration – the Préfet de la Seine and Préfet de 
Police – had not been able to come to a consensus with the Conseil municipal 
over their closure or continuation. The Conseil municipal wanted to keep the 
bateaux-lavoirs while the Préfets de la Seine and de Police with the Conseil 
                                                 
487 Ibid.  
 
  205 
d’Hygiène and the Service de Navigation wanted to close them.488 Because the 
city government could not come to a decision, the investment in a future project 
of municipally-run lavoirs could not be approved. In letters addressed to both the 
Préfet de la Seine and Préfet de Police, conseiller municipal Pétrot called 
attention to the fact that he had supported a plan submitted to build a series of 
lavoirs six months ago and had received no response from the administration.489 
The conseiller was worried that “even the smallest towns have a city-funded 
lavoir; Paris must not fall behind.”490 He continued, emphasizing that if the 
administration did decide to eliminate the bateaux-lavoirs, they would need to 
build a few test pieces for the rest of the city; therefore, there should be no 
obstacle to building the lavoir already proposed.491 The creation of lavoirs was 
urgent if the Préfet de la Seine closed bateaux-lavoirs. Yet, they were not rushing 
to build anything to replace the needed facilities. Pétrot ended his letter by 
admonishing the Conseil municipal de la ville de Paris and the Préfets for not 
being able to come to a decision and “establish lavoirs in the interest of the poor 
population.”492 In the last years of the nineteenth century, the Préfet de la Seine, 
Justin Germain Casimir de Selves, unceremoniously ordered the first five 
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bateaux-lavoirs to be eliminated, based on the needs of the Navigation 
Department.493 De Selves staggered the demission of the bateaux-lavoirs; those 
established first left Paris first. It would take until the winter of 1910 to 
completely eliminate them from Paris when the Seine froze and destroyed the 
remaining ones. After the recriminations and spirited defenses, the owners agreed 
to have their establishments towed out of the city to a place in the surrounding 
communes like Issy-les-Moulins, and Boulogne-sur-Seine who still welcomed the 
bateaux-lavoirs.    
Lavoirs Still Unwanted in Paris 
 Although touted as the answer to the problems created by the bateaux-
lavoirs, the Conseil d’Hygiène was not satisfied with the lavoirs in Paris either, 
and sought to regulate them further in view of public hygiene concerns, primarily 
microbes which were linked to contagious diseases like tuberculosis and 
diphtheria. The focus of this section will be the new standards of hygiene set forth 
by the Conseil d’Hygiène for lavoirs and the manipulation of dirty laundry from 
1890-1905. Fear of the tuberculosis epidemic resulted in new power for the 
Conseil d’Hygiène to go into private homes as well as lavoirs to root out these 
diseases.  
 These new standards would have immense consequences for the lavoirs 
operating in Paris. Those lavoirs who could not meet the Conseil d’Hygiène’s 
demands to use the latest technologies could be closed. The government would 
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not be finished targeting laundry facilities until they were safely out of the city. 
Chapter two showed how the administration was more rigorous with those who 
applied to open lavoirs within the city and would let lavoirs conduct their 
business more freely in the banlieue. With the wave of fear set off by another 
cholera outbreak in 1887, the administration once again directed their blame 
toward the lavoirs. On the one hand, the administration commended lavoirs over 
bateaux-lavoirs; on the other, it sought to close more lavoirs than ever before.  
 The Conseil d’Hygiène renewed their supervision of lavoirs with vigor, 
and based their attacks on the threat of microbes and contagious disease. In a 
report prepared for the annual work summary for 1887, it called attention to the 
looming danger that lavoirs represented in Paris.494 The reporter reminded the 
Conseil that the lavoirs were in the third class of dangerous establishments and 
that severe precautions should be taken so that these establishments would not 
become a health risk for the people living around it.495  
 The work reports from 1890-1894 reflected how difficult it was to 
establish lavoirs in any neighborhood because the inspectors or neighbors would 
find a problem with the physical constraints of the placement or the cultural 
preconception of the lavoir, particularly that it would be noisy. The inspector 
denied the application for a proposed lavoir on Rue St. Jacques in the fifth 
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arrondissement, traditionally a working-class neighborhood, because it was in a 
courtyard and thus not easily observed; further, it would share a wall with a girl’s 
school. The inspector thought that it was not appropriate for the lavoir to be so 
close to the school and suggested that the culture of the lavoir would corrupt the 
school girls with the laundresses’ obscene language.496 The inspector’s denial of 
the application on the grounds that it was attached to a school or other type of 
group home for children was not uncommon, since five other applications were 
turned down in the same year based on similar grounds.497  
 The debates over the regulation of lavoirs took place against the backdrop 
of the general anxiety regarding tuberculosis. Some estimated that, by the late 
nineteenth century, seventy to ninety percent of the population in cities around 
Europe had contracted the disease.498 In 1898, the Conseil d’Hygiène determined 
that the lavoirs needed further regulation to stop the threat of contagion. The idea 
of contagion had won the medical communities loyalty since Robert Koch’s 
discovery of the tuberculosis bacillus in 1882. From that point forward, the effort 
was to find the most effective methods in identifying contagion that caused the 
most diseases, as well as in stopping the spread of the bacteria, which merely 
consisted of the trial-and-error method. Since laundry was already on the radar as 
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a source of contagion, it became an easy assumption that it enabled the danger 
associated with tuberculosis. Added to this phenomenon, Germain Casimir de 
Selves, the new Préfet de la Seine, formerly the director of Postes et Télégraphes, 
was interested in cleaning the city, creating more water lines to feed Paris, 
installing electricity around the entire city and reforming transport.499  
 The anxiety regarding the dangers raised by the Parisian lavoirs and the 
subsequent drive to bring new regulations to the laundry industry was a result of 
the Conseil d’Hygiène’s knowledge that many small washing businesses in Paris 
existed outside of the law; it is impossible to know the exact numbers of these 
laundry boutiques since they were not declared. The Conseil was afraid that the 
dirty laundry itself would cause increase the incidence of contagious disease. It 
was precisely these types of establishments and their handling of dirty laundry 
that the Conseil d’Hygiène feared was the locus for contagious diseases, 
particularly tuberculosis in the last years of the nineteenth century.500 The Conseil 
d’Hygiène demanded that lavoirs post notices with the new rules in every 
establishment. The first and most important rule for the hygienists was that the 
laundry packets from different families not be mixed.501  The obstacle to 
regulating these small businesses was that the Service d’Inspection de Travail did 
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not consider them as industrial because they did not have more than ten 
employees during a work day.  
 Laundry itself had not been specifically connected to outbreaks of deadly 
diseases before; the cholera epidemics did not prompt the public health experts to 
target the laundry businesses as propagators of disease. During the cholera 
epidemics of the early-nineteenth century, doctors and scientist interested in the 
spread of the disease warned not to wash clothing in contaminated water. In that 
case, it was not the clothes that caused illness. In the case of the tuberculosis 
epidemic of the late-nineteenth century, hygienists thought the clothing itself was 
the source of contagion. Regulating the laundry business in all of its forms – the 
large industrial-size establishments in the banlieue to the small boutique run by 
one laundress who employed a few other women – became of paramount 
importance in the fight against contagion. If the plan was to stop the bacteria and 
quarantine it, then, the microbes in dirty laundry needed to be contained. Until 
WWI, the Conseil d’Hygiène’s focus consisted of stopping and containing the 
danger the establishments posed. This focus was not easily managed by the 
establishments who could not meet the demands to install ever-changing 
machines that promised to kill all bacteria they washed.  Disinfection of laundry 
was the new priority. Current medical knowledge about bacteria and other 
contagions disprove the Conseil d’Hygiène’s ideas about laundry’s ability to 
spread illnesses. Bacteria and viruses cannot live on soft surfaces for more than a 
few hours and one would have to have direct contact between the infected 
clothing and a mucous membrane to transmit any illness. However, the idea of 
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germs contaminating laundry is still current in popular culture, which I discuss in 
the conclusion.  
 In 1898, in light of these new concerns about laundry and contagious 
diseases, Dr. Eugène Deschamps, who was the head inspector at the Service des 
Epidémies, wrote an extended article on the threat laundry represented to both the 
laundresses and their customers. Dr. Deschamps investigated the methods of 
laundering practiced in the lavoirs to determine the danger for contagion.502  The 
inquiry was at the behest of the Conseil municipal de Paris who was also 
preoccupied with the prevention of contagion. The assumption at the beginning of 
Deschamps’ study was that the laundresses were transmitting diseases that they 
contracted during their work.503 The hygienists on the Conseil d’Hygiène were 
certain that the laundresses were becoming ill because they worked with 
contaminated clothes; they were convinced that only the bacillus made people 
sick and turned away from the idea that people’s housing and diet also played a 
role in people contracting diseases.504 Deschamps reported that, despite the 
relatively few cases of pulmonary tuberculosis among laundresses, he would go 
ahead with the research because the Conseil municipal had charged him with 
studying the question.505 He found the women who gave laundry to a laundress 
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would generally not divulge that there was a contagious person in their house for 
fear that the laundresses would ask for more money.506 This problem arose when 
the medical services wanted to force people to give embarrassing information 
about an illness in their home that could ostracize them in the community or 
possibly cause them to lose their work for being contagious. People had many 
reasons to hide that they were seriously ill, which made studying the issue 
particularly difficult. Deschamps believed that it was only with the power of 
inspection that the Conseil d’Hygiène could identify contagious illnesses in 
people’s homes. According to the doctor, the most dangerous process for the 
laundress was the sorting of laundry before the washing.507  Importantly, he found 
that the washing of laundry with soap effectively rendered the germs harmless and 
therefore “this danger, in practice, [was] illusory.”508 However, Deschamps 
emphasized that he would carry out the investigation to its conclusion for the 
Conseil municipal. He found that the other processes, soaking, washing, rinsing, 
were without danger to the laundress because the water diluted and carried away 
the pathogens. The washing occurred in a large cauldron heated to boiling were 
all the contagions would be killed.509 
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 The public hygiene services had a license to investigate and root out the 
causes of contagious diseases, which gave them permission to become more 
intrusive into people’s homes to find a sick person – who could cause an 
epidemic.510 They also advocated laws that obligated people to announce their 
disease to a centralized office that would send out experts to decontaminate the 
home and laundry.511 The Préfet de la Seine required all conseillers municipaux to 
inform the Conseil d’Hygiène if they had encountered a case in their 
arrondissement that had not been signaled to the proper authorities.512 A 
conseiller municipal turned in a report of a laundress who had developed a lesion 
on her arm following her normal work routine.513 He immediately connected the 
lesion with a sick person who had passed some horrid illness on to the unwitting 
laundress. The Conseil d’Hygiène nominated Dr. Deschamps – who had 
previously studied laundry – to interview the laundress at her residence. He 
determined she had not gone to the doctor and therefore, it was impossible to 
determine what she had at the time the conseiller municipal announced the 
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lesion.514  Deschamps emphasized the complex nature of contagion through 
laundry. He also characterized the practice of blaming laundry for diseases as 
outmoded.515 It was already a motive in the medical repertoire and an easy 
scapegoat without conclusive proof. He reported that the professional laundresses 
marked each sack as it came in; so any contaminated laundry would be 
identifiable. The only other real danger Deschamps found in lavoirs was the 
mixing of linens, when the laundresses took the clean laundry, before it went to 
the drying room, into the same room where they brought in the used laundry. The 
lavoirs used wooden tables, which he contended stored germs that the moist 
laundry released.516 He accused the small boutiques of this practice and discussed 
the budgetary limitations if they had to implement new procedures. When the 
laundry – which was possibly contaminated by the wood tables – dried, it would 
not produce any threat; the bacteria and viruses that found their way to the 
laundry would die while it was drying.517 
 Deschamps recounted a case that involved a child who was ill with 
Diphtheria without having any contact with anyone sick, which illustrate the fear 
of the workers themselves transmitting disease to their clients. The laundress, who 
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had a child with diphtheria at home, delivered the linens on the day before the 
child became ill. Thus, the doctor concluded, with only circumstantial evidence, 
that the laundress must have been a carrier for the illness and had infected the 
child when she delivered the laundry.518 The packages that laundresses used for 
the delivery and pick-up of laundry was often the same; Deschamps decried this 
practice as being a serious cause of contagion. Importantly, the doctor argued that 
it was those who had the money to send their laundry out who were most at 
risk.519   
 Deschamps outlined the ways to protect the population from these laundry 
establishments. He identified the triage as the operation that seemed the most 
useless and dangerous. However, it was during that stage that the laundress 
attached the tags to her clients’ clothes before they were mixed in with the other 
clients’ laundry for boiling. For the triage to be safe, he argued, it was necessary 
to have a room dedicated to that specific purpose. Although Deschamps wanted 
the government to legislate and enforce these plans, he admitted in the following 
paragraph that the small establishments would never be able to work within such 
restrictions.520 Only the industrial blanchisseries would be able to meet these 
requirements; there would be no more independent laundresses working for 
themselves. Deschamps complained that nothing in the current legislation let the 
Conseil d’Hygiène attack these problems that lavoirs engendered and therefore 
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recommended legislating that everyone must disinfect their laundry before the 
laundress came and collected it.521  
 In contrast, Deschamps called the women who ran laundry boutiques 
“mercenaries” who could never be regulated since their business was not 
classed.522  The doctor was highly critical of the laundry boutiques and was 
convinced that laundry coming from these businesses was a major propagator of 
contagion.523 The Minister of Commerce also listed the many dangers laundry 
boutiques presented to public health. He argued that, because they employed 
people and were the biggest threat to public health, the boutiques should be 
classed.524  
 Consequently, in 1903, the Minister of Commerce solicited the Conseil 
d’Hygiène for an investigation into the nomenclature of laundry establishments 
and their classification and specifically asked if they were dangerous in light of 
the tuberculosis epidemic reports he had read from cities in France.525 He wanted 
to know if they should be classed as dangerous establishments in the second class 
or remain in the third class. At the end of the nineteenth century, the Minister of 
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Commerce had recommended placing them in the third category for the purpose 
of easing restrictions on establishing new lavoirs in Paris.526The proceedings then 
established the nomenclature for the different types of laundry establishments. 
Buanderies being the establishments that only heat the water, all other processes 
were done elsewhere and were private, with only the laundresses by profession 
being able to use them. The lavoirs – housing every process – were necessarily 
public, inviting in anyone who wanted to wash. The Blanchisseries were 
industrial-size lavoirs that were private. All of these establishments were already 
classed. 
 Paradoxically, the Conseil d’Hygiène did not support a lavoir specifically 
operated for people infected with tuberculosis despite their own requirement to 
disinfect the laundry of the ill. According to one of its inspectors, the case of a 
lavoir connected to an anti-tuberculosis dispensary in the ground floor of an 
apartment building presented too many possibilities for contagion.527 The lavoirs 
would take laundry from sick patients and would disinfect them, as well as carry 
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out isolation measures of the contaminated laundry.528 The Préfet de Police had 
awarded the facility a limited permit to operate, which was conditional on 
perfecting the lighting and flooring. The owner had made the changes, but the 
inspector recommended that the application be denied.529 The owner wrote a letter 
arguing that the facility served the public interest by disinfecting the laundry. In 
addition, the owner would insulate the motors to reduce the noise, and the laundry 
would be given back without being ironed and with no contact with the residents 
of the apartment building. However, the recommendation was supported by the 
Préfet de Police, but since the Conseil d’Hygiène thought it was too risky and 
advised against it. The Préfet ultimately rejected the application.530  
The law on the disinfection of laundry used by people with contagious 
illnesses like tuberculosis, typhoid, small pox, cholera or meningitis, among other 
diseases, made it mandatory to declare a contagious illness in the household to the 
police – who would then contact the Conseil d’Hygiène – and to disinfect the 
laundry by passing it through a disinfection solution.531 Within an article 
explaining their new regulatory powers, the members of the Conseil d’Hygiène 
worried that they had not been able to get the lavoirs classed as more dangerous, 
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specifically in reaction to the threat of tuberculosis.532 However, the Minister of 
Commerce was the one who had rejected the idea of reclassifying lavoirs and 
requiring them all to install a disinfection tub on the contention that “it would be 
too difficult to enforce while still respecting private interests.”533 The problem 
with regulating the mandatory use of specific disinfectants was that they often 
reacted with stains in different manners. In effect, if one mandated a certain type 
of disinfectant, it could ruin hundreds of people’s laundry. Although the Conseil 
d’Hygiène could not decide what to use, its intent to regulate the laundry industry 
more closely in the face of tuberculosis was clear. Yet, the Minister of Commerce 
had rejected the idea of reclassifying the lavoirs to enable the inspectors to 
examine every laundry business, and there was no agreement on a type of 
disinfectant. Thus, the Conseil’s intentions came to nothing.   
 The city administration grew more unsatisfied with its regulatory powers 
and sought new laws to protect against the spread of contagious disease they 
thought laundry establishments were responsible for. The Conseil d’Hygiène 
pushed for the reclassification of lavoirs from third to second class.534 The 
Minister of Commerce informed the Préfet de Police that there was no possibility 
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of granting this request.535 The Comité Consultatif des Arts et Manufactureurs 
deliberated on the request that had been made and returned with instructions that a 
law specific to the contagious aspect of used laundry was already under review.536 
Further, the Minister argued that the workers were already covered under the 
1893 law protecting the health of the workers and the 1902 law which required 
the declaration of any contagious disease in a household.537  
  The Conseil d’Hygiène was disappointed by the answer the Minister of 
Commerce gave the Préfet de Police. In their June 1904 quarterly meeting, the 
subject of disinfection returned, and they agreed that every modern lavoir would 
have to be equipped with a special disinfection bath for all laundry that passed 
through.538 This law would not apply to the few bateaux-lavoirs that were left on 
the Seine because they were not a classified industry, thus the Conseil had no 
oversight of those establishments. The Conseil contended that the law on the 
disinfection of laundry had not been effectively enforced and that “the threat of 
tuberculosis alone should have been sufficient for the reclassing of lavoirs.”539 
The Conseil was not convinced that they could obtain the necessary political 
support to require every lavoir to install a disinfection bath since the Minister of 
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Commerce had already rejected the idea of reclassifying lavoirs on the grounds 
that it would hamper the economy by closing small businesses.540 Following the 
requirement to have a disinfection bath raised the problem of which disinfectant 
to use; Lysol, Cresol and Formol would ruin people’s laundry making stains 
permanent.541 The Conseil d’Hygiène could also decide to be less exigent in 
according permission to proposed lavoirs which were not meeting the standards 
already in place. Included in the report on disinfecting laundry, the investigation 
of a proposed location for a lavoir in the XXth arrondissement reflected the 
anxiety the Conseil d’Hygiène had about the establishments. After looking at the 
space, the inspector wrote that the lavoir was “irredeemable”, and it would be 
“impossible to not compromise the neighbor’s health [with the establishment].”542 
The inspector ended with a somber warning that “the improper installation of a 
lavoir in the heart of Paris could become a home for sickness and a breeding 
ground for tuberculosis.”543 The Conseil d’Hygiène did not accord permission for 
the lavoir. Factually, the 20th arrondissement was definitely not “in the heart of 
Paris” at the beginning of the twentieth century; the inspector’s use of this 
metaphor may signify that the Conseil d’Hygiène considered any laundry 
establishment within the boundaries of Paris dangerous.  
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 The Conseil d’Hygiène was convinced that the manipulation of dirty 
laundry in lavoirs and industrial blanchisseries was the cause of high rates of 
tuberculosis, typhoid, diphtheria and other contagious diseases among laundry 
workers.544 They were convinced that the bacillus of tuberculosis and other 
diseases could be contained and destroyed.545 Yet, the myriad environmental 
factors coupled with countless sources of viruses and bacteria made rooting out 
sources of contagion for every illness nearly impossible. These confounding 
variables made the crusade against laundry useless. Moreover, the idea of 
contagion obscured other important causes associated with the contraction of 
contagious diseases, such as living conditions and malnourishment. Living 
conditions for the poor and working classes only saw the first improvements by 
the beginning of the twentieth century.546 
 The constant effort on behalf of the Conseil d’Hygiène to identify laundry 
and lavoirs as dangerous finally convinced legislators to write a decree on the law 
of 1893 protecting workers’ health, specifically targeting laundry workers. The 
decree served to protect the greater population from contagious illnesses. The 
work on crafting the proposed law began two years earlier, and the French 
President Émile Loubet signed the decree in 1905.547 The law required the owners 
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and managers of all laundry establishments to follow a specific set of procedures 
when taking in laundry to be washed.  The laundry had to be closed in a bag until 
it arrived at the washing facility.548 Although some women sorted their laundry on 
the street, laundresses would usually sort the laundry immediately, before arriving 
at the facilities, usually in the carriages they used to retrieve the laundry from 
clients; the Conseil worried this action was a possible source of contagion to 
bystanders and laundresses. The law required the laundry worker to immediately 
put all laundry into a disinfectant bath, or a boiling caldron, or to spray it to fix 
the dust to the clothing. After she arrived at the lavoir, then, she needed to 
disinfect the laundry bag. In cases where there was a known infectious disease in 
the customer’s house, she needed to disinfect the laundry by chemical means 
only.549 Moreover, the owners and managers of the establishments were to 
provide overcoats to those who sorted the used laundry. The law outlined the 
regular washing and maintenance of the coats, as well as forbidding their storage 
in any rooms where the workers stored clean laundry or washed laundry.550 
Article six also forbade the sorting or storage of used laundry in the ironing 
rooms.551 The workers regularly used the ironing rooms as a store-all area and as 
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an eating area since there were tables. Finally, the law also required every lavoir 
to evacuate used water through closed pipes leading directly to the underground 
sewer.552  In 1913 there was a major investigation commissioned by the Minister 
of Commerce and Work under the rubric of health and safety for workers. Chapter 
six will study the investigation to determine if the blanchisseries and lavoirs 
complied with the prescriptions set out by the law of 1905.    
 The new regulations for the manipulation of dirty laundry threatened the 
existence of small facilities that operated in the basements and courtyards of 
buildings around Paris. Most of these facilities had only one or two rooms to 
work. The law would hamper the small businesses whose owners could not afford 
to rent larger premises that would allow them to follow the new regulations. In 
effect, the Conseil d’Hygiène had greater power to close those lavoirs that could 
not strictly follow the new prescriptions. From this time, the Conseil d’Hygiène 
had regulatory powers over all laundry facilities; yet they could not practically 
regulate clandestine laundry boutiques. The larger industrial facilities had no 
problem keeping pace with hygienic developments. They installed and developed 
new technologies that the Conseil d’Hygiène used as models for hygienic 
facilities. At least one member of the Conseil d’Hygiène, Marcel Frois – who had 
owned and operated an industrial blanchisserie – commented that these 
regulations would be an advance in hygiene but would nonetheless mean the 
demise of small lavoirs and their employees for the sake of public health, since 
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they would never be able to implement the new regulations.553 Being an owner of 
an industrial blanchisserie meant that Frois was not impartial on the subject and 
would not be sorry to see his competition be regulated out of existence. The push 
for regulation highlighted the partiality of the Conseil d’Hygiène.  
 In 1908, three years after the new regulations became law, the Conseil 
d’Hygiène revisited the problem of regulating the small lavoirs in the heart of 
Paris. Armand Gautier, a chemist on the Conseil d’Hygiène who worked on 
questions of food hygiene, wrote an article for the Annales d’Hygiène outlining 
his observation on hygiene and laundry in Paris.554 Gautier claimed that the 
inspectors of classed businesses were reluctant to formally classify small lavoirs 
in the poor neighborhoods of Paris because of their rapid growth. The steady 
stream of migrants to Paris had not abated, and the city was not yet fully equipped 
to cope with the influx of people in need of affordable housing.  
The neighborhoods with the least-expensive housing experienced the most rapid 
growth, and it was in those neighborhoods that laundresses would open 
clandestine lavoirs.  
 Gautier identified the small lavoir as being a public health danger. He 
underlined that “it is not the large blanchisseries that are away from the 
population, but the small boutique de blanchisseuse in the heart of the 
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neighborhood.”555 He argued that the boutiques were a danger to the laundresses 
and to the residents because the dirty laundry was sorted at the laundress’ home 
before being washed. The large industrial facilities had special rooms suited for 
this purpose.556 He claimed that “these precautions were not taken in smaller 
facilities that existed by the hundreds which the Préfet de Police and his 
inspectors were usually ignorant of anyway.”557 He emphasized that the law had 
not curbed the dangers presented by laundresses and dirty laundry because it 
could not regulate the boutiques de blanchissage and ironing shops that frequently 
doubled as boutiques.558 Repeating the argument that persisted at least since 1800, 
Gautier claimed there was no place for laundry establishments inside of Paris 
because the high population density precluded hygienic laundry operations.559 His 
article sought to illustrate that the law on the manipulation of used laundry was 
flawed; it did not take into account the various types of laundry facilities that were 
most worrisome to Gautier. He argued that the law actually made hygienic 
conditions worse in the boutiques de blanchissage because the women hid the 
laundry in their rooms where their children lived.560  
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 While tuberculosis raged across Europe, and other contagious diseases like 
typhoid and diphtheria cut down the population, the French government grappled 
with the problem of a diminishing population caused by low birth rates and high 
infant mortality. A contagious disease like diphtheria would be particularly deadly 
for infants.  In an attempt to increase the population they tried to root out disease, 
which came at the expense of laundresses. The Conseil d’Hygiène sought to close 
every business that was not closely regulated without regard to the consequences 
for the workers in the industry or the residents who needed washing facilities. 
Gautier’s article demonstrates that the law the Conseil d’Hygiène pushed for 
succeeded in hiding the problems from public sight, but had not resolved the 
contagion problem, particularly among the poorer residents of Paris.  
 The problem of dirty laundry and contagion was not yet resolved. A year 
after Gautier’s report, the Conseil d’Hygiène grappled with the problems of 
enforcing the regulations on sorting used linen and the issue of clandestine 
boutiques de blanchissage. These were businesses run by women and employed 
women, in contrast to the bateaux-lavoirs, lavoirs and blanchisseries. The 
boutiques were akin to the establishment Zola described in L’Assommoir. Maurice 
Bezonçon, reporter for the Conseil, elucidated the ongoing issues with laundry. 
He related to the Conseil that the sorting of dirty laundry still took place on the 
streets, in apartment building corridors, carriages, courtyards and private 
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rooms.561  In four years, the law had done little to stop what the Conseil 
d’Hygiène believed to be the most dangerous part of laundering. Members of the 
Conseil d’Hygiène wanted to create an annex to the law on the manipulation of 
soiled linens, anything that people used or wore that could be washed, which 
specifically outlawed the sorting everywhere except rooms specifically created for 
the purpose.562 The problem was the lack of hygiene inspectors to investigate and 
find the facilities not following the law. The Conseil suggested that work 
inspectors should be added to the hygiene service to find the clandestine facilities 
that, in the Conseil d’Hygiène’s opinion, could contaminate an entire 
neighborhood. Bezonçon accused the laundresses of not caring if they made 
others ill.563 The Conseil d’Hygiène complained that there were many different 
types of laundry facilities that remained unregulated because they had less than 
three employees, and that there was no way to close the dangerous businesses 
without more inspectors. For example, on Rue Marcadet, located in the 18th 
arrondissement, only one boutique owner had employees – and thus was regulated 
– out of sixty other laundry boutiques on the same street.564 The problem was that 
most laundresses had two or three jobs, working in successive boutiques since one 
could rarely fully employ a group of laundresses and ironers since they drew their 
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client base from the neighborhood around their business. The inspectors had 
trouble finding the clandestine boutiques because taking in laundry and ironing – 
coupled with bread delivering and housekeeping – was often a hidden occupation 
that married women used to help make ends meet.565 Bezonçon concluded that, 
while closing small laundry businesses would be a heavy price to pay for the 
women, it would have to be done to protect public health. He added that the 
laundresses could go work in the blanchisseries, not taking into account the 
reasons women took in washing – distance to travel for other work, to take care of 
their children, and control over their hours of work. Bezonçon admitted that 
“…this transformation of an ancient method of work carried by tradition will not 
go without difficulties, but will it not be desirable progress?”566 His statement 
reflected the willingness of the Conseil d’Hygiène to sacrifice laundresses and 
their work in the name of progress instead of teaching new methods of washing.  
Conclusion  
 This chapter described how, by discriminating against bateaux-lavoirs, 
tightly regulating lavoirs in the center of Paris, only approving laundry facilities 
in the outskirts of Paris, the city administration pushed laundry facilities for the 
poor out of the city. The biased report from Jungfleisch exposed the city 
administration’s real intention. The Préfet simply wanted the bateaux-lavoirs out 
of Paris, not in regards to hygiene concerns, but because they blocked the traffic 
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of municipally-operated transport companies, and did not match his overall vision 
of the city and its public space which prioritized fluidity and a clean image.  
Moreover, this chapter demonstrated that lavoirs were not wanted in Paris 
either. While tuberculosis raged across Europe, and other contagious diseases like 
typhoid and diphtheria affected the population, the French government attempted 
to root out disease. The Conseil d’Hygiène identified laundry as a possible 
medium for the growth of disease-causing microbes because of its proximity to 
contagious people. However, there was never any conclusive proof for this idea. 
Consequently, the Conseil d’Hygiène sought to close every laundry facility that 
was not closely regulated without regard to the consequences for the workers or 
the residents who needed washing facilities. There were already industrial 
blanchisseries outside the city to meet the more affluent residents’ needs, so when 
microbes and contagion theory became the dominant paradigm to assess and 
control crises in public hygiene, lavoirs became an easy target. Although in 
Jungfleisch’s report he did identify hospitals being another major source of 
pollution, the city could not afford to close or move those institutions.567 The 
tanneries on the Bièvre had moved out of Paris in 1905 after a strike and 
reopened in the southern communes outside of Paris and the river was covered 
over in 1912 in Paris.568  Described as clandestine, irredeemable, corrupting or 
inappropriate, lavoirs were associated with noisy, damp, dark, cluttered and 
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insalubrious buildings, which opposed the city administrators’ concept of urban 
space favoring open, light and clean streets.   
On the water, the campaign against the bateaux-lavoirs succeeded, and by 
the turn of the century, they were slowly being eliminated one-by-one. On land, 
the building of lavoirs – the Conseil d’Hygiène’s proposed replacements of the 
bateaux-lavoirs – never occurred in great numbers and most establishments 
located themselves in less expensive areas around the edges of Paris since 
inspectors did not approve the establishment of any lavoirs located in the urban 
center from 1885-1905. The Conseil d’Hygiène admitted that the task of bringing 
all the clandestine laundry boutiques under regulation was nearly impossible 
because the women could easily hide the business. Thus, by clearing the streets of 
its clutter, optimizing the flow of traffic, privileging profitable businesses, 
exporting poverty to the banlieue, hiding women from public space, and 
providing a cleaner image of the city centre, the Parisian government was closer 
to achieving its goals for modernizing the city. The reports and their internal 
contradictions made it clear that laundry was not a disease vector: it was matter 
out of place.  
The Conseil d’Hygiène and Annales d’Hygiène focused on one solution to 
the city’s laundering needs: the blanchisseries. They contended that these 
establishments had the money to incorporate all the required changes to ensure 
hygiene such as separate rooms for sorting dirty laundry and the installation of 
disinfection baths. The Conseil d’Hygiène asserted that these measures would also 
protect the women who worked in them from transmissible diseases. However, 
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chapter six will show that these assertions were not always true. Moreover, the 
women became wage workers with no control over their working environment or 
hours; they went from laundresses to laundry workers. However, this change in 
work enabled women to gather and rally for better conditions, wages, and hours.    
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Chapter 6 
WOMEN'S WORKING CONDITIONS IN LAVOIRS AND THE INDUSTRIAL 
BLANCHISSERIES: 1865-1913 
 Chapter five showed the focus on laundry facilities as vectors of disease 
were the result of the actions of the Conseil d’Hygiène, which, armed with the 
discovery of microbes, thought they could pinpoint the source of infectious 
diseases that threatened the Parisian population. Their strict regulations of  the 
laundry industry affected laundresses in Paris. I argued that, rather than 
subsidizing and updating existing facilities in Paris to enable better hygiene 
practices benefiting everyone, city administrators used the suggestions of the 
Conseil d’Hygiène to achieve their own goals – to reorder the city and move 
laundresses and laundry away from central Paris via regulations – having 
identified them as potential vectors of epidemics. Exporting blanchisseries into 
the surrounding areas of Paris solved several problems: Laundresses would be out 
of sight, hanging laundry would no longer conjure images of poverty and 
pollution, and the businesses would be able to incorporate the latest developments 
in public hygiene. The Conseil d’Hygiène championed the improved health and 
hygiene standards of the larger industrial establishments, arguing that these 
facilities could integrate all the hygiene regulations. They touted the 
blanchisseries as the answer to the city’s problems about laundry businesses: on 
the one hand, the problems related to pollution of the Seine by bateaux-lavoirs; on 
the other hand, the possibility of epidemics coming from the small laundry 
boutiques that could not adhere to prescriptions on manipulating dirty laundry.  
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This chapter will explore the conditions of the laundry worker after the 
mechanization of the laundry process and the effects of the labor laws on women 
who worked in the blanchisseries. In lavoirs and clandestine laundry boutiques, 
laundresses earned money working for themselves cleaning others’ clothes; they 
were entrepreneurs choosing their own hours, and isolated, lacking a shared 
interest in changing their working conditions. In the industrial blanchisseries, 
which used mechanized laundering and served the affluent population of Paris 
and large businesses that required linens, the women who worked in them did not 
work for themselves. Blanchisseries had moved out of Paris early in the century 
to take advantage of inexpensive land, ample water and easier drainage. Women 
working in the large blanchisseries faced similar problems that other women who 
worked outside of the home in industrial conditions encountered; these conditions 
led to a consciousness of laundresses’ shared plight as working women. The 
advent of industrial blanchisseries from 1865 generated a new type of laundresses 
with the awareness among these women that they had the right to better 
conditions. The machines employed in blanchisseries were new and often did not 
have any safety measures. The laundry workers were subjected to working hours 
over which they had no control. They fought for better wages and demanded that 
their bosses respect their right to a rest day. Organized chronologically, this 
chapter will explore their struggles to improve their working conditions, through 
demands, unions, letters, and strikes. Their actions were relayed by the socialist 
newspapers of the time which highlighted the lack of safety controls for the 
machines the blanchisseries used compared to the lavoirs and traditional methods 
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of laundering. This chapter will describe various protective labor laws that 
affected the working conditions of laundry workers. It will also investigate the 
records of adherence to these laws, revealing that the laundresses’ and the 
public’s health were not better protected in the blanchisseries than in the smaller 
lavoirs as the Conseil d’Hygiène had argued they would be. The blanchisseuses 
working in the industrial laundry facilities will be referred to as laundry workers 
in this chapter to reflect their changing work conditions.  
The Unions and Strikes of Laundry Workers: 1865-1904 
In her work on English laundresses, Patricia Malcolmson succinctly 
summarized what these women did: “laundry work was first and foremost heavy 
manual labor, and it was the means, whether primary or secondary, of earning a 
living.”569 Malcolmson highlighted the perception that laundry workers were 
independent, quoting a laundry owner who spoke before the Royal Commission 
on Labour: “laundresses were the most independent people on the face of the 
earth.”570 This characteristic was true in France as well, for laundresses at the 
lavoirs and the bateaux-lavoirs generally worked for themselves. In contrast, with 
the industrialization of the laundry process, laundry workers in the blanchisseries 
– while not abandoning their independent spirit and outspoken tendencies – 
became subordinate to their patrons (managers) and worked under patriarchal 
domination. This shift in workplace significantly affected their conditions and 
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their attitude. Industrial blanchisseries utilized large machines to process great 
amounts of material; they catered to hospices, hospitals, and other institutions as 
well as commercial ventures, and personal clothing. The blanchisserie 
represented a place where women could communicate with a wider community of 
workers sharing a similar experience under similar circumstances. The communal 
aspect of the blanchisseries was important; working outside the home was the 
first component that enabled laundry workers to conceptualize taking action; 
sharing the same plight and having a boss, manager, owner, to rally against, 
enabled these women to take action to ameliorate their working conditions. 
Indeed, their workplace represented the most important variable in the formation 
of unions and in their grèves (strikes). In the blanchisseries, laundry workers did 
not work in isolation; they could discuss matters with others workers with little or 
no supervision.  
The presence of the laundry workers’ supervisor rarely constituted a major 
obstacle blocking them from collective action; without fellow male employees, 
who could possibly co-opt their movement and make a separate peace with the 
employer, the women could organize themselves and strike for what they needed 
without interference. On 13 May 1865, laundry workers took action. In the article 
published in Le Temps the newspaper of record, and the forerunner of Le Monde – 
there is no information regarding the workers’ demands. Yet, the newspaper 
article underscored the importance of clean laundry to Parisians. The article 
described the workers in sympathetic terms with a remark about the many small 
items Parisian women wore to be fashionable without caring that someone would 
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have to wash them. “The numerous strikes happening now are a subject of 
preoccupation for the public. From the coach driver to the blanchisseuses de fin, it 
is the rich who will suffer from the cessation of labor. Who will wash the bonnet 
that the Parisiennes are so found of? Who will drive the promeneur du dimanche 
to the country? It is possible to go without ‘carriages’, but not without white linen. 
This is beyond Parisians’ strength. This time, one will have to – willingly or not – 
wash the family’s linen ourselves.” 571 The article highlighted that the laundresses 
were even more essential than the coach drivers because no one could go without 
clean laundry and adhere to social norms. The author also alluded to the affluent 
women who did not do their own laundry and that it would be against custom for 
them to wash their own family’s laundry.  
Several laws designed to offer protective legislation to women marked the 
evolution of blanchisseuses as laundry workers. The law of 1874 indicated for the 
first time that women were treated as specific individuals. It stipulated that 
workers between ages 16 and 21 were forbidden to work nights and days over 12 
hours. Women workers engaged in strikes because of issues related to their 
wages, the length of their workday, and their patron‘s sexism. The textile sector 
was the most affected by these mouvements revendicateurs. Between 1871 and 
1890, strikes by women accounted to 5.9 percent (versus 12 percent mixed); in 
1903 the percentage rose to 21.5 percent.572 Among the laundry workers, working 
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conditions were one of the causes for striking. The laundresses showed no interest 
in actually toppling the social order; syndicalism was an outlet that provided an 
organization to strike against unfair conditions. Peter Stearns also demonstrated 
that the workers in France found syndicalism convenient for their form of action, 
the strike, and had little interest in either destroying the social order or engaging 
in a general strike.573 They were only revolutionary in the sense that they wanted 
fair pay for a fair day’s work. The working conditions in the laundry 
establishments were dreadful. The following article published in Le Temps in 
1887 underscores the point that difficult working conditions prompted laundresses 
to strike. “The Conseil d’Hygiène Publique et de Salubrité du Départment de la 
Seine has dealt with diverse accidents of laundresses caused by the use of lye and 
bleach… From the hardening and wrinkling of the skin epidermis, the chemicals 
produce temporary muscle spasm of the fingers that hinder their proper 
functioning and their normal position. The Conseil has emitted [an] 
advisory…[banning the use of] concentrated bleach… and making the manager 
responsible for the non-execution of the… prescriptions.”574 On 4 October 1887, 
following the report by the Conseil d’Hygiène, Le Temps reported that the Préfet 
de Police had decided to enforce the ban on the use of bleach and chaux chloride 
(lye) based on the skin and muscle injuries that it caused.575 However, the 
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enforcement consisted of posting a warning about the dangers of its use and 
letting the establishment control the regulations.  
 The working conditions only grew worse, as laundresses took work in 
blanchisseries.  Without a union, industrial blanchisseries workers in Marseille 
went on strike. On 18 October 1881, a report from La Citoyenne – a feminist 
newspaper –commented that the strike illustrated the severe economic deprivation 
the laundresses worked under. However, the feminist press was not the only ones 
to observe the difficulty of the work and the dangerous working conditions in 
which laundresses worked. The article further claimed that men refused to wash 
laundry because they claimed they were embarrassed to handle women’s 
underclothes; and yet, the commentator noted, embarrassment never stopped them 
from becoming women’s physicians. “Let us notice that the blanchisseuses who 
work in this difficult profession are paid very little and have to support their 
children alone. It does not matter if she is a widow, non married or married; if she 
has children she must take care of them.” 576  Moreover, the reporter pointed out 
that no matter what the social or financial circumstances were; society expected 
mothers to take care of their children. 
 The press attention to the working conditions present in industrial 
blanchisseries facilitated the creation of a union – specifically for the interests of 
the women workers – and the coordination of strikes. In 1884, the legislature of 
France passed a law allowing for the creation of unions; the Waldeck-Rousseau 
law gave women la liberté syndicale (freedom to join a union). However, the 
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number of working women who belonged to syndicats remained relatively low; in 
1900, there was 30,000 women in syndicats (versus 558,000 men) ; in 1914, there 
was 89,000 women in syndicats (versus 1 million men). 577 The working women’s 
low representation in unions could be attributed to their economic conditions and 
to the daily burden they endured; they saw little means to emancipate themselves. 
According to Yannick Rippa, gender consciousness among female workers was 
inexistent during the time feminists such as Marguerite Durand organized 
conferences (1878-1907).578 Other factors account for women’s difficulty in using 
their right to unionize. Given the fact that the Code civil required wives to submit 
to their husband’s authority, and that some associations demanded women to ask 
written permission – via their husband or father – in order to speak up, women’s 
public expression was often met with mockery.579 Yet, in 1889, seeking to 
improve their lives through organizational structures, laundry workers took 
advantage of the 1884 law to create their own union in Paris and the banlieue. 
They were interested in advancing their own cause, not necessarily a syndicalist 
cause.  
Le Temps and La Citoyenne both reported on the creation of the syndicat 
de blanchisseuses in distinct ways. In the earlier Le Temps article it underlined 
that the laundresses were a part of everyday life and their absence would 
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negatively affect individual families. The article highlighted their role as women 
in society whereas the feminist newspaper, La Citoyenne, focused on their legal 
rights, the creation of a union, the women’s right to meet at the Bourse de travail 
(labor exchange), as well as their protection under the law of 1900 limiting their 
work day to eleven hours.580  Le Temps described the occasion emotionally, and 
emphasized that the women had to stand outside for work, implicitly making the 
parallel between the conditions laundresses were forced to work in and 
prostitutes. The article begins with an evocative sentence: “The 10,000 
blanchisseuses of Paris have dreamt for a long time to have a Chambre Syndicale 
to take care of their interests.”581 It quotes Mrs. T, a speaker at the event, who 
explained the laundry workers’ plight: 
We have only one place de grève, underneath the bridge from the Rue de Rocher. The 
ones among us who want to get hired are forced to go there on the street from seven to 
nine in the morning, feet in the water, and the snow, empty stomach; they often think 
about the crying child they left at their house. Well, let us hurry to create a syndicate that 
will be able to demand an office at the bourse du travail. At least there, we will be 
sheltered and we could stay there the whole day. Our delegate will be able to receive job 
offers from both individual houses and patrons blanchisseurs. We currently earn 3 to 
3.25 francs per day for eleven hours. Let us ask 3.75 for a day that starts at eight [a.m.] 
and ends at seven[p.m.].  
On 19 February 1889, three days after the creation of a syndicate, laundry 
workers were striking for a place of their own and a raise in their pay. Le Temps 
covered the event. The article noted that blanchisseuses were now organized, and 
had planned for all of the workers involved in the laundry industry to meet under 
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the bridge on Rue Portalis in the 8th arrondissement of Paris. This event was a 
special meeting because the famous socialist Louise Michel was supposed help 
the laundresses work with their patron. Le Temps described a scene in which the 
laundry workers took the initiative to march on top of the bridge with banners that 
announced the imminent arrival of Louise Michel.582 It described the laundresses 
as being charmingly ignorant of the laws because they held their meeting outside, 
which was dismissive of their attempts to create a larger march. Again the article 
appealed to gendered ideas about women that they had only gathered to talk.583 
The article focused on the disorderly aspect of the march and that the laundresses 
would not even listen to Louise Michel; instead, they only wanted immediate 
gains in their pay and a sheltered place to solicit day work.  
A few hand banners had announced “the help of Louise Michel was assured.” Louise 
Michel went back to the Chemin de Levallois after simply inviting the blanchisseuses to 
choose a room where people could hear one another. “At my place if you want?” But the 
ouvrières showed no hurry to go to Levallois. They let the revolutionary woman go and 
they spread in small groups, all composed of 2-3 ouvrières who talked with one patronne 
who would not stop repeating “you have the right to demand shelter, this is right, about 
the rest, demand to be paid by the piece and everyone will be happy.”  
The group of laundry workers did not obtain the help they had intended on 
receiving from Louise Michel. Piece work being the most exploitative. They had 
assumed that she would bring immediate gains in their pay, while she was 
interested in constructing dialogue for more long-term solutions.  Laundry 
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workers were striving for better pay and shorter hours, goals they deemed 
obtainable. 
 On 23 March 1889, Le Temps reported with a congratulatory tone that the 
secretary of the Syndicats des Ouvrières Blanchisseuses received one thousand 
francs that morning, which had originated from an unnamed industrial person in 
the neighborhood of L’Hôtel de Ville. The article reported that the laundry 
workers would finally be able to use a large meeting room at the bourse du travail 
three days a week between seven and nine in the morning thanks to the donation. 
The article added in sympathetic terms, that they would no longer have to endure 
the weather under the bridge on Rue Portalis which impugned their dignity.584 
The comment alluded to the parallels that could be drawn between the laundresses 
on the streets looking for work and prostitutes. In May of 1889, Le Temps 
reported in one line that another group of laundresses formed a syndicat on 
Avenue de Clichy, making the laundresses one of the better organized groups of 
working women in the city.   
 In 1892, The Millerand-Coillard law was passed. This labor law limited 
the hours of work, forbad night work for women, gave workers repos 
hebdomadaire (one weekly rest day) and respect des fêtes légales (official 
holidays). However, Yannick Rippa described an exception in terms of 
hypocritical discourse apparent in the 1892 law; female nurses were permitted to 
work at night because it was a feminine domain, in the pure tradition of the 
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woman as soignante (caretaker) by nature. 585 Rippa underscores the gendering of 
different types of work.586 Sylvie Schweitzer described how moral arguments 
were advanced to protect society as a whole. One theory about night work was 
that it permitted offenser les bonnes moeurs (violater of sexual norms) sexual 
harassment at the work place.587 
The length of the workday was one of the largest concerns for laundry 
workers. The dual demands for fewer hours and more pay were constant factors in 
their strikes. Mary Lynn Stewart highlights that women rarely went on strike. 
However, when they did, it was to maintain their pay or their rate of work. When 
the Millerand-Coillard law passed in 1892, a group of women mill workers went 
on strike to protest the labor law because they did not want to give up the night 
shift because it worked well for their family and childcare. 588 Laundry workers 
went on strike in order to regulate their work hours so their bosses could not 
obligate them to do night work. Women in a feminine trade had little hope of help 
from the government in regulating their working conditions to meet their 
particular needs.                                                                                               
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Stewart attributes this situation to the dual market that relegated women’s work to 
a lower paying status because it worked well for the economy.589  The 
inattentiveness of the law pressed laundry workers to act on their own behalf.  
Stewart found a gendered discourse in the legislation limiting the hours 
women could work. She concluded that instead of protecting women, the laws 
were contrary to the women’s needs. 590 Her conclusions were true for women 
working in the mills who appreciated the flexibility of working at night, since the 
practice did not compete with their family responsibilities. According to the 
legislators, the women were endangering their essential reproductive function by 
working long hours in the mills. The legislators never mentioned laundresses who 
also worked long hours, often at night, perhaps because the laundresses were in a 
typically feminine occupation in contrast to the mill workers.  Consequently, 
night work and other types of work the politicians deemed dangerous became 
unlawful. On the one hand, the laws limited the ability for women employees to 
earn as much as they did before the cut in hours. On the other hand, laundresses 
working in blanchisseries used later labor laws to fight for better working 
conditions, to protect themselves from bosses who required them to work all night 
on weekends when the demand was the heaviest.591  When the women went on 
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strike over working conditions, they referenced the labor laws as their 
justification.   
Between 1900 and 1910, laundry workers were active in terms of strikes 
and syndical activity. Two important laws may have contributed to such activities: 
The law of 13 March 1900 restricted women and children to only work 10 hours a 
day, and men 12 hours; the law of 30 March 1900 stipulated that there would not 
be any night work in any industry for women.  
In this survey of newspaper coverage of strikes regarding working hours 
and pay, the socialist-syndicalist newspapers reported on laundry workers’ strikes 
and unions more frequently than the feminist press. One reason may have been 
the lack of attention from moral reformers. Many feminists urged the women who 
worked in the sweated industries to organize, thereby completely neglecting the 
laundry workers who actually carried out organization and actions to gain their 
demands. According to Judith Coffin, moral reformers considered needle workers 
“the epitome of femininity”, which explained why they attracted so much 
attention from moral reformers. 592 While needle workers perfectly illustrated the 
perils of women who worked, laundry workers were hardly the “epitome of 
femininity”; in contrast the (pejorative) descriptor usually applied to them was 
forte en gueule – loudmouth.  
Through these years of agitation and their fight for better working 
conditions, the laundress perpetuated the image of an outspoken and independent 
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woman. In April of 1900, laundry workers went on a series of strikes that 
occurred in the Parisian banlieue where all of the industrial blanchisseries were 
located. An article on the strikes ran in the anarchist newspaper Le Libertaire on 9 
April. The reporter commented that, “the blanchisseuses and blanchisseurs of 
Paris have the intention to join their comrades of the banlieue. This is a very good 
way to force the bourgeois, who do not have the courage, to wash their own 
chemise.”593  The circumstance of women and men “agitating together” was not 
unusual for the workers of the industrial blanchisseries. Laundering had been a 
feminine task until the mechanization of the 1880s when large blanchisseries 
gathered men and women on the same floor. However, men worked on the 
machines, while women did the tasks associated with washing laundry. The men 
working on the machines was skilled labor, one had to have knowledge of 
machinery and hydraulics.  The women’s work handling laundry, transferring it 
from one machine to the next was unskilled labor. Yet, both men and women 
were in the same spaces, men working on the machines while women used them. 
According to Yannick Ripa, “industrialization shattered the spatial differentiation 
of labor. Not only did women cease to be invisible, they found themselves in a 
mixed space.”594  
There was little competition or hostility from the men in creating or 
joining syndicates amongst laundry workers. The men and women had different 
skills and men were not afraid of being undercut by women for doing the same 
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work for less pay. Yet, aspirations of better pay grew among women. In April 
1900, La Fronde, a feminist newspaper funded and run by Marguerite Durand, 
reported on a strike at an industrial blanchisserie in Billancourt. This strike was 
an example of how women and men working in the blanchisseries although not 
doing the same work, came together for a common gain both wanted better pay. 
The patron, claiming to be guided by a spirit of reconciliation, complained that he 
did not want to throw any discredit on the upcoming strike and was therefore 
working with the women and men, but his patience would not last much longer. 
The article recounted that there were 1500 to 1800 strikers at the meeting place at 
a school on Avenue de la Mairie.  “There were a few people who went back to 
work, but it was insignificant; the strike will continue. We were at the Bourse du 
travail today, 3,000 strikers; the speakers asked for persistence in the strike. There 
were some young women who applauded strongly. The success was for each 
striker, each blanchisseuse… Regarding salary, they will only go back to work 
after their demands are met.” 595  The article illustrated that, despite the labor 
division based on sex, men were willing to cooperate with the women so that each 
could have better working conditions. It also underscored that both sexes felt that 
their work in blanchisseries was difficult and not remunerated properly.   
The 1900 article in La Fronde also described a case in which a 
blanchisseuse brought laundry from a lavoir to do at her home, a case that was not 
unusual. The anomaly is that a woman who worked in her home was aware and 
willing to throw her lot in with the other laundry workers to get better pay. She 
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did not participate in the undercutting and strikebreaking that strikers commonly 
charged homeworkers with. Undercutting was a fact of life for the women who 
relied upon competitive piecework to get jobs. The article recounted her situation 
and applauded this woman’s fortitude to refuse piecework because it undermined 
the strike that the blanchisseuses were engaged in.596 
 The unions wielded greater power against the exploitation of the patron 
than a single person and were an immense aid to remedy the problem of working 
conditions.  In December of 1900, La Voix du peuple published an article to 
inform their readers of the working conditions in blanchisseries to shed light onto 
the problem and to help the laundry workers obtain some protective regulation. 
The government remained uninterested in such regulation until it the 1905 law on 
the manipulation of dirty laundry. The report detailed the abusive conditions 
present in the laundry industry. The ironers worked fifteen or sixteen hours a day, 
but labor inspection reports did not reflect that reality since the inspectors were on 
such friendly terms with facilities’ patrons that inspectors would warn them 
before the visit to guarantee the results; on the day of the expected inspection, all 
of the workers would be gone by seven or the patron would rush them out of the 
back door upon the inspector’s arrival. In addition, the patron would falsify the 
worksheets to document that the workers only attended from seven in the morning 
to five in the evening. The article also indicated that the patrons of establishments 
located in the banlieue – Boulogne, Sevres, Chaville, Arcueil-Cachan, Vanves, 
etc. – had submitted a petition to the commerce minister for the non-application of 
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the 1892 law which limited women’s workdays to ten hours. The strategies the 
patrons used to collect the signatures for the petition were appalling. The article 
described the abuses of the owners. “What goes beyond the limits is the pressure 
coming from the patron to recruit the signatures. They used threats of dismissal 
and actual dismissals, false signatures, double signatures, etc. For instance, in 
Sevres and Chaville, some ouvrières were forced to sign under their maiden name 
and their married name. In Boulogne, the patron had signed for the ouvrières who 
came from Italy under the pretext they did not know how to write in French.”597 
However, the Fédération des Syndicats Ouvriers Blanchisseurs started an 
education campaign which convinced the commerce minister not to accept the 
petition. The workers’ managers were sources of negative treatment and power-
based intimidation.  
The Effects of Hygiene Law of 1905 and Labor Law of 1906 
The law of 15 February 1902 provided the groundwork in terms of health 
protection for laundresses. It became obligatory to declare and disinfect linens in 
case of known transmissible diseases (tuberculosis, thyphoid, variole, diphtheria). 
In the Annales d’Hygiène Publique et de Médecine Légale, Marcel Frois asserted 
that the law would not only protect the public, but also laundry workers who came 
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into contact with the possibly contaminated laundry.598 The architects of the law 
claimed that it would protect laundresses from possible contamination through 
laundry from people who had contagious diseases. In effect, it would sanitize their 
work environment and provide them with safer working conditions by 
disinfecting the laundry. However, the Conseil d’Hygiène used the law to propose 
the closure of lavoirs, and targeted laundresses as possible incubators for the 
contagious diseases of their clients, and potentially dangerous to the city’s 
health.599  
The Minister of Commerce and Work commissioned a study to investigate 
how well the blanchisseries around France had incorporated the law in 1911-
1913.600 The inspectors reported their findings to the Minister of Commerce who 
then set out a series of fines depending on the seriousness of the infraction. The 
rubric the inspectors used asked a series of nineteen questions: how many workers 
were employed; was the laundry enclosed in bags for transport; did the service 
have any knowledge of the bag being opened during transport; was there a 
chemical disinfection or boiling disinfection process; was there an aspersion 
system for fixing dust to laundry; was the laundry disinfected by the laundry 
process; was dirty laundry sorted in a separate room if it had not been pre-
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disinfected; was the local carefully cleaned after each delivery; was there an 
overcoat for people sorting dirty laundry before disinfection; and were the 
soaking waters drained by underground canal outside of the workshop?601 There 
were some questions the inspectors never answered, such as any knowledge of the 
bags being opened during transport and whether the washing process laundry had 
disinfected the laundry.602 
Over the three-year investigation, the reports gathered by inspectors 
mandated by the Minister of Commerce and Work demonstrated that the majority 
of the blanchisseries did not follow the prescriptions of the law such as putting 
laundry into closed bags, sorting laundry in separate rooms designed for the 
purpose, wearing an overcoat while sorting and putting laundry through a 
disinfection bath before washing it. Out of 412 blanchisseries in the Paris 
agglomeration, 100 establishments installed a disinfection bath, though the 
inspector commented that only 15 had the bath ready during working hours, when 
he had visited.603  Among these blanchisseries, 230 had followed the rule for 
closed-bag deliveries and pick-ups, 103 had installed a separate room for sorting 
laundry, and only 80 had provided personnel with overcoats used specifically for 
                                                 
601 AN F22 572 Travail et Sécurité Sociale, Enquête sur les conditions du travail 
dans les blanchisseries, 1911-1913. Rubric of the questionnaire.  
 
602 Ibid.  
 
603 AN F22 572 Travail et Sécurité Sociale, Enquête sur les conditions du travail 
dans les blanchisseries, 1911-1913. Questionnaires de Paris, février 1911-mars 
1913.    
  253 
the sorting process (and washed after every delivery).604 The laundry workers 
were still exposed to transmissible diseases.  
Reports on the law of 1905, which regulated the manipulation of dirty 
laundry, provided useful information about the conditions of industrial laundry 
establishments. 605 The hygienists on the Conseil d’Hygiène, who the Préfet de la 
Seine appointed, intended the law to slow the epidemics of contagious diseases 
such as tuberculosis, diphtheria, and typhoid. However, as the reports revealed, 
the blanchisseries were not the bastions of health and hygiene that the hygienists 
writing for the Annales d’Hygiène and working on the Conseil d’Hygiène touted. 
Instead, the owners, trying to save money, rarely employed separate rooms for the 
sorting of dirty and possibly contaminated clothing and linens. The blanchisseries 
were, in many cases, no better than the small lavoirs or the clandestine laundry 
boutiques in the heart of Paris, which both the Conseil d’Hygiène and the Annales 
d’Hygiène had claimed were incubators of transmissible diseases, had railed 
against and made so difficult to open.           
 The reports of the Conseil d’Hygiène exposed their preferences toward 
the modern blanchisseries which, they perceived, provided better working 
environments for laundresses and were safer for public hygiene to the determent 
of facilities within Paris serving those with modest incomes. Yet, the reports 
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revealed that, far from being actual threats to the health of laundresses or the 
greater public, laundry facilities were only a nuisance to the city.  
On 13 July 1906, a labor law was passed guaranteeing a rest day on 
Sunday and no days longer than ten hours. The syndicats who represented the 
laundry workers denounced the blanchisseries owners’ irregularities and 
malpractice by writing letters addressed directly to the Minister of Commerce. For 
instance, one writes: “The owner of the blanchisserie on Rue St. Denis does not 
observe the Sunday rest day and keeps twelve to fourteen women on Sunday. He 
only has to give a small pot de vin (bribe) to the inspector and he can therefore do 
what he wants.”606 The letter also reported that the owner had also hidden women 
in his private apartment in a cupboard where they had almost suffocated.607 In 
another example, Madame Dugeunes, blanchisseuse, wrote to the Minister of 
Commerce herself requesting that her place of work, a blanchisserie on Rue de la 
Fédération in Paris, be inspected immediately for non-compliance of the 1906 
law.608 The Minister of Commerce promptly enlisted chief inspector Boulisset to 
send out a work inspector to investigate the establishment.609  
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One of the laundresses at a blanchisserie at Issy-les-Moulins in the 
banlieue requested that the inspectors come back to the establishment for non-
compliance of the 1906 law. She wrote to the Minister that they worked on 
Sundays and that on the weekdays they worked from seven in the morning until 
eleven or midnight which violated both the 1906 law and the 1892 law on night 
work. She added that they were counting on the Minister to make this abuse 
stop.610 Although she had taken the first step in protecting herself and her fellow 
laundresses, she made clear that her employer had no intention of following the 
law and that the Minister of Commerce was the only one with the power to 
compel him to do so. The issue resulted in a citation and increased visits from the 
inspectors to force the manager of the blanchisserie to follow the law.611 The 
following Sunday, an inspector visited the same establishment and saw another 
ten women washing clothes; he gave another citation to the manager and told him 
that the business would be under special surveillance until he brought it into 
compliance. The inspector added that he could get no testimony from the workers 
and that he suspected that if they had talked to him they would have been laid 
off.612 This case revealed the difficulties in compelling a blanchisserie to conform 
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to a law that presented logistical challenges for its daily operations. The rest day 
on Sunday was no small matter to enforce for a business that had traditionally 
done most of its business that day. The case also illustrates the workers’ courage 
to denounce their manager or the owner of the blanchisserie when it could lead to 
their dismissal.  
Another impediment to gaining more rights was the owner’s attitudes 
towards the laundresses who worked for them. Georges Mény, head of the union 
for owners of blanchisseries, illustrated the owner’s opinions of laundresses in a 
pamphlet detailing the profession of laundry and its future in 1908. He stated that 
“when one asks the bosses about their workers, they unanimously complain about 
the immorality of their personnel and that their level of morality keeps going 
down. The older workers corrupt the young ones with foul language and behavior 
and three-quarters of them are alcoholics.”613  In his reiteration of the owner’s 
opinions, Mény did not take into account that the owners themselves gave 
laundresses alcohol on their break and then blamed them for being drunk. 
Drinking alcohol was a traditional supplement to the laundresses’ pay. Mény’s 
writing also exposed the negative attitudes towards laundresses and their working 
habits which may have also contributed to the owner’s justification for not 
providing the legally required day off.   
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In 1909, the Chambre Syndicale des Ouvrières et Ouvriers Blanchisseurs 
of Chaville filed a petition with the Minister of Commerce for an immediate 
inspection of five blanchisseries in the area.614 They cautioned the Minister to 
send his inspectors without foreknowledge of their visit because the laundresses 
knew the owners had tried to hide workers in the blanchisserie at night and on 
Sunday to circumvent citations. The newspaper La Révolution, a socialist 
periodical which had knowledge of the infractions committed in these 
blanchisseries – most likely from employees writing in to report the blanchisserie 
–  declared the law of 1906 a “dead letter”.615  The inspector wrote to the head of 
the union promising that he would adhere to the suggestions made by the workers 
to try and catch the owner in an infraction.616 The inspector went to the named 
blanchisseries and could not find anything to garner a citation. Although, he did 
write back to the Chambre Syndicale to keep it informed in case anything else 
came to his attention. 617 However, the report came two months later, illustrating 
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that, in 1909, the system was slow to react to petitioners’ grievances, which 
possibly gave the owners time or indications to avoid citations.   
The owners of the blanchisseries were reluctant to follow the new law and 
sought to be exempted from the 1906 law which designated Sunday as the legal 
day off from work. The owners complained that Sunday was their busiest day. It 
was the day people would request their laundry to be finished and ready for pick-
up or delivery.618 The owners pleaded with the Ministry of Commerce to be 
exempted from the law by simply moving the required rest day from Sunday to a 
holiday, if one happened to occur during the week. While this was legal under the 
1892 law, the 1906 law did not allow for this type of substitution and provided 
two rest days during the week which owners of blanchisseries found 
infuriating.619 Saturday night was often the busiest time for laundresses who 
prepared the clothes for Sunday morning; the manager or owner often required 
them to work all night or until the early morning. The owner of a blanchisserie 
that proclaimed to be specialists in work for the maisons bourgeoises could not 
understand why the laundresses were entitled to two rest days simply because a 
holiday fell on a day other than Sunday that week. He wrote to the Minister of 
Commerce complaining that this was detrimental to his business and 
fundamentally unfair to him as an owner.620 
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The inspections and application of the law were not systematic, which led 
to both workers and owners complaining about the inequality of the 
investigations. The Syndicat des Blanchisseuses et Blanchisseurs-sur-Seine 
(located in the western Parisian agglomeration) complained that there were many 
blanchisseries in Boulogne which had never been inspected, where the owner 
flagrantly disregarded the law and did not give his employees any rest day, even 
the holidays. The head of the union wrote that he “had informed inspectors of 
another establishment that employed twenty women on Sunday and there had 
never been any inspection of this blanchisseries.” Further, the employer “did not 
allow complaints about the work schedule and had threatened to fire anyone who 
talked to an inspector.”621  
Blanchisseries tried to find ways to be exempt from the law by 
triangulating between the Minister of Commerce and the Préfet de Police, which 
the unions and other blanchisseries objected to vehemently. This illustrated the 
patchy enforcement and flexibility of the law when the owner complained to a 
powerful person such as the Préfet. The blanchisserie Emile on Rue Maître-
Jacques in Boulogne had written to the Préfet de Police asking to make an 
exception for his establishment, arguing that being open Sunday morning was 
essential to his business. The Préfet de Police permitted the owner to open on 
Sunday morning and close Sunday afternoon to Monday afternoon. The Syndicat 
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des Blanchisseuses et Blanchisseurs de Boulogne-sur-Seine wrote to the Ministre 
du Commerce protesting the unequal treatment that the employees would suffer 
from. Additionally, the union claimed that nothing would stop other 
blanchisseries from requesting the same special treatment, which would 
eventually render the law ineffectual.622 However, the Ministre du Commerce 
upheld the Préfet de Police’s decision and allowed the different hours.623 
However, the Ministre investigated the matter again, as twenty-five blanchisseries 
in Boulogne also requested an exemption from the 1906 law. The Conseil 
Municipal and the mayor requested that all of the blanchisseries in their commune 
be exempted from the law because the industry “worked under special conditions” 
requiring that the businesses were open on Sundays.624 The Préfet de Police also 
wrote to the Ministre du Commerce in support of the blanchisseries of Boulogne 
insisting that their “unique character added to the fact that the owners recognized 
that the work on Sunday was only to last a very short time and employ a 
minimum of women.”625 All of those in support of the industry thought that the 
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business should not be put under pressure to adhere to the law protecting the 
rights of women and children – the ones who worked on Sundays – or the right to 
a rest day on Sunday. The mayor of Boulogne-sur-Seine and its Conseil 
Municipal wanted to protect the business rather than workers rights, expressly 
those of women. The Comité Consultatif des Arts et Métiers also wrote in support 
of the blanchisseries and their “special nature” adding that it was in the best 
interest of the industry if the Ministre du Commerce changed the nomenclature of 
the law of 1906 to include blanchisseries in the businesses that enjoyed a 
deferment of the Sunday rule in favor of a system of rolling days off which 
guaranteed at least two days off a month like auberges (inns) and cafés.626 In 
November of 1907, the Ministre du Commerce gave a final review of the status of 
the blanchisseries after receiving the different arguments in favor of exempting 
the blanchisseries of Boulogne-sur-Seine. The advisory council of the Ministre du 
Commerce did not agree with the opinions of the Préfet de Police, the Comité 
Consultatif des Arts et Métiers, the Conseil Municipal and the mayor of 
Boulogne-sur-Seine.627 The advisory council found no reason to inscribe the 
blanchisseries on the list of exempted businesses due to their special working 
conditions or needs. The Ministre added that “since the blanchisseries in 
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Boulogne-sur-Seine have no special character of a nature to motivate different 
treatment than the blanchissage industry in the rest of France, I cannot maintain 
the exemption that the Préfet de Police accorded”628 The Ministre remarked that 
the industry had already the right to cancel fifteen Sundays a year, which should 
give the industry the needed elasticity that was already built into the law of 1906. 
The women who worked in the industry now had rights they could not be 
deprived of, and the law protected them against these types of authorizations.629 
With the 1892 legislation – limiting the hours women were allowed to 
work and banning night work – and the subsequent 1906 legislation – giving 
every worker the right to a full day on Sunday away from work – women found a 
legal foundation to fight for better working conditions. The reports generated by 
the investigations into the adherence of the 1906 labor law and the requests 
produced by the laundresses themselves for inspections of their workplace 
revealed that the blanchisseries were not havens of cleanliness and order for the 
laundresses who worked in them. The blanchisseries owners were reluctant to 
provide the rest day required by the 1906 law. Furthermore, the requests by the 
laundresses to inspect their workplace provide an insight into their lives and 
working conditions that was only gleaned en passant in earlier chapters. The 
historical sources from the Conseil d’Hygiène, Annales d’Hygiène, the 
correspondence with the Préfet de la Seine and Préfet de Police, navigation 
engineers and other government officials did not document the women’s thoughts 
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or opinions. It was only in the documents directly relating to working conditions 
that their voices could finally be heard and they became central actors in the story 
of laundry in Paris.   
Moreover, the reports from the laundry workers’ unions and the women 
themselves also highlighted a problem with the corrupted inspection system. 
However, when the Ministre du Commerce opened the investigation, the 
laundresses and their unions took the opportunity to denounce the practices of 
dishonest bosses and work inspectors. It was only in this industrial context – 
regulated by legislation – that laundresses found opportunities to protect 
themselves as workers, and that their agency came into the full view of historical 
records.                       
Lavoirs and the 1906 Law 
The lavoirs represented a special case for the law of 1906. The Syndicat 
des Blanchisseuses, Laveuses, et Repasseuses of Bercy wrote to the Ministre du 
Commerce protesting that there were two lavoirs open on Sunday in their 
neighborhood. They objected to the establishment being open and taking possible 
business away from their industry and also employing a small number of women 
to oversee the operations.630 The Ministre answered their query explaining that he 
“had accorded an exception in the quartiers populeux of certain areas that were 
used Sunday mornings by ouvrières who were working outside of the home the 
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rest of the week so they could do their family’s laundry.”631 He further explained 
that in these cases there were no professionals washing, and he had requested that 
the owners of the lavoirs provide hot water and supplies for the women who 
wanted to use the facilities. This exception was by no means open to 
blanchisseries that employed professional blanchisseuses.632  This case was also 
an example of the lavoirs being used by women who could not afford to send 
their family’s laundry out to a blanchisserie for washing. Instead they used their 
only day off to finish the household chores. 
There were also complications in the nomenclature of blanchisseries and 
lavoirs. Some lavoirs were large enough to accommodate small business owners 
who would use them to finish some of the laundering processes they were not able 
to complete in their own facilities. The question arose as to what laws these 
businesses needed to follow if they used another place of business to work in. The 
Fédération des Ouvrières et Ouvriers de Blanchissage of Chaville – which was in 
the Parisian agglomeration  – wrote to the inspector of industry to clarify the 
rights of the workers. The federation highlighted that everyone seemed to have 
their own rules as to what was legally acceptable for the workers since the small 
businesses could manage their practice themselves, although when everyone was 
working the businesses consisted of more than fifty laundresses. Indeed, they 
were working Sundays and national holidays, as if it were a lavoir open to the 
public and accessible for the ménagère doing her laundry, but employed only 
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professional blanchisseuses. The federation wrote that the case seemed abusive 
and was convinced that the work inspector could clarify the matter.633 The chief 
inspector responded by sending the area inspector to investigate the case, who 
found that the lavoirs-blanchisseries in question were indeed employing 
laundresses on Sunday. After interviewing the laundresses, he found that the 
owners had hid other laundresses as he was coming in. He gave a citation to the 
owners and suggested the continued scrutiny of the business.634 The unions 
attempted to standardize business practices so that one manager or owner could 
not compel his employees to work based on the practices of other establishments. 
Professional laundresses fought for their day of rest; it was the women doing 
laundry for their family that wanted the lavoirs open on Sundays because they 
worked the rest of the week.   
A blanchisserie in St. Maur-sur-Seine illustrated the complex enforcement 
of the 1906 legislation for businesses that also made use of hydraulic machines to 
power, in the case of the blanchisserie, the mechanical arm used to turn the 
clothes during the washing process. The work inspector caught four men working 
in the engine room of the blanchisserie on a Sunday morning and cited the owner 
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for non-compliance with the law of 1906.635 The owner answered the charge by 
stating that he didn’t think he had committed an infraction because they were 
fixing and marinating machines that could cause death or serious injury if not 
repaired in a timely manner.636 The Ministre confirmed the owner’s idea and 
wrote an exemption for the citation the inspector gave the owner, reminding the 
inspector that when it came to machines using pressure, their maintenance could 
be done legally on a Sunday.637  
Another case generated bad press, and the inspection service of industrial 
work felt compelled to defend its actions in the face of criticisms. The 
conservative newspaper l’Echo de Paris called into question the utility of a 
citation the work inspector issued against an owner of a blanchisserie.638 The 
article reported that a fire had broken out and destroyed already clean laundry 
ready to be delivered to his Parisian clientele. He claimed that spontaneously, his 
laundresses offered to help him in whatever way was possible. The newspaper 
recounted that “everyone was working when the terrible inspector came along. 
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The terrible inspector gave him a citation and the owner had to go in front of the 
judge for violating the rest day on a national holiday. The judge was so indignant 
at such a citation that he gave the owner the minimum sentence. Are we going to 
modify such a stupid law soon?”639 The tone of the article was clearly against the 
inspection service and the law of 1906 giving all workers the right to a rest day. 
Expectedly, the conservative newspaper positioned itself on the side of business.   
The owner’s wife provided another account of what transpired. The owner 
had left a gas lamp burning above a pile of laundry that was waiting to be ironed 
on the evening of 12 July 1909. The lamp fell and started a fire which burned a 
portion of the laundry valued at two thousand francs. Insurance covered this loss. 
The laundry not burned needed to be rewashed and whitened, and the laundresses 
the blanchisserie employed came back to do this work on 14 July. The inspector 
happened to be in the neighborhood to confirm that no blanchisserie was to open 
on the national holiday, upholding the law on the required rest day on holidays. 
The owner made the inspector aware of the fire and why the workers were there 
on a national holiday. The inspector wrote the citation anyway, not wanting others 
to think he was not impartial since he had already written citations to other 
blanchisseries that remained open on the holiday. The citation had no specific 
fine amount, leaving the judge free to give the lightest penalty he could.640 
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Predictably, the inspector, Monsieur Bris, gave another account of the 
story, reporting that he could see no damage from a fire and that the laundresses 
present behaved like it was a regular day and no emergency had transpired. The 
owner had attempted to hide the workers, but could not do so before the inspector 
saw them. He was separating the dirty laundry in the ironing room and wished to 
hide that fact – since it violated hygienic regulations. The situation was not at all 
what the newspaper described; the citation concerned the manipulation of dirty 
laundry in a room where clean laundry was processed. Furthermore, the 
inspector’s second citation concerned the failure to post that the owner had 
applied for an exemption; the business was entitled to a maximum of fifteen per 
year.641 
The division inspector decided the citation – that L’Echo de Paris had 
criticized – was completely justified and that the judge could not have been 
indignant about the citation because it was legally justified and irrelevant to the 
judgment. The inspection service may have been self-conscious about its role in 
possibly exaggerating, or worse, looking like it was uncaring in the face of a 
citizen’s hardship. Inspectors needed to justify their intentions and the process by 
which they generated citations.                                                                                       
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Solidarity among Laundry Workers and Strikes: 1907-1913 
In 1907, the newspaper L’Humanité – a newspaper founded in 1904 by 
Jean Jaurès, which became the newspaper of the French Communist Party in 
1920, reported on the working conditions of laundry workers under the heading 
“communication syndicale chez les laveuses.” The article indicated that the 
inspectors were still not enforcing the 1892 law limiting women’s hours. “The 
laveuses are deserving citizen women who are the most exploited of all; they are 
abandoned by the public powers…the labor law is violated everyday. In the lavoir 
du Quartier de Martire, the laveuses are forced to work after 6 pm without being 
paid.” 642 
In 1908, L’Humanité reported on the ongoing struggle for industry 
regulation by les Syndicat des Ouvrier and Ouvrière de Blanchisseurs of Paris. 
The delegation of workers wrote a report on the infractions to the law of 30 
March 1900 – which stipulated that there would be no night work in any industry 
– and presented it to the Ministre du Commerce. The delegation requested that no 
establishment be granted an exception. They pointed out that most blanchisseries 
did not observe the law of 1906 for a day of rest or the decree of April 1905 on 
the dangers of the manipulation of soiled linen. 643  
Expectedly, L’Humanité was one of the most sympathetic newspapers to 
the laundry workers’ cause in obtaining better working conditions.  The article 
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highlighted the dangers that the industrial blanchisseries and new machines 
presented to the women who were already exploited by their patron. The 
blanchisseuses needed regulation because in the industrial blanchisseries the 
patron paid them by the day which was officially 11 hours. If the laundress 
worked overtime, there was no system of remuneration for that. In contrast, 
people paid their laundresses who worked out of their home or in a lavoir by the 
piece. Laundry workers did not get overtime, and there was no separate shift at 
night like in mill work. They came in the morning and left when they finished the 
washing. Therefore, regulation was crucial for these women and men. The 
dangers the new industrial machines presented were due to a lack of regulations. 
There were few safety protocols; when they existed, the manager or owner 
ignored them because installing safety equipment or encouraging the laundresses 
to work more slowly cut into their profits. The drying machine that industrial 
blanchisseries utilized was notorious for burning and crushing the hands of the 
blanchisseuses who ran this machine. In an article entitled « Le Travail des 
blanchisseries, des mains broyeés et brulées », L’Humanité detailed the cases 
where the drying machine crushed and burned laundresses who could then no 
longer be able to work. In support of fellow workers, the newspaper shed light on 
this horrific situation that exemplified the callousness with which the patron 
treated their workers. This article was also a rallying cry to the workers not yet 
syndicated. The article reported that “an ouvrière had both of her hands destroyed 
by a machine that dries with steam. It is the ninth accident that has come in four 
years at this factory. The comrades have declared that the work in a blanchisserie 
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is dangerous and rough. The ouvrières from the large factories of blanchisseries 
are exposed to brutal accidents caused by the machines.” 644 
 The labor laws forbidding night work for women necessitated men 
working in the blanchisseries. The large blanchisserie took care of table and body 
linen as well as linens from hotels, cafes, salons, and hairdressers, as well as the 
aprons and overcoats from slaughter houses. The men worked from six in the 
evening to six in the morning boiling laundry in a couleur and earned forty francs 
per week. From there, the linen went to the barbottes , a cauldron with a 
mechanical agitator, where it is washed. The men who work at the barbottes were 
soaked constantly from head to toe, like the women had been in the lavoirs.  They 
did not have special clothes for this work; neither did they have other clothes to 
change into, explaining the high mortality rate among blanchisseurs hospitalized 
in Laënec, a public hospital that served the Paris region which was dedicated to 
lung ailments. The tuberculosis rate among blanchisseurs was around 75 
percent.645 The essoreuses (drying women) sorted the linen and dried it. They fed 
the clothing through two metal ringers that were heated by steam to 80 to 100 
Celsius. The workers were grouped around the machines by teams of six. One 
would get the wet linen out of the washing baskets, beat it and shake it to separate 
it. At the same time, the worker would throw it onto a platform where the other 
workers pushed the linen through fast spinning cylinders; the linen went through 
the machine very quickly, and workers caught it on the other side. This machine 
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presented a real danger, as there was no protection between the spinning cylinders 
and the workers’ hands.  The article conveyed the horror of the accidents that 
have happened because of this machine. 
A second of weakness, distraction, or inattention – who would not have any of 
those things after long hours of working while standing – and next thing you 
know the hand becomes trapped, pulled through, broken and burned. Such 
accidents are extremely frequent; the details that were told to us by numerous 
ouvriers and ouvrières are tragic. At the blanchisserie of Grenelle, a 16 year-old 
girl puts a piece of cloth in the sécheuse, the piece of linen does not feed through 
and she tries to get it out of the machine. Her hand is taken, the girl screams and 
a woman comes to her rescue. One tries to stop the machine; it took 8 minutes to 
get her away from the machine. Taken by pain, screaming, wanting to disengage 
her right hand, she pushes her left hand against the hot cylinders; a man had to 
hold her back while another got her left arm away from the machine. Feb. 16 at 
13:15 a similar incident happened at Blanchisserie de la Seine.  When her hand 
got caught, a 25-year-old woman let out a scream of pain so atrocious that some 
women ran away. Other women came quickly and rushed to the devices that 
controlled the sécheuse. It took 7 minutes for the machine to stop. When the 
cylinders stopped moving it did not mean they stopped squeezing. It took metal 
bars to pull the two cylinders apart to relieve the pressure. It took four men to 
accomplish this task and release the hand. Not only her hand, but her forearm 
until her elbow was crushed, burned and flattened like a piece of paper. During 
her panic, in shock and in pain, she had pushed her other hand against the 
machine resulting in her arm being burned to the bone. One had to cover her head 
so she could not see her arms. 646 
 
The problems did not end there for the blanchisseuses who became injured. The 
largest disability pension given was 200 francs. The articles sarcastically 
indicated that, in searching for the best way to compensate someone who was 
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crippled for life, the patron settled on two hundred francs. While the employer 
may have welcomed her back after her recovery, he would have found a pretext to 
fire her. The article called for more comprehensive protection for these women, 
starting with building new safety guards in front of the steam rollers. According to 
the report, the syndicates needed to intervene and lobby for the protection of 
work. Many of the ouvriers and ouvrières explained that “in large blanchisserie 
they would suspend the worker who does not do a good job drying a piece of 
linen through the rollers from one to four days. You can now understand why the 
16 year-old ouvrière cited above risked destroying her hand to catch a serviette 
that was not engaged in the rollers correctly. Four days of suspension, what a 
reduction in salary for the week.” 647 The minimum age to work in industry was 
sixteen, which was also the age one could leave school.  
 L’Humanité reported that some blanchisseuses had begun to strike against 
the patrons when they did not meet the demands for higher wages put forth by the 
laundresses in a meeting at the bourse du travail. Even in places that seemed 
hostile to organizing workers, the blanchisseuses were receptive and were willing 
to strike when necessary. The article illustrated the solidarity of the 
blanchisseuses as they left the meeting. On the way out, they all began to sing 
L’Internationale, the song commonly used by the unions to raise morale. In 1911, 
the monthly journal La Vie Ouvrière published an article detailing a major strike 
formed by the laundresses of Chaville who worked in the blanchisseries. The 
patrons of blanchisseries wanted to raise their prices, but before the new prices 
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took effect for the customers, they wanted to take the price increase out of the 
worker’s salaries. The patrons had started their own syndicate to protect their 
interests and sought to standardize their prices to protect themselves against each 
other because they constantly undercut each other. The article indicated that 
syndicates were supposed to bring about better conditions for all workers. 
However, the patrons only organized to protect themselves; they did not care to 
improve the working conditions of their employees or encourage them to organize 
themselves. The workers prepared a list of claims to submit to the patrons. The 
workers listed their grievances, which were not unlike the other grievances 
examined in this chapter. They sought to remedy 648 
the unhappiness of the ouvrière caused by their cost of living, the rise in housing prices, 
and the lack of application of the workers laws in relation to hygiene, protection of labor 
and to the limits of the work day and to the weekly breaks, abuse of the patron, the 
insufficient salaries, and the formation of new syndicat patronal, the insults from the 
patrons to the workers have pushed the personnel of the industry of blanchissage to 
regroup itself to claim their rights. 
The blanchisseuses who began their day at six in the morning and often ended 
around eight or nine at night, earned between twenty five and thirty centimes an 
hours plus a few extras like a glass of wine, coffee, or liquor, they asked for forty 
centimes an hour minimum. The memoranda from the syndicate of patrons 
indicate they were not willing to work with the demands of their workers. The 
owners warned that this was only the beginning; if they gave in to their 
employees’ demands they would not be able to turn a profit anymore. However 
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they could not stem the tide that had already started, and recognized that if they 
wanted to avoid a strike and more loss of profit they had to grant the laundresses 
thirty-five centimes an hour, not the forty that they had originally asked for. The 
owners also threaten that if anyone asked for more they would be fired 
immediately.649 
Yet, those concessions came at the detriment of other perks the workers 
enjoyed. The blanchisseuses would no longer get their break with the customary 
coffee or liquor. The article argued that the concessions were merely a trick. “By 
posting the propaganda, the patron wanted to trick their workers by giving the 
blanchisseuses a paid salary. The other workers believed that the women would 
lead to the death of the strike, but they were definitely mistaken.”650 The women 
did not break the strike.                                  
Conclusion  
This chapter described how industrial blanchisseries changed working 
conditions for women which helped form a consciousness of themselves as 
workers and led to them working for better conditions. Working together in an 
establishment, under a manager, provided the atmosphere for the women to 
realize that they had common problems and that they could join together to solve 
those problems through unions and strikes. In many instances, it was less safe to 
work in the blanchisseries, which used machines that had no safety guidelines or 
protection, than in the lavoirs or in the clandestine laundry boutiques. The lavoirs 
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were not as conducive to women forming unions and striking. The women 
working in lavoirs were entrepreneurs and had no comrades to join with and no 
boss to fight against. They made their own hours and negotiated their pay. 
Moreover, the blanchisseries were not the hygienic utopias that the Conseil 
d’Hygiène and Annales d’Hygiène had asserted. The investigations into the 
adherence of the 1905 law illustrated that these industrial establishments had not 
integrated the measures the law prescribed. The laundresses working in the 
blanchisseries were exposed to the same possible contamination and had to 
endure unsafe machines and bosses who wanted them to work over the legal 
hours. It was these very conditions that provided laundry workers with the 
impetus to fight for better working conditions. The 1906 law on a weekly rest day 
represented a platform for the laundresses to protect themselves. While the other 
chapters of this dissertations focused on public policy and examined how it 
influenced the laundry business which affected the laundresses, this chapter 




   
 




 At the urging of the Conseil d’Hygiène, the government had passed the 
law of 1902 requiring the disinfection of laundry that came from homes infected 
with contagious illnesses, as well as the law of 1905 prescribing hygienic methods 
for handling dirty laundry in blanchisseries. By 1910, the Préfet de la Seine had 
effectively rid Paris of the bateaux-lavoirs, and the city had finished building the 
sewer system, which enabled lavoirs to drain used water. The only laundry 
facilities the city administration did not control were the clandestine laundry 
boutiques which the Conseil d’Hygiène admitted were nearly impossible to 
regulate because their owners could hide the business easily.651 From 1914, the 
Conseil d’Hygiène and the Annales d’Hygiène, as well as the Préfet de la Seine 
turned their attention away from laundry issues within Paris. 
 Although the Annales d’Hygiène still published articles about laundry, the 
First World War focused attention on laundry problems in battle; the emphasis 
was on cleaning soldiers’ clothes on the front lines and making bandages sterile. 
A 1915 article in the Annales d’Hygiène proposed new types of mobile machines 
that could both heat water and agitate the clothes, which the Germans had already 
begun using.652 With a team of twenty men, the machines could wash 2,000 
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uniforms in twenty-four hours. The article expressed the need for the French 
military to develop a similar system that would effectively clean soldier’s clothes 
on the front lines. 653 Another article from the same edition of the Annales 
d’Hygiène reported that ironing bandages was an effective method for 
sterilization.654 The ironing had to be carried out as laundresses had customarily 
done it, with the bandage lightly humidified and with an iron heated to 50c. This 
practice followed the principle of sterilization in a humid environment with heat. 
After the First World War, advances in the technology of washing machines also 
emerged. 
 The introduction of the washing machine into the home was a slow 
process. The first washing machines for the home appeared on the market in 
France at the Salon des Arts Ménagers in 1923.655 The manufacturers marketed 
the machines as time-saving devices for working women who did not have time to 
do laundry in the traditional way that took days for every step. Yet, the machines 
were bulky, expensive, and did not clean clothes as well as the blanchisseries.656  
In 1934, washing machines with a motor for agitation and spinning cost 3,601F. A 
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skilled worker – plumber, tailor, carpenter – with an hourly salary of 6.34F, 
working 40 hours a week, would need to work between nine and fifteen weeks to 
earn enough to buy a washing machine.657 However, the Great Depression 
affected the stability of work; the material deprivation during the Second World 
War meant that most people still did not have washing machines in the 1950s. 
Moreover, only 58 percent of lodging around Paris had running water available in 
the interior of lodgings in 1954; this number increased to 91 percent by 1968. The 
infrastructure for electricity also had to be widespread before washing machines 
could be introduced into the home. It was only in 1962 that the national electric 
company Electricité de France succeeded in equipping the majority of private 
dwellings with electric power. Until that time, many women used the planche à 
laver – a washing board – usable anywhere there was running water. The washing 
machine was not present in the majority of private dwellings until 1964, when 41 
percent reported they had a motorized washing machine. Yet, the national 
statistics hid regional differences; in the Paris region 58 percent reported having a 
washing machine compared to 79 percent in the north of France. The more 
industrialized region used private machines at a great frequency because more 
women worked outside of the home so the family purchased time-saving devices 
at higher rates. In Histoire de la machine à laver, Quynh Delaunay argues that the 
Parisians’ habit to use blanchisseries represents another factor limiting the 
presence of washing machines in the home. 
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The Influence of Representations 
This dissertation has shown that the influence of representations that 
portrayed laundresses in negative ways had a negligible effect on how the Conseil 
de Salubrité, Conseil d’Hygiène and Préfets de la Seine regulated the laundry 
business and treated laundresses. The sexualized images of laundresses Zola 
presented in L’Assommoir or in Degas’s paintings, nor did the statistical analysis 
published by the Paris Chamber of Commerce motivate city administrators to take 
action against the laundry industry or laundresses. The concern about laundry was 
not due to laundresses being outside gender norms. Instead, the Préfet de la Seine 
was concerned with modernizing Paris and creating an aesthetic appeal to the city.  
The Conseil de Salubrité and Conseil d’Hygiène wanted to eliminate epidemics.  
 The statistical analysis published by the chamber of commerce in 1853 
portrayed laundresses as being prone to immorality brought on by the conditions 
in which they worked.658 The study asserted that women who were not subjected 
to a patriarchal structure in their working environment experienced a negative 
effect on their morality. The Statistique listed laundresses as being part of 
industry, which meant that they engaged in entrepreneurial and not only 
productive activity as “an individual making goods to order for bourgeois 
clientele.”659 Scott asserts that this was a political and statistical solution to the 
problem of Paris being overrun by workers, although it would have been more 
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accurate to call them workers since essentially they were selling their labor and 
not necessarily goods.660 In their work, laundresses were self-managed. In the 
terms of social commentators this could be dangerous for their morality because 
they had no male oversight; yet, to city administrators this did not matter in terms 
of regulations. The Statistique claimed that laundresses were also in danger of 
being immoral because “those who launder receive a glass of eau-de-vie [on their 
break] and would be led into drinking too much.”661 The passage did not indicate 
who would provide the liquor although it was customary for the owner to furnish 
the drink for their break as a bonus to their salary; yet they were faulted for 
having the moral laxity of becoming drunk. The laundresses’ reputation for 
drinking and being independent put them outside of acceptable gender behavior 
and influenced the treatment of the places they worked in by the Conseil 
d’Hygiène and the Préfet de la Seine. The women were undesirable therefore the 
places they worked were also.  
 The conditions laundresses worked in, in underclothes and consuming 
alcohol, disposed them to the judgment of bourgeois social commentators who 
had little influence over the motivations of the Préfets de la Seine. Photographs 
from the time revealed laundresses dressed only in chemises and corsets and in 
underskirts.662 To wash laundry the women would strip down to their bodices 
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(undergarments) or simply wear a cloth with a hole cut out for the head and tied 
under the arms. The naturalist author Emile Zola represented laundresses in a 
sexualized way. He reflected the discourse about working women’s immorality 
from social commentators. However, his depiction remained relegated to the 
fictional world. The city administration did not restrict laundresses based on his 
representation of them. He planned the cycle of the Rougon-Macquart family in 
1869. He had trouble publishing the novel because of its content, some thought it 
was nothing more than pornography, and serialized it in 1875 before publishing it 
in 1877.663  Being influenced by ideas of naturalism, Zola aimed to create a novel 
that painted a true picture of a laundress’s life. However, historians must also take 
into account that he wrote with a bourgeois lens through which he interpreted 
what he witnessed in the neighborhoods he visited to gather information for his 
novel. While the novel aimed to be “the first novel about the common people that 
[did] not lie” he could not escape his bourgeois-male worldview.664    
 Laundresses’ working uniform gave the impression that they were 
immodest, and sexually available, which did not affect their treatment in terms of 
legislation against them. Further, working-class women were not always 
interested in meeting bourgeois standards of behavior because they simply could 
not when it interfered with their work. Gender standards of the time placed a high 
value on modesty, which was a sign of morality. Laundresses were therefore 
outside the acceptable gender norms. Set during the Second Empire, Zola’s 
                                                 
663 Robert Lethbridge, introduction to L’Assommoir, trans. Margret Mauldon 
(1877, Oxford : Oxford University Press, reprint, 1995), v. 
 
664 Lethbridge, introduction to L’Assommoir, vii.  
  283 
L’Assommoir, the only novel wholly dedicated to the story of a laundresses’ life, 
depicted the struggles the main character Gervaise endured trying to adhere to 
gender prescriptions while being a laundress and working class. Intent on making 
the novel colorful, Zola did not hesitate to portray sexually charged scenes that 
tempted men when they passed Gervaise’s workshop. The temperatures in lavoirs 
and bateaux-lavoirs could reach 50c with the stoves to heat irons and the boiling 
water to wash laundry. In these conditions laundresses would be tempted to take 
off their over clothes. In the following example, L’Assommoir echoed the 
women’s propensity to wear only a chemise, a thin shirt that went under the 
bodice. Gervaise had fired up the stove for ten irons. “My goodness…We’re 
going to melt away today! Makes you want to take off your chemise!...[the 
woman was] in her white underskirt, with her sleeves rolled up and her bodice 
slipping off her shoulders, her arms and neck bare…”665 An ironer, more 
concerned with the image she portrayed to anyone passing the shop had not taken 
her coat off and exclaimed: “Oh no Mademoiselle Clémence, put your bodice on 
again! While you’re about it, why not show off everything you’ve got. There’s 
already three men stopped across on the other side.” Clémence was not 
embarrassed and retorted: “This is mine, after all, ain’t it?” Gervaise interceded 
and asked the girl to put her bodice on again because “People’ll take my shop for 
something it’s not.” 666 In this scene Clémence is fully aware that her behavior 
could be taken as immodest and possibly immoral. Yet, she was unconcerned with 
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the connotations of being half dressed because she was suffering in the heat of the 
workshop. She was in control of the scene and her sexuality. Clémence also 
reflected many working women’s attitudes towards society’s rules regarding 
proper behavior. While she was working she did not care about rules regarding 
modesty because they hindered her. In a latter scene, Gervaise’s former lover is 
watching her, making his sexual observations discreetly when she is focused on 
her work. The latter scene made her an object of desire, putting the observer in 
control of her sexuality. “Clémence was leaning heavily over the work table, her 
wrists turned inwards. Her elbows held high and wide apart, her neck bent with 
the effort she was making, and all of her bare flesh seemed to swell, her shoulders 
lifting rhythmically as the muscles under her fine skin slowly pulsated, while her 
breasts, damp with sweat, bulged in the rosy shadows of her gaping bodice. So 
then [Lantier] reached down with his hands, wanting to touch.” 667 The passages 
reflect how Zola, as a bourgeois male, portrayed the laundresses being half-
clothed in public. Although it reflected their working conditions, he did not 
hesitate to sexualize the situations. It was a titillating experience to see 
laundresses at work, immodest in public, akin to seeing a prostitute walking the 
streets. This was his fictionalized idea of their world and did not reflect the 
concerns of the Préfet de Police or the Préfet de la Seine.  
 Other novels written by Zola used laundresses to depict sexually available 
women. While he only wrote about them en passant, the eroticized theme was 
similar throughout. In Zola’s Une Page d’Amour, the leading male character 
                                                 
667 Ibid,. 147.  
  285 
asked his friend if he had dreamt of seducing his blanchisseuse.668 In La Fortune 
des Rougon, a man cheated on his wife with a laundress.669 Bourgeois men also 
thought of women of lower class status as being sexually available, which may 
have contributed to Zola depicting laundresses that way.670  
 The fact that laundresses had access to private information about other 
people through their dirty laundry also placed them outside of gender norms; 
information was power. Having power over their customers, including men, 
signified they were no longer dependent to the patriarchal structure. Zola 
recounted a scene in the laundry boutique as the women sorted through their 
customer’s laundry, readying it for washing. They surmised the customer’s “… 
fortunes of their beds, cracking jokes about every hole or stain they came across.” 
The state of the laundry communicated what customer’s had used it for and could 
also communicate wealth or poverty and their private habits. 671  
Those table napkins belonged to the Goujets; you could see with half an eye that 
they’d never been used to wipe the bottom of a saucepan. The pillowcase was 
undoubtedly the Boches’, because of the pomade Madame Boche plastered all 
her linen with. And she knew other details, very personal things about how clean 
everyone was, about what was underneath the silk skirts that neighborhood 
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women wore out in the street, about the number of stockings, of handkerchiefs, 
of shirts people got dirty in a week. So she had masses of stories too tell. Every 
time they sorted the laundry in the shop, they undressed the entire neighborhood 
of the Goutte-d’Or in this way. 
Laundresses were outside of the social order the bourgeoisie sough to create and 
maintain. 
 Several paintings from 1860 to 1885 also depicted laundresses in a 
sexualized manner, though not all. Honoré Daumier’s The Laundress stands out 
from others as being one that represented a laundress in a respectable light. The 
painting shows a laundress walking up the steps from a river carrying a load of 
washing. She is holding a little girl’s hand, probably her daughter, while the little 
girl holds a paddle used to wash laundry. In the painting, the laundress is not in 
her underskirts and chemise, in water, or drinking, which is the way other artists 
painted them. She is a respectable mother with her daughter who has engaged in 
respectable work. There are no overtones of sexual availability, or immodesty. 
Daumier was an ardent supporter of the working class and sought to bring to light 
the desperate lives of the poor during the July Monarchy when society the poor 
bore sole responsibility for their condition.672 His attitude may have influenced his 
sensitive portrayal of a woman who worked outside of the home for wages.  
 In contrast, the many images Edgar Degas painted of laundresses are 
eroticized or have overtones of bad behavior. However this had no bearing on 
how the city administration regulated the business. Coming from a bourgeois 
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family, his background possibly influenced how he represented working 
women.673 Degas echoed some of the presumptions about laundresses as available 
and having little morality. His interest in laundresses and ballet dancers came 
from their work, as it demanded movement and interesting postures. The two 
professions also were associated with prostitution. Judith Hanna points out that 
“middle and upper-class men’s leisure was sustained and enlivened by working 
women.” 674  Degas in particular connected the working ballerina and prostitute.675 
The working environments of both types of women contributed to their reputation 
as being engaged in prostitution. Dancers had to rely on men to keep them 
because dancing did not pay very much. The public associated laundresses with 
prostitution because some women were day laborers who were in public looking 
for work. Degas once declared to his friend: “everything is beautiful in the world 
of people. But one Paris laundry girl, with bare arms, is worth it all for such a 
pronounced Parisian as I am.”676 This quote indicated the excitement and pleasure 
Degas took from seeing a woman engaged in laundry work. In 1869, he painted 
La Repasseuse, portraying the woman with half-open languid eyes and a slightly 
open mouth. The pose is inviting the viewer in, not looking modestly away so the 
viewer remains as an onlooker. The painting also ignores the hard labor that 
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ironing was, heating a stove and pushing an object that weighed three to four kilos 
over and over, while not burning the linen. Degas painted Les Repasseuses in 
1884. In his portrayal of a group of women ironing, one is taking a rest with a 
bottle of wine or spirits, echoing the idea that they drank too much and had 
questionable morality because of it. While not every painting of laundresses 
Degas completed had sexual or immoral overtones, he did echo the ideas of a 
bourgeois mentality that these women were immodest or immoral.  The 
representations of laundress in Zola and Degas’s work reflected more about the 
bourgeois idea of the occupation than reality. The Préfet de la Seine and the 
Conseil d’Hygiène based their regulations on their ideas about acceptable uses of 
urban space and hygiene and not on popular representations of laundresses. 
Modernization and Medicalization 
This dissertation has demonstrated that the forces of modernization and 
medicalization (hygiene) replaced women’s savoir-faire and made laundry the 
domain of public policy and medical knowledge, just as the washing machine 
replaced women’s knowledge of laundry with the need for technical/mechanical 
knowledge. The washing machine symbolizes the key relationship between 
laundry and Paris over the nineteenth century, that of modernization and hygiene. 
Kristin Ross connected the mass introduction of the washing machine into private 
homes in the 1960s with the drive to cleanse society and remake the old as new in 
a redemptive hygiene.677 Ross asserts that the drive toward privatization, on the 
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individual level the withdrawal of the middle class into their domestic interiors, 
was part of the modernization of French culture.678 The middle-class woman 
would no longer have to share personal information through her laundry with 
either household staff or, in a more public setting, a laundress. She now had the 
choice not to wash dirty laundry in public. Ross equated the inclination for new 
levels of hygiene with the modernization of society. As the French compared 
themselves with Americans, who were the ultimate symbols of modernity after 
the Second World War, they sought to emulate their hygiene practices. Washing 
clothes was something that was difficult to do before the improvements in water 
and electric services. During the 1960s with the washing machine, French women 
could attain the modern cleanliness standards of American women.  
Modernization also meant that women would have to contend with 
machines they knew little about. In a 1954 advertisement in Elle for the Hoover 
washing machine, a woman declares that the company sends out a service-man 
regularly to verify and maintain her washing machine. While attempting to create 
the image of an easy-to-use machine, the advertisement also implies that the 
woman has no idea how the machine functions and is totally dependent upon a 
service-man’s knowledge. Washing clothes no longer involved “a commonsense 
response or the vague memory of how one’s grandmother performed the task - 
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experts must be consulted…”679 Similarly, Delaunay claims that during the 
nineteenth century the technical aspects of urban laundering stripped the city of its 
mythic representations; the dislocation of washing from its natural environment 
on the banks of streams to the city in lavoirs and the use of chemicals like 
chlorure de chaux and bleach submitted the process to regulations and business 
relationships at the expense of women and their ancient knowledge.680  
Modernization of urban space in Paris consisted of a re-conceptualization 
of the use of space beginning with Napoléon. As early as 1805, the government 
had banned women from using the river banks and the Seine within Paris, giving 
preference to boat traffic. During the July Monarchy, the Préfet de la Seine 
Rambuteau identified the circulation of goods and people as a major hurdle in the 
development of Paris and sought to redefine how the inhabitants used the space to 
make the city more prosperous. Movement was at the core of his new vision; the 
Seine was to be used as a thoroughfare as it flowed through Paris. Limiting the 
floating merchants and bateaux-lavoirs eased navigation in the same vein as 
Napoléon’s earlier regulations. Focusing on the maintenance of roads that had 
been used as social gathering points, Rambuteau also sought to change how the 
residents used the streets of the capital. In the case of laundry, roads had 
commonly been used as drainage for lavoirs and – for other businesses – general 
dumping grounds for refuse. New regulations called for the public way to be kept 
clean, and made it more difficult to launder in Paris. During the Second Empire, 
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Haussmann implemented the vision that Paris needed to function better in the way 
it moved goods and people. In his drive for modernization, there was no room for 
the bateaux-lavoirs. Haussmann ordered the phasing out of the laundry boats, 
which had been in existence since the 1600s, prioritizing a new use of the river in 
the city, specifically the transportation of municipally-run passenger boats.  
 The re-conceptualization of space to reflect modernity also included the 
aesthetic appeal of Paris as a capital city. As the national government shifted back 
to Paris and away from Versailles during the French Revolution, the city needed 
to reflect France’s importance on the European political stage. Napoléon began to 
remake Paris as a city to reflect national glory, building the Arc de Triomphe for 
example. In his 1823 pamphlet proposing to rid the city of bateaux-lavoirs, Lefort 
accused the bateaux of debasing the beauty and greatness of Paris. In 
Haussmann’s bid to get the bateaux-lavoirs out of Paris, he accused them of being 
disgraceful. Today, the consequences of this modernization through the exclusion 
of laundry from the city can be seen in the prohibition, in apartment buildings, to 
hang one’s laundry in the windows or balconies where it is visible. The mayor of 
Reillanne, a small town in the south of France, recently forbade any resident to 
hang their laundry outside because, in his words, “the village is beautiful but 
dirty, and I want to restore order. I consider hanging laundry a visual nuisance.”681 
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The resident that legally opposed him answered that he thought the mayor wanted 
the village to look like “a village of Parisians.” 682 
 The medicalization of laundering progressively joined with modernization 
in a dialectical relationship. I argue that modernization was often thought of, and 
carried out through, a program of medicalization; in some cases the medical 
became the modern. As the city sought to modernize, medical explanations 
supported the idea that laundering did not fit in urban space. Moreover, the 
medicalization of laundry in terms of hygiene shifted the expertise about 
laundering from women to the medical domain. Laundering was part of women’s 
knowledge passed on from generation to generation. Women used household 
products like ashes or urine to bleach the laundry. When the Préfet de Police 
classified laundry businesses in 1815, they came under the supervision of the 
Conseil de Salubrité, which, from that point, decided how and where laundering 
would be done. Laundering became a medical issue. 
  The Conseil de Salubrité focused its attention on laundry for two reasons: 
first as a result of the waste water accumulated from washing; later as a potential 
source of disease transmission. Hence, the Parisian sewer system exemplified the 
convergence of medical issues and modernization of the city. Before the 
completion of the sewer system at the end of the century, the Conseil considered 
waste water from laundry as a dangerous nuisance. In the 1820s and 1830s, as 
new ideas about the acceptability of certain odors became current, the waste water 
would build up around the lavoirs and emit foul odors that disturbed urban 
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space.683  The Conseil granted permission to establish laundry facilities in Paris 
only when the owner committed to building underground canals that would direct 
waste water to the few existing sewer lines. This process was a costly requirement 
for a business that was not extremely profitable, and laundry facilities often did 
not meet the requirements set forth by the Conseil de Salubrité to exist in urban 
space. The development of the sewer system was also an issue of modernizing 
Paris. In his memoir, Haussmann’s engineer Eugène Belgrand declared that “Paris 
became the cleanest capital in the world, after having been the foulest.”684 To 
prove that Paris was a modern capital, it had to compete with cities like London 
who had a functioning sewer system by the beginning of the nineteenth century.  
The Third Republic’s reliance upon medical explanations for France’s 
perceived national degeneration presented another occasion to medicalize 
laundering.685 The Annales d’Hygiène and the Conseil d’Hygiène articulated the 
idea that laundry could transmit contagious diseases like tuberculosis and 
diphtheria, which reached epidemic proportions. Physicians pointed to laundering 
practices, such as mixing the clothes of the healthy and sick, as one source of 
transmission, whereas chemists debated the idea that contaminated laundry could 
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infect the Seine by transmitting dangerous microbes to the waters that people still 
used as drinking water in the 1880s. The Conseil used the latter argument against 
the remaining bateaux-lavoirs in Paris. The Conseil and Annales d’Hygiène 
proposed a series of standards by which laundering should be done, moving 
knowledge from the women’s domain to the medical domain. The government 
made the proposed standards for laundry washing and handling into laws and 
effectively changed the occupation of laundry. The new regulations favored the 
blanchisseries, industrial facilities, that the Conseil asserted could maintain 
hygiene standards and prevent the transmission of microbes. However, the 
blanchisseries rarely implemented the regulations, and laundresses worked in 
worse health and safety conditions than the lavoirs or bateaux-lavoirs that were at 
the center of the debate on microbes.  
 Yet, the medicalization of laundry and the connection to modernization 
through hygiene persists to this day. Advertising still associates laundry with the 
medical sphere. The widespread introduction of the washing machines and other 
household appliances after the Second World War ushered in the idea that 
housewives were responsible for maintaining a home not only clean to the eye, 
but hygienic as well.686 The idea of germs in laundry and their ability to infect the 
person wearing the clothes remains current. The advertisement for the laundry 
detergent Vanish Oxi Action Extra Hygiène claims that it “eliminates 99.9 percent 
of bacteria.”687 Although the pink packaging and advertisement still target 
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women, the technical expertise rests with the detergent and the scientists who 
formulated it. The women consumers only have to read a label, removing the need 
to have any technical knowledge of the product. Through modernization and 
medicalization, laundry can be sanitized to meet evolving hygiene standards and 
no longer has to be done in public space.  
                                                                                                                                     
687 Retrieved 5.24.11, http://www.vanish.fr/product.php?id=5. 
  296 
REFERENCES 
ARCHIVES NATIONALES  
 
F1  – Ministère de l’intérieur – objets généraux 
 F1A66 18 Navigation. Rivières flottables et navigables, 1820-1856. 
 
F7  – Police Générale - Grèves 
 F7 6883 Dossier général. Grève sous la restauration. 
 F7 12165 Dossier général. Grève sous le Second Empire. 
 F7 12527 Dossiers particuliers. 
 F7 12528-12534 Grèves, 1906-1908. 
 F7 12535 Dossiers particuliers. 
 F7 12643 Dossiers particuliers. 
 F7 12773-12792 Dossier général. Grève sous la IIIe République.  
 F7 12784 Grèves, 1905. 
 F7 12787-12790 Grèves, 1908. 
 F7 12891 Dossiers particuliers. 
 F7 12912-12919 Dossier général. Grève sous la IIIe République. 
 F7 12949 Dossiers particuliers. 
 F7 13064 Dossiers particuliers. 
 F7 13310 Dossiers particuliers. 
 F7 13327-13329 Grève générale de 1912. 
 F7 13568- 13618 Bourses du travail et unions de syndicats, 1891-1924. 
 F7 13570 Grève générale de 1909. 
 F7 13581-13583 Dossier général. Grève sous la IIIe République. 
 F7 13696 Dossiers particuliers. 
 F7 13762 Dossiers particuliers. 
 F7 13833-13836 Syndicalisation 
 F7 13838-13935 Dossier général. Grève sous la IIIe République. 
 F7 13933-13935 Grève générale, 1898-1936. 
 F7 14605 Dossiers particuliers. 
 F7 14778-14974 Dossier général. Grève sous la IIIe République. 
 F7 15168 Abyssinie 
  
F8  – Police Sanitaire 
 F8 77 An II – 1820. 
 F8 93 Etablissements insalubres, 1811-1869. 
 F8 95 Etablissements insalubres, 1791-1820. 
 F8 168 Conseil d’Hygiène : circulaires, 1890-1905. 
 F8 169 Conseil d’Hygiène et de Salubrité et exécution de la circulaire. 
 F8 170 Conseil d’Hygiène et de Salubrité : affaires diverses, 1849-1902. 
 F8 171-172 Etablissement du Conseil de Salubrité. 
 F8 173 Comptes-rendus de la Commission d’Hygiène. 
 F8 174 Anciens conseils de salubrité, 1828-1848. 
  297 
 F8 175 Seine, 1844-1849. 
 F8 176 Etablissements dangereux, incommodes, 1811-1897. 
 F8 208 Commission de l’assainissement de Paris. 
 F8 209 Assainissement de la Seine 
 
F17 – Instruction Publique 
 F17 28-29 Livre du blanchissage de l’Opéra, An XII. 
 
F21 – Bâtiments Civils 
 F21 1347 Bains et lavoirs publics, 1853-1865. 
 
F22 – Travail et Sécurité Sociale 
 F22 167 Brèves, 1905-1906. 
 F22 362 Blanchisserie. 
 F22 409 Journée de huit heures, 1919-1936. 




ARCHIVES DE LA PREFECTURE DE POLICE  
 
 D/A 35-36 Conseil d’Hygiène et de salubrité. 
 D/A 38 Conseil d’Hygiène et de salubrité. 
 D/A 46 Etablissements. Lavoirs et Bains Napoléon.  
 D/A 63 Conseil d’Hygiène et de salubrité, 1874-1878. 
 D/A 231 Mœurs, An II-1861. 
 D/A 336-337 Navigation. Bateaux lavoirs. 
 D/A 408 Carnaval.  
 D/A 417 Conseil d’Hygiène et de salubrité. 
 D/B 58-59 Carnaval Mi-Carême. 
 D/B 109 Bièvre. 
 D/B 133-139 Etablissements classés. 
 D/B 226 Blanchisseries. 
 D/B 440 Hygiène Publique. Manipulation du linge sale. 
 D/B 460 Hygiène. Commissions crées en 1831. 
 D/B 609 Fonctionnaires. Grèves.  
 D/B 605 Grèves. 
 D/B 1065-1066 Grèves. 
 D/B1077 Grèves. 
 
 
ARCHIVES DE PARIS  
 
5M Santé Publique et Hygiène. Etat sommaire, 1966. 
1070W2/236 Syndicat National des maîtres laveurs blanchisseurs, 1886-1972. 
  298 
1070W22/1168 Union des ouvriers et ouvrières à la journée de l’assistante 
publique. 
1070W23/1975 Syndicat des journaliers non-professionnels et l’assistance 
publique, 31 août 1904. 
1070W22/1763 Syndicat Général des buandiers, buandières et lingères de 
l’assistance publique, 22 août 1902. 
1070/W25/1168 Association amicale des ouvriers buandiers de l’assistance 
publique, 18 mai 1907. 
1070/W25/2300 Association amicale des ouvriers buandiers de l’assistance 
publique. 
1070/W35/3695 Syndicat national artisanal des blanchisseurs et blanchisseuses  
teinturiers, 14 mars 1921. 
1070/W53/6977 Syndicat général des blanchisseurs de gros et fins de la région  
parisienne,1936 -1972.   
1070/W54/7287 Chambre syndicale des laveurs, nettoyeurs, et des femmes de 
ménage. Région parisienne, 24 décembre.  
DO3/28 Lavoirs et bains publiques. Bercy, 1854. 
DO9/1 Autorisation de la police pour les établissements insalubres. Auteuil, St- 
Denis.1855.  
DO9/5 Salubrité, hygiène. Batignolles, 1822-1859. 
DO9/10 Salubrité publique. Belleville, 1829-1856. 
DO9/10 Buanderies, lavoirs. 3e classe d’établissements insalubres, 1855-1857. 
DO9/14 Etablissements insalubres : ouvertures, enquêtes, arrêtés relatifs à la 
salubrité publique. Bercy, 1850-1858. 
DO9/18 Etablissements insalubres, 1815-1859. La Chapelle. Arrêtés sur la voie 
publique, 1817-1859. 
DO9/18 Etablissements insalubres. La Chapelle, 1846-1857. Demandes 
d’établissement de lavoirs publics, 1846, 1856, 1857. Usage d’une chaudière à 
vapeur, 1855.  
DO9/21 Etablissements insalubres. Charonne, 1822-1857. Demande pour 
autorisation de lavoirs publics, usage de chaudière à vapeur. 
DO9/23 Etablissements insalubres. Grenelle, 1822-1839. Hygiène et salubrité : 
curage des mares de la commune, 1832. 
DO9/29 Fontaines publiques. Montmartre, 1809-1857. 
DO9/31 Etablissements insalubres. Salubrité publique. Passy, 1829-1858. Arrêtés 
du Maire. Interdiction de se baigner dans la Seine, 1857. Demandes 
d’établissement de buanderies, 1829. Expédition sur buanderies, 1844. 
Exploitation d’un lavoir public, 1855. Enquête buanderie, 1856. Lavoirs publics, 
1856-1858.  
DO9/34 Etablissements insalubres. Bureau de Bienfaisance. Passy, 1809-1858. 
DO9/37 Etablissements insalubres. Vaugirard, 1809-1841. Commission de 
Salubrité : mares, égouts, fossés, 1831. Etablissement de buanderies. 
DO9/42. Etablissements insalubres, lavoirs publics. La Villette, 1834-1859. 
DO9/43. Etablissements insalubres, La Villette, 1843-1859. 
  299 
DM5/5 Dossier. Enquête sur les lavoirs des communes de l’arrondissement de 
Sceaux, 1828.  
DM5/11 Salubrité. Arrondissement de Sceaux. Travaux sur une fontaine et un 
lavoir dans la commune de Fontenay-aux-Roses, 1831. 
DM 8 Commerce 
DM 9 Industrie 
 
DS/3 Service hydraulique 
 
D3S/3 – D4S/3 Rivière Bièvre, 1756-1952.  
D3S/3 2 Tonneaux de lavage. Bièvre. 
D4S/3 1 Antony. Lavoir communal et tonneaux de lavage. 
D4S/3 2 Arcuiel. 
D4S/3 3 Bourg. 
D4S/3 4 Cachou. 
D4S/3 5 Chatenay. 
D4S/3 6 Fontenay Roses. 
D4S/3 7 Fresnes. 
D4S/3 8 Gentilly. 
D4S/3 9 L’Hay-les-Roses. 
D4S/3 10 Massy. 
D4S/3 11 Rungis. 
D4S/3 11-1 règlements de lavoirs.  
D7S/3-5 établissements flottants – bateaux lavoirs. 
D7S/4 Rivière Seine.  
D7S/4 8-10 lavoirs, Bercy.  
D7S/14-40 établissements flottants – bateaux lavoirs. 
D8S/4 11-22 bateaux lavoirs. 
 
VD4 2/3471 Etablissements insalubres. 
VD4 2/3472 Commission de Salubrité. 
VD4 11/3124 Rapport général du Conseil de Salubrité, 1840-1845. 
VD4 11/3131 Instructions aux membres des commissions d’hygiène publique. 
VD4 19 Bureau de bienfaisance. Distribution de bons de blanchissage, 4 avril 
1848. 
VD6 3/9 Compte-rendu des travaux du Conseil d’Hygiène et de Salubrité, 1851. 
VD6 4/14 Rapports du Conseil d’Hygiène, Rapports salubrité de la Seine, 
Commission d’Hygiène et de Salubrité,1861-1893.  
VD6/7-8 Allocation par le Préfet d’un crédit pour les travaux de la Commission 
 d’Hygiène, 7 juin 1853- 31 août 1863. Conseil de Salubrité. 
VD6 80 Procès verbaux de la Commission d’Hygiène. Eaux. 
VD6 171 Fonctionnement de la Commission d’Hygiène, 1834-1861. 
VD6 194/2 Procès verbaux de la Commission d’Hygiène, 1852-1859. Lavoirs.  
VD6 274/2 Rapports de la Commission d’Hygiène, 1852-1858. 
VD6 330 Procès verbal de la Commission d’Hygiène, 1852-1856. 
  300 
VD6 331 Procès verbal de la Commission d’Hygiène, 1858-1865. 
VD6 354/12 Police de l’Hygiène, 1832-1853. 
VD6 370/2-3 Procès verbaux et rapport de la Commission d’Hygiène, 1852-1876. 
Bateau à lessive. 
VD6 486/6 Statistiques générales de l’industrie dans les arrondissements. 
VD6 524/6 Célébrations des fêtes et bals de la ville.  
VD6 536 Procès verbaux de la Commission d’Hygiène, 1852-1859. 
VD6 627/6 Création et fonctionnement de la Commission d’Hygiène, 1851-1873. 
VD6 670/1 Procès verbaux et correspondance de la Commission d’Hygiène, 
1852-1853. 
VD6 670/2 Formation de la Commission Centrale de Salubrité, 1831. 
 
 
NEWSPAPERS AND JOURNALS 
Actualités 
Annales d’Hygiène Publique et de Médecine Légale 





Le Moniteur Universel 






Bezonçon, Maurice. « Rapport : Les causes d’insalubrité dans les lavoirs de 
 Paris. » Compte rendu des séances 1909, Rapport général sur les travaux 
 du conseil d’hygiène publique et de salubrité. Paris : Imprimerie Chaix, 
 1910.  
 
Bonaparte, Louis-Napoléon. L'extinction du paupérisme, quatrième ed. Paris : 
 Imprimerie Lacrampe et Fertiaux, 1848. 
 
« Décret sur la manipulation du linge sale dans lavoirs et blanchisseries. » 
 Annales d’Hygiène Publique et de Médecine Légale, Quatrième Série, 
 Tome 40 (Juillet 1905) : 369-370. 
 
Delarue, Jacques-Antoine. Histoire physique, civile et morale de Paris depuis les 
 premiers temps. Paris: D-H Krabbe, 1854.  
 
  301 
Deschamps, Eugène. « La désinfection du linge à Paris. » Annales d’Hygiène 
 Publique et de Médecine Légale, Troisième Série Tome XXXIX. Paris : 
 Librairie J.-B. Ballière et fils, 1898. 
 
Dordor, Gertrude. Je me souviens du 16e arrondissement. Paris : Parigramme, 
 1997.  
 
Drujon, Ferdinand ed. Rapport général sur les travaux du conseil d’hygiène 
 publique et de salubrité 1887. Paris : Imprimerie Chaix, 1889. 
 
__________ Rapport général sur les travaux du conseil d’hygiène publique et de  
 salubrité 1898. Paris : Imprimerie Chaix, 1900. 
 
Enquête sur le travail à domicile dans l’industrie de la lingerie. Paris : 
 Imprimerie Nationale, 1908.  
 
Frois, Marcel. « L’hygiène et le lessivage du linge dans les lavoirs et 
 blanchisseries. » Annales d’Hygiène Publique et de Médecine Légale, 
 1905 Quatrième Série Tome XXXX. Paris : Librairie J.-B. Ballière et fils, 
 1907. 
 
__________ . « Triage du linge sale. »  Annales d’Hygiène Publique et de 
 Médecine Légale, quatrième série, tome treizième (Janvier 1910) : 217-
 229. 
 
Gautier, Armand. « Rapport : Hygiène dans les lavoirs après le décret du 1905. » 
 Compte rendu des séances 1908, Rapport général sur les travaux du 
 conseil d’hygiène publique et de salubrité. Paris : Imprimerie Chaix, 1908. 
 
Hugo, Victor. Les Chansons des rues. 1865. Reprint. Paris : Ollendorf, 1933. 
 
Jungfleisch, Emile. « Rapport sur l’intérêt que présentent pour la santé publique le 
 maintien ou la  suppression des bateaux-lavoirs. » Rapport général sur les 
 travaux du conseil d’hygiène publique et de salubrité. Paris : Imprimerie 
 Chaix, 1886. 
 
__________  « Au sujet de la désinfection, préalablement à tout lavage, des linges 
 contaminés. » Annales d’Hygiène Publique et de Médecine Légale, 
 Troisième Série Tome XXXIX. Paris : Librairie J.-B. Ballière et fils, 1898. 
 
La Reine des blanchisseuses : La mi-carême. Le Petit Journal, supplément 
 illustré, No 118 (25 février, 1893).  
 
Lasnier, M. ed. Rapport général sur les travaux du Conseil de Salubrité de Paris 
 1843- 1846. Paris : Boucquin Imprimeur de la Préfecture de Police, 1850. 
  302 
 
Lefort, L.M. Buanderies publiques pour remplacer tous les bateaux à lessives. 
 Paris: chez l’auteur, 1823. 
 
__________. « Remplacer les bateaux à blanchisseuses. » Journal de Paris, 5 
 septembre 1826.  
 
__________. « Remplacer les bateaux à blanchisseuses. » Le Moniteur Universel, 5 
 septembre 1826. 
 
Mény, George. Pour nos blanchisseries! Paris : Victor Lecoffre, 1909. 
 
Moisy, J. Les Lavoirs de Paris. Paris : Imprimerie de E. Watelet, 1884.   
 
Rapport général sur les travaux du conseil d’hygiène publique et de salubrité du 
 département de la seine pour les années 1862-1866. Bouquin, Imprimeur 
 de la Préfecture de Police, Paris : 1870. 
 
Rapport général sur les travaux du conseil d’hygiène publique et de salubrité. 
 Paris : Imprimerie Chaix, 1903. 
 
Rapport général sur les travaux du conseil d’hygiène publique et de salubrité. 
 Paris : Imprimerie Chaix, 1904. 
 
Rapport général sur les travaux du conseil d’hygiène publique et de salubrité. 
 Paris :  Imprimerie Chaix, 1908. 
 
Statistique de l’industrie à Paris résultant de l’enquête faite par la chambre de 
 commerce pour l’année 1860. Paris :Guillaumin, 1864.  
 
Troisième Congrès de l'hygiène et de la sécurité des travailleurs et des ateliers. 
 Paris : L’Emancipatrice, 1907.  
 
Zola, Émile. L’Assommoir. Trans. Margaret Mauldon.1877, reprint. Oxford: 





Accampo, Ellinor, A., Rachel, G. Fuchs, and Mary Lynn Stewart. Gender and the 
 Politics of Social Reform in France, 1870-1914. Baltimore: The Johns 
 Hopkins University Press, 1995.  
 
  303 
Aisenberg, Andrew. Contagion: Disease, Government, and the “Social 
 Questions” in Nineteenth Century France. Stanford: Stanford University 
 Press, 1999.  
 
Barnes, David. The Making of a Social Disease: Tuberculosis in Nineteenth-
 Century France. Berkley: University of California Press, 1995.  
 
__________ The Great Stink of Paris and the Nineteenth Century Struggle 
 against Filth and Germs. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
 2006.   
 
Bourdelais, Patrice. Epidemics laid low: a history of what happened in rich 
 countries. trans. Bart K. Holland. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 
 2006. 
 
Bowie, Karen, ed. La modernité avant Haussmann : Formes de l’espace urbain à 
 Paris 1801-1853. Paris : Editions Recherches, 2001. 
 
Carmona, Michel. Haussmann. Paris : Fayard, 2000. 
 
Chevalier, Louis. Classes laborieuses et Classes dangereuses à Paris, pendant la  
 première moitié du XIXe siècle. Paris : Librairie Générale Française, 
 1958,1978.  
 
__________. La Formation de la population parisienne au XIXe siècle. Paris : 
 P.U.F., 1950.  
 
Coffin, Judith. The Politics of Women's Work : The Paris Garment Trades, 1750-
 1915. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996. 
 
Coleman, William. Death Is a Social Disease: Public Health and Political 
 Economy in Early Industrial France. Madison: University of Wisconsin 
 Press, 1982. 
 
Corbin, Alain. The Foul and the Fragrant: Odor and the French Social 
 Imagination. trans. Miriam Kochan. Leamington Spa, NY: Berg, 1986.  
 
___________ Time, Desire and Horror: Towards a History of the Senses. trans. 
 Jean Birrell. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995.  
 
De Certeau, Michel. “Spatial Practices”: The Practice of Everyday Life. 
 Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984. 
 
De Cointet, Nicolas, ed. L’eau et Paris : Extraits des « Mémoires » du baron  
 Haussmann ; Extraits du « Mémoire sur les eaux de Paris » d’Eugène 
 Belgrand. Paris : Albin Michel, 2009.  
  304 
 
Delaporte, François. Disease and Civilization: The Cholera in Paris, 1832. trans. 
 Arthur Goldhammer. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986. 
 
Delaunay, Quynh. Histoire de la machine à laver: Un objet technique dans la 
 société française. Rennes : Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 1994.  
 
_________. La machine à laver en France: Un objet technique qui parle des 
femmes. Paris : L’Harmattan, 2003.  
 
Douglas, Mary. Purity and Danger:  An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and 
Taboo. London: Routledge, 1966, 2001.  
 
Elias, Norbert. The Civilizing Process: The History of Manners. New York: 
 Urizen Books, 1978.  
 
Ellis, Jack D. The physician-legislators of France : Medicine and politics in the 
 Early Third Republic, 1870-1914. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
 Press, 1990.  
 
Elwit, Sanford. The Making of the Third Republic: Class and Politics in France, 
 1868-1884. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.  
 
Faure, Alain. Paris carême-prenant: Du Carnival à Paris au XIX siècle 1800-1914 
 Paris : Hachette, 1978. 
 
Ferry, Claude. La Blanchisserie et Teinturerie de Thaon (1872 - 1914). Presses  
 Universitaires de Nancy, 1992.  
 
Fuchs, Rachel. Poor and Pregnant in Paris: Strategies for Survival in the 
 Nineteenth Century. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 
 1992.  
 
__________. Gender and Poverty in Nineteenth-Century Europe. New York: 
 Cambridge University Press, 2005.  
 
Gueslin, André. Gens pauvres, Pauvres gens dans la France du XIXe siècle. 
 Paris : Aubier, 1998.  
 
Godineau, Dominique. The Women of Paris and Their French Revolution trans. 
 Katherine Streip. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. 
 
Goudsblom, Johan. “Public Health and the Civilizing Process.” The Milbank 
 Quarterly, Vol. 64, No. 2 (1986), pp. 160-188. 
 
  305 
Grüring, Jaimee. 2003. Dirty and Dangerous : French Laundresses in the 
 Discourse of Order and Disorder, 1850-1910. Arizona State University. 
 MA Thesis. 
 
Hanna, Judith. Dance, Sex and Gender: Signs of Identity, Dominance, Defiance 
 and Desire. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988.  
 
Hélias, Pierre-Jakez. The Horse of Pride: Life in a Breton Village, trans. June 
 Guicharnaud. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980.   
 
Hills, Richard. Power from Steam: A History of the Stationary Steam Engine. 
 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. 
 
Jordan, David. Transforming Paris: The Life and Labors of Baron Haussmann. 
 Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995. 
 
Kudlick, Catherine. Cholera in Post-Revolutionary Paris: A Cultural History. 
 Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996.   
 
La Berge, Anne. Mission and Method: The Early Nineteenth-Century Public 
 Health  Movement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
 




Le Yaouanq, Jean. Les structures sociales en France de 1815 à 1945. Paris: 
 Ellipses, 1998. 
 
Locke, Robert, R. French Legitimists and the Politics of Moral Order in the Early 
 Third Republic. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974.  
 
Malcolmson, Patricia. English Laundresses: A Social History, 1850-1930. 
 Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1986.  
 
Miller, Michael. The Bon Marché: Bourgeois culture and the Department Store 
 1869-1920. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981. 
 
Mort, Frank. Dangerous Sexualities: Medico-Moral Politics in England since 
 1830. NY: Routledge, 1997. 
 
Nord, Philip. The Politics of Resentment: Shopkeeper Protest in Nineteenth-
 Century Paris. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. 
 
Nye, Robert. Crime, Madness, and Politics in Modern France: The Medical 
 Concept of National Decline. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.  
  306 
 
Olsen, Donald J. The city as a work of art. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
 1986. 
 
Perrot, Michelle. “Femmes au lavoir,” Sorcières, no.19 (1980) : 128-133. 
 
Perrot, Philippe. Fashioning the Bourgeoisie: A History of Clothing in the 
 Nineteenth Century. trans. Richard Bienvenu. Princeton: Princeton 
 University Press, 1994.   
 
Pinkney, David, H. Napoleon III and the Rebuilding of Paris. Princeton, N.J.: 
 Princeton University Press, 1958.  
 
Pinon, Pierre. Atlas du Paris haussmannien: La ville en héritage du Second 
 Empire à nos jours. Paris : Editions Parigramme, 2002.  
 
Reid, Donald. Paris Sewers and Sewermen: Realities and Representations. 
 Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991. 
 
Ripa, Yannick. Les femmes, actrices de l’Histoire: France, 1789-1945. Paris : 
 Armand Colin, 2002, 2004.  
 
Rose, Sonia. Limited Livelihoods: Gender and Class in Nineteenth-Century 
 England. Berkley: University of California Press, 1991.  
 
Ross, Ellen. Love and Toil: Motherhood in Outcast London, 1870-1918. Oxford: 
 Oxford University Press, 1993.  
 
Schweitzer, Sylvie. Les femmes ont toujours travaillé: Une histoire du travail des 
 femmes aux XIXe et XXe siècles. Paris : Odile Jacob, 2002.  
 
Scott, Joan Wallach. Gender and the Politics of History. New York: Columbia 
 University Press, 1988, 1999. 
 
Shapiro, Ann-Louise. Housing the Poor of Paris: 1850-1902. Madison:  
University of  Wisconsin Press, 1985. 
 
Sharpe, William and Leonard Wallock, eds. Visions of the Modern City: Essays in  
 History, Art, and Literature. Balitmore: The Johns Hopkins University 
 Press,  1987. 
 
Stewart, Mary Lynn. Women, Work and the French State: Labor Protection and 
 Social  Patriarchy, 1879-1919. Kingston: McGill-Queen's University 
 Press, 1989.  
 
  307 
Thompson, Victoria. The Virtuous Marketplace: Women and Men, Money and 
 Politics in Paris, 1830—1870. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
 2000.  
 
_________“Telling "Spatial Stories": Urban Space and Bourgeois Identity in 
 Early  Nineteenth-Century Paris”, The Journal of Modern History Vol. 
 75, No. 3 (Sep.,  2003), pp. 523-556.  
 
__________“Urban Renovation, Moral Regeneration: Domesticating the Halles in 
 Second-Empire Paris”, French Historical Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Winter, 
 1997),  pp. 87-109.  
 
Tóth, Istavan. Literacy and Written Culture in early-modern Central Europe, 
 trans.  Tünde Vadja and Miklós Bodóczky. New York: Central European 
 University Press, 2000. 
 
Walkowitz, Judith. City of Dreadful Delight: Narratives of Sexual Danger in 
 Late-Victorian London. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992. 
 
Wasserman, Francoise. Blanchisseuse, laveuse, repasseuse: La Femme, le linge et 
 l’eau. Fresnes: Écomusée de Fresnes, 1986. 
   
 
   
 
